



The CANDID

Quarterly Review
of Public Affairs: Political, Scientific,
Social and Literary.

Conducted by Thomas Gibson Bowles.

CONTENTS.

Indecision
Gentlemen
The Vulgar and the Few
The War—So Far
Diplomacy
The Fleet Freed
British Liberty
The Law of Nations
Right Reason
More Martial Law
The Censoriad
The Chemist
War Documents. *From the Fighting Line*
Solomon on Drink
Finance and the War
Fiscality
After the War
War for a Window
The Conduct of the War at Sea
Walcheren and Wellington
The War by Land



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No. 6. May, 1915

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ERRATUM

CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW, No. 5 (February 1915). Line 11 on page 93 should read "an increase of *threepence* a pound . . ." instead of "an increase of *fivepence* a pound is "added to the Tea Duty."

INDECISION

“ Now, whether it be
“ Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple
“ Of thinking too precisely on the event,
“ A thought which, quartered, hath but
“ one part wisdom,
“ And ever three parts coward,—I do not
“ know. . . .”
“ Hamlet,” Act IV, Sc. iv.

IN great affairs and above all in the great affairs of nations when the welfare of millions and the issues of peace or war may be at stake, one quality is of supreme importance, and that quality is decision. You may take the right course or the wrong course. That will depend upon knowledge and judgment. But destiny is merciful. Often, very often, a blunderer will be able to retrieve his error or at least his victims may be saved from its consequences if he knows the necessity of decision, of saying yea or nay, of making his path plain to friend or foe. It is a question of character. When the Duke of Cumberland was asked his opinion of Lord Chatham, then Mr Pitt, with whom he was at the time engaged in bitter quarrel, he was fair-minded enough to answer, “ From what I can learn Mr “ Pitt is a Man—which is rare.” And so it was and so it is, and so it will be—rare, until this country insists upon putting an end to the subterranean system which saps the moral courage of members of Parliament and of the Ministers who in succession contrive to float upon the Parliamentary surface as bladders float upon the water or gas balloons in the upper air. Cæsar shaped the future of the world at the Rubicon, Wellington saved Europe at the

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lines of Torres Vedras by this very quality of decision; knowing beforehand what they meant after deep reflection, mastering beforehand all the facts, leaving little or nothing to chance, and, once the resolution taken, inflexibly adhering to it till their work was done. These were among the great men of the world; but the smaller the men the greater is the need that they should anchor themselves to some fixed resolve when the signs of a coming storm give the warning; or they and those whose fate is linked to theirs will drift through shoals and misery to an unforeseen end. Small men may do a great deal by knowing their own minds and even great men may mar a great deal by watching how the cat jumps and then trying to follow the animal—if, indeed, it be not profanity to imagine that those who do so can in any sense be called great.

We are approaching the time, though no one can say how far it is yet distant, when the belligerent nations of Europe will have to deal with one another in regard to the terms of peace; for flesh and blood will not endure that this war shall continue indefinitely. Whether it comes to an end by some great military success or by famine and pestilence among the millions without number who are not responsible for its commencement; or by Revolution in countries driven mad by suffering; or—may it be so—by the will of pitying Heaven, the day will come when this horror will end. Are our Ministers, including therein our leaders of the nominal Opposition—who ought rather to be called our Ministers' Ministers—prepared by full information, by close study and reflection, to make up their minds when that time comes? Or are they intending to do as Sir Edward Grey did on 3rd August, 1914—to throw the burden at two or three hours' notice on the House of Commons, at the same time announcing that he had on 2nd August given a promise of armed support to France subject to the consent of Parliament? How could Parliament refuse him then—even if the

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House of Commons were of the stuff that makes martyrs? It is this that we dread, when the time comes for considering an end to the war; that we shall have the same thing that happened upon our entrance—secrecy as to what are the real facts of the situation, vacillation as to what ought to be done, an absence of any firm policy either one way or the other, and a final shouldering off on to a House of Commons which has been kept in the dark, of the fearful responsibility to be assumed and discharged at a few hours' notice.

This is what we fear: that, as the Government were unprepared for war, so they will be unprepared for Peace. And though, while our energies are bent upon saving our country, all inquiry into the past is to be deprecated, unless it becomes necessary with a view to the future; yet it is necessary to show how indecision, coupled with concealment, have brought upon us this great calamity, in order that public opinion may be rallied to prevent like causes from producing like effects. Nothing can be done without public opinion, and that is now smothered by Censorships and suppression of news, while people are inflamed to most legitimate indignation at the conduct of our enemies. They do well to be indignant, but they ought also to be vigilant lest they be deceived again from sources nearer home.

No one who reads either our own White Book or the publications of other Governments can doubt that when the hour of danger came, when the abyss yawned before their eyes, Ministers made every effort that men could make to save Europe from war and to save this country from sharing in it. This last object was very difficult to attain because we were already tied to France inextricably, tied by countless invisible threads such as fastened down Gulliver while he slumbered in the Land of Little Men. The assurances of Mr Asquith in 1913 and 1914 were of the same kind as certain statements made by his colleagues in the Marconi

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affair. They were true by the card. No one could have been indicted for perjury on them. In no other sense were they true. It would have been very difficult to refrain from joining France in the war; it was impossible to join Germany. What Sir Edward Grey really thought came to be expressed without reservation in his speech on 3rd August. He said little about Belgium. He dwelt passionately on the motives that bound us to defend France, our interest, our friendship, our acceptance of their naval support in the Mediterranean, our honour. That was his view throughout. Mr Asquith and Mr Lloyd George perceived later the controversial value of the Belgian episode. To do him justice, Sir Edward has always taken his stand upon the real issue. He strove to avert the European war when he saw that the Continent was on the brink of it. It was very late in the day, the fifty-ninth minute of the hour. But it was not too late even then if only the Government had stated explicitly its intention to do what it did in the end. If only there had been decision, we should have averted the European war altogether.

Proofs of this statement, authentic, abundant and conclusive, are to be found in the White Book itself, during the few days which elapsed from between the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum on 23rd July and our declaration of war on 4th August. On 24th July the Russian Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador at St Petersburg implored the British Ambassador to get from his Majesty's Government a declaration of complete solidarity with the French and Russian Governments. Our only chance of averting war, they said, was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. The British Ambassador, whose answer was at once approved by Sir Edward Grey, replied that perhaps his Government might see its way to saying that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. The Russian Minister answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did

Indecision

not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France. On 25th July the Russian Foreign Minister again pressed our Ambassador at St Petersburg. He said that he did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. Our Ambassador observed that England could play the *rôle* of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. The Russian Minister said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. On 27th July Sir Edward Grey was told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles the impression prevailed that in any event we would stand aside, and he deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

“This impression,” [writes Sir Edward], “ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic support was promised.”

On the same day, 27th July, Sir Edward saw the Austrian Ambassador and

“pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up our reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet, but owing to the possibility of a European conflagration it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt.”

Merely an illustration of anxiety, nothing more. Our

Indecision

Foreign Minister took occasion on 29th July to discuss our policy with the French Ambassador. He was about to tell the German Ambassador that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed.

“But I went on to say to the French Ambassador
“that I thought it necessary to tell him also that
“public opinion here approached its present difficulty
“from quite a different point of view from that taken during
“the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago.”

Sir Edward explained the difference, as he thought, and proceeded:—

“In the present case the dispute between Austria and
“Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.
“Even if the question became one between Austria and
“Russia we should not feel called to take a hand in it. . . .
“*If Germany became involved and France became involved we*
“*had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case*
“*that we should have to consider.* France would then have
“been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in
“which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest
“obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements
“and we should have to decide what British interests
“required us to do.”

And he went on to say that it would not be fair that he should let the French Ambassador be misled into supposing that what he was about to say to the German Ambassador “meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency “that I still hoped might not arise.” This was on 29th July, two days before the German ultimatum to France and Russia, and our Government was anxious that neither Germany nor France should be misled into supposing that it had decided what to do. On the same day Sir Edward Grey gave to the German Ambassador the same warning,

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that he must not be misled into supposing that if Germany became involved, and then France, we should stand aside.

“ If the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.”

While this was being said in London on 29th July the German Chancellor, on the same evening, made to our Ambassador at Berlin his well-known proposal, his “ infamous proposal ” as Mr Asquith described it, that we should bind ourselves to be neutral if the neutrality and integrity of Holland and the integrity of Belgium were respected and no territorial acquisition were made at the expense of France apart from French colonies. This proposal was repelled, as one disgraceful to England, on 30th July. On the same day the President of the French Republic told our Ambassador in Paris that

“ he is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty’s Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present difference between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.”

In answer to this appeal, Sir Edward Grey wired on 31st July (the day on which Germany sent her ultimatum) that

“ nobody here feels that in this dispute so far as it has yet gone British treaties or obligations are involved. . . . I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in the situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.”

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At this point French and German alike commenced to press his Majesty's Government very strongly to declare their intentions. On 31st July the French Foreign Minister notified us that Germany had sent an ultimatum to Russia and if it were not acceded to would mobilise against France also. In these circumstances what, they asked, will be the attitude of England? M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, told Sir Edward Grey that, according to their Berlin Ambassador's view, if England would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France there would be peace. He repeated a question he had asked the day before what would England do? The answer of Sir Edward Grey is not very pleasant reading.

“ I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet
“ to-day that we could not give any pledge at the present
“ time. Though we should have to put our policy before
“ Parliament we could not pledge Parliament in advance.
“ Up to the present moment (31st July) we did not feel and
“ public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations
“ of this country were involved. Further developments
“ might alter this situation and cause the Government and
“ Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified.
“ The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be—
“ I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in
“ determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to
“ Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war,
“ Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard
“ to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should
“ ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared
“ to undertake an engagement that she would not be the
“ first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. M. Cambon
“ repeated his question whether we would help France, if
“ Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only
“ adhere to the answer that as far as things had gone at
“ present, we could not take any engagement.”

That same day we asked both France and Germany if they would undertake to respect the neutrality of Belgium. France said yes. Germany gave no answer.

Germany was not able to get any more information than

Indecision

France. On 1st August the German Government asked us, through their Ambassador,

“whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied, [said Sir Edward Grey], that I could not say that; our hands were still free and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here and the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. *He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.* I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.”

How Mr Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne interfered the next day to demand support for France and Russia, how the Government gave on the spot an undertaking of naval support to France, and two days later declared war on Germany upon the ground that she would not undertake to respect the neutrality of Belgium, is well known.

We have told this story because of the lesson it teaches. If, instead of hovering as they did between one opinion and another, our Government had said either one thing or the other, it is more than probable that there would have been no war at all. Herr Ballin is not a very admirable person perhaps; but the statement he made to a representative of the *New York World* was said to be made after an interview with the Kaiser. This is what he said: “We all feel that this war has been brought about by England. We honestly believe that Sir Edward Grey could have stopped it. If on the first day he had declared England refused to go to war

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“because of the internal questions between Serbia
“and Austria, then Russia and France would have found
“a way to compromise with Austria. If on the other
“hand Sir Edward Grey had said England was ready to go
“to war, then, for the sake of Germany, probably Austria
“might have been more ready to compromise. But by
“leaving his attitude uncertain and letting us understand
“he was not bound to go to war, Sir Edward Grey certainly
“brought about the war. If he had decided at once, one
“way or the other, Sir Edward Grey could have avoided
“this terrible thing.”

It is a curious turn to throw blame on England for a war which was commenced by Germany—by saying that Germany would not have begun if she had only known that England would resist her. It is not for a German to complain. None the less tragic is it to hear from such an authority that what France and what Russia so vehemently urged upon our Government from beginning to end was indeed true. If only his Majesty's Government had made a decision; if they had said to Germany in perfectly courteous language, before things had gone too far, what Sir Edward Grey said to the House of Commons when it was too late, there would in all probability have been no war at all. It is a most lamentable reflection. Who will give us the comforting assurance that the same want of definite resolve which brought us into war will not hinder the coming of peace or spoil it when it comes?

GENTLEMEN

“ The best of men
“ That e’er wore earth about him was a sufferer,
“ A soft, meek, patient, humble, tranquil spirit,
“
“ The first true Gentleman that ever breathed.”
(Decker, *Our Saviour*.)

NONE of us—God forgive us—are Christians. Those of us who come nearest to it are Gentlemen; and the rest think they are. For we all have somehow to content ourselves with ourselves, and this is the English way of trying to do it.

We all see that in some sort of proportion to be determined, our dominion over the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, the fishes of the sea and the very Earth itself must be shared with our fellow-man. Somehow we have to content both him and ourselves—if that be possible; if not, then either he must impose his will upon us or we ours upon him. In either case we must try to understand him. Without at least some knowledge of his character, we can neither live with him in peace nor kill him in war. And no sooner do we begin to try to understand him than we become aware that—even though a strange, uncouth, unchartered foreigner—he is a creature of like desires, similar passions, identical social interests and affections with ourselves. Wherefore, feeling the force of these qualities in ourselves and the part they play in our actions, and justifying those actions because of them, we cannot but admit a similar possible justification for the similar actions of our fellow-man. We see that he is a human being like unto ourselves, full of our own admirable, or at least

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excusable, human nature; and therefore, like ourselves, entitled to admiration, or at least to excuse, for the things he does. Here begins Sympathy. We feel ourselves to be much the same as he. Of the good things he does we too feel ourselves capable; of the evil things also nearly as capable. Fortune, chance—that unaccountable name of nothing—or maybe the direct interposition of something higher, has alone deprived us of his glory or saved us from his shame. We cannot but make allowances for him. In his case we might have done the same; probably a little better, conceivably a little worse; but in the same circumstances something not essentially different. We have a fellow-feeling for him; we hold ourselves entitled to expect a fellow-feeling from him. We recognize that it is a duty to do unto others as we would they should do unto us. This is the Way of Knowledge. This even the great godless Chinese wise men taught as the duty of man nigh on three thousand years ago—to do one's duty to one's neighbour, and to return good for evil. Then came the new Light of the World in the great inspired final Word—Love one another. It illumined all, satisfied all desire for a plain rule of life, simplified all, explained all. It showed us that not merely by sympathizing with our neighbour, but only by loving him, could we arrive at a full understanding of him or of our duty towards him. That Word is still with us, overlaid much and much forgotten, yet always there, and with it the whole duty of man to man. The great Riddle was solved. And we English, despite our defects, have in our imperfect, halting, hesitating stupid way tried to do the duty of man. We have honestly sought to love our neighbour, not alone our foreign neighbour of strange tongues and nations in the little frontier-scored chess-board of Europe but our neighbours throughout the great Earth, and to do good to others in our day. We have failed here and there; but here and there we have succeeded. And, so far as we have succeeded, it has been because we have tried to be Gentlemen.

Gentlemen

Hear now what St Paul—himself a gentleman—says:

“Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, does not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Charity never faileth: but whether there be prophecies they shall fail; whether there be tongues they shall cease; whether there be knowledge it shall vanish away. . . . Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.”

That is the perfect gentleman. The gentleman as we English understand him is somewhat less perfect and more human. For we expect him to be something of what we call a sportsman, and to have dignity and courage as well as charity. But certainly he must never sound like brass or tinkle like a cymbal. He must ever sound true gold.

The gentleman, as we understand him, is simple, frank, and unaffected in his manners, truthful, considerate and upright in his dealings, modest, merciful and compassionate to all—especially to the weak or the inferior—sure of himself, high-minded yet no boaster or swaggerer, not given to vaunting display but ever modest in demeanour. Also he must have a certain generosity of character, such as rejoices to sport with danger; and, if need be, for his friend or his regiment or what he thinks a good cause, he will go to death with a good heart. And he must have that merciful tenderness which can hardly resist the tears of woman, and never the cry for quarter of a defenceless enemy. He abhors the taking of any mean advantage, so that he is bad at a bargain; but to have at one's side in peril, he is the best. Other men can sometimes be trusted; he

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always. He is human—superlatively human—and therefore has in himself those weaknesses which he finds it in his heart to excuse in others. But they must be only such as become a gentleman. He may be unable in accounts, incurably ignorant of the value of money, even a spendthrift and yet a gentleman; but he must be altogether incapable of doubtfully honourable money dealings even to save himself from ruin.

He is a man and something more; always something so much greater and nobler than the merely powerful man, wise man or even than the inspired man, that no birth however illustrious, no power however great, no wisdom or inspiration however divine, is to be compared with the human qualities of the Gentleman. For he daily, hourly and always practises towards his fellow-men, as Paul in another place says, that which, of all, his fellows most prize, “Charity out of a pure heart and of a good conscience and of faith unfeigned.”

Here assuredly are the lovable qualities of the perfect Christian. Here is something less, something more possible and more human than the counsels of perfection; something that any simple honest unselfish man may attain to, though with no gift of tongues or of prophecy, and all incomplete in knowledge; a very working model to which one living among his fellows may mould himself. And some echoes of this were assuredly in the minds of our forefathers when, in their own separate insular way, they conceived and elaborated their own island ideal of the Gentleman. It was wholly their own. There was not and is not now any word in any other European tongue than the English that truly expresses the English notion. The *Gentilhomme* of France, the *Hidalgo* or *Caballero* of Spain, is something very different—though the knightly *Caballero* comes nearest to it. Still more different are the *Ehrenmann*, and *Biedermann* of Germany and Austria, and the *Gospodin* of Russia. These describe men of ancient family, of great possessions, of inherited rank, of official position, or of

Gentlemen

quality fashion or nice manners. They describe the surroundings, the trappings and accidents of the man. No one of them describes the gentleman, which is the man himself expressed in feelings and conduct towards his fellow-men. Each one of these may have in perfection the qualities attributed to him by his name, and yet be no gentleman. Lauzun, the Duc de Richelieu, the Cid, Frederick the Great, were the highest expressions of the highest notions in their languages; but they were none of them gentlemen. The Cid was a *Caballero*, yet no gentleman. The Roman Emperors were called gods but, with the possible exception of Marcus Aurelius, there was not a gentleman among them all. Nor were any of the gods of Olympus gentlemen, certainly not Jove, nor Mars, least of all the rascal Mercury.

Few, if any, of the notable heroes of Romance are gentlemen; which is natural, since they are the creation of writers who neither knew what a gentleman was nor would have been capable of thinking him worthy to be a hero. Ajax, Hector, Ulysses, Agamemnon cannot show a gentleman among them. Mr Pickwick came much nearer to it—Sir Roger de Coverley as near, yet no nearer. Don Quixote, but for his madness, would have been a gentleman. As he was, he was a *Caballero*. The St Francis d'Assisi described by Dante, was a very perfect gentleman; yet neither then nor to this day has the Italian language had a word that conveys the idea, nor could have, for not St Francis but Machiavelli is still the popular Italian ideal.

Monarchs, sad to say, have rarely been gentlemen.

St Louis of France—however saintly—was no gentleman; for in order merely to save his own soul and those of his own ancestors he released his Christian subjects from their debts, not to himself—as a gentleman might have done—but to the Jews, which is what no gentleman would do. Frederick the Great, however great in soldiery and the duels of diplomacy, cheated everybody—even Voltaire—and paid his debts—all, except those to his flute-maker—

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with false money. For which reason, were there not others and better, he was no gentleman. The same is true of Louis XIV and of every French Monarch between him and the last Napoleon. The last German Emperor appears to have been a gentleman. The present one aspires to be a War Lord, which is another thing. Crowns and courts are indeed not favourable to the development of the gentleman. They less often create him than they destroy him; and of more than one modern monarch who has shown himself without due delicacy of feeling, it has had pityingly to be said by those who knew him well enough to judge, that "he was not quite a gentleman."

The Gentleman comes into our nether world like a fresh breath from the empyrean; is known all his days for such to all who come in contact with him, though imperfectly if at all to all others; and, having sweetened the air and brightened and lightened the life of all about him, leaves all other men the better for him—and at last goes from among us, unknown and unrecorded, with no other monument than his own sweet memory among a few. We have complete, and more than complete, memorials of our princes and heroes—none of our gentlemen, nor could have. Only occasionally do we get, as it were, an accidental glance at one of them to show us that here and there he was, and that such he was. The names of gentlemen rescued from oblivion are few. King Alfred, so far as we can judge of him, was a gentleman. So was Sir Philip Sidney. Falkland was a gentleman. John Nicholson was a gentleman. Chinese Gordon was a gentleman. It so happens that of these we know something; but of the many gentlemen now in England or warring abroad no trace will be left—none except the marks of their deeds in the hearts of their fellows, fading away with them. Too many of them will go to their death with a good heart, but with no glory nor even any recognition. Whereof, because they are gentlemen, themselves assuredly would make no complaint.

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The test of the Gentleman is neither lineage, position, rank, possessions, nor intellect. It is Conduct—the hardest test and trial of all. It is in fact—with but a small difference—that same charity of St Paul. Many a man of the people, one of what are called the lower classes only because they are lower in riches, is a true gentleman. Nay, in these classes those who know them find a proportion of gentlemen greater than in any other, probably because their lives are simpler. The Irish peasant, the Scottish ghillie, the English seaman before the mast, the private soldier, are daily shown in moments of trial to be truer gentlemen than are easily to be found in any courts or capitals. The various classes, as they are called, are—except in some rare and remote country places—strangers and foreigners to each other, with different ideals as well as different lives; they speak a different language; they live wholly apart; they scarcely ever in the usual life of usual times so much as come into real contact with each other; each is an unknown mystery to the other; and most of all, as most unfortunately happens, in this England of ours. Yet those many of the upper classes who owe to their own generosity and to the War the privilege of taking into their houses, of themselves nursing and caring for and, for the first time, actually sharing life with the man of the people coming wounded and broken from the fight—these have been amazed and rejoiced to find him, now that for the first time they have made his acquaintance, almost always a true Gentleman, instinct with the delicate feelings that belong to the name; and especially to find those of them the greatest gentlemen whom the world would allocate to the lowest class of all. It is one at least of the blessings of war that here in England it has unexpectedly made many of us acquainted for the first time with our own countrymen whom before we knew not, and aware of the high quality in them which before we neither knew nor suspected. A War that has done this much for us has not been fought in vain.

One thing about our new friends we did already know,

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which might have suggested that now learnt of them. It is that these men of the people expect all their pastors and masters and leaders to be Gentlemen; most especially those who are to lead them through difficulties or dangers. Otherwise they have neither respect for them nor confidence in them. Their sure instinct always tells them truly what sort of man it is that is set over them. They cannot describe him perhaps, for they have no great store of words; but they know him when they see his conduct. He is the one they need, the only one they trust or admire. And the greatest reproach they have in their vocabulary—only to be used on extreme occasions—is the steady and bitter inquiry: “Do you call yourself a gentleman?”

Although the Gentleman hates all that is unfair, mean, shabby, paltry, ungenerous, yet he hardly hates those who practise these vices: rather he regards them with a pitying compassion as men who do not rightly understand the game of life, and who because of that—poor dears!—cannot play it honourably. For the wicked man he feels indignation, and will resist him, defeat him and reprobate him. But even for him he retains feelings of charity and compassion; even the wicked man he will not, if it can anyhow be avoided, utterly destroy as David—who was no gentleman—would do. Once he finds the wicked man beaten down, broken and defenceless, he does but think how to bind up his wounds, to take him to some safe inn, to hand out his two pennies, and to make himself liable to the innkeeper for whatsoever is spent more on the broken man. Of hatred for anybody he is all but incapable. Of hatred for a whole People, he cannot so much as conceive.

When therefore the German “Hymn of Hate” was launched against England, adopted by Court and Kaiser, and taken up by all Prussia and part of Germany, we English, whose ideal is the Gentleman, were much shocked, more scandalized and most of all astonished. It seemed an incredible product of malignity and virulence, the scream of a weak, bad, angry, silly woman. There was

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nothing like it, actual or possible, in England. To us it was wholly incomprehensible; it was also somewhat sad. We wondered; we deplored; at last we laughed; then again we wondered how such a thing could be.

Yet read this from an English naval officer:

“A captured German naval officer (a decent fellow) remarked to one of our people the other day, just before he left for his prison quarters, ‘Well, old man, it will always be the same; *you* will always be fools, and *we* shall never be gentlemen.’ ”

Alas!

THE VULGAR AND THE FEW

“ I HAVE sometimes represented to myself the vulgar, who
“ are accidentally distinguished by the titles of king
“ and subject, of lord and vassal, of nobleman and peasant;
“ and the few, who are distinguished by nature so essentially from the herd of mankind, that, figure apart, they
“ seem to be of another species, in this manner: the former
“ come into the world, and continue in it, like German
“ travellers in a foreign country . . . their presence or
“ their absence would be equally unperceived, if caprice or
“ accident did not raise them often to stations, wherein
“ their stupidity, their vices, or their follies, make them a
“ publick misfortune. The latter come into the world, or
“ at least continue in it after the effects of surprise and
“ inexperience are over, like men who are sent on more
“ important errands.”

Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. IV, pp.
190-1. London, 1809.

THE WAR—SO FAR

THE War continues—and must. And we, putting all else aside, must continue our part in it until such success in it has been attained as will secure an honourable and lasting Peace. Of that there is no question. To that end we have surrendered all our rights and liberties, political, civil, economical and personal, into the doubtful hands of a doubted Government, not exempt from the suspicion that it ought not to be trusted with powers so great and arbitrary as those handed over to it. Besides our rights and liberties we have handed over our money without count or stint; which indeed we do not regard: nobody cares about that, or complains either of loss in income or increase of taxes. Besides that, and infinitely more cruel, is the sacrifice of our best and bravest never to be seen again. Yet all this, and more, we cheerfully accept, because we all feel that, in this crisis of our fate, there is but one thing that matters, but one thing to think about and care for—to win the War; and most especially to win it on the Seas; which for us is alone of consequence.

“Who made the War?” is a question which nobody at first cared to ask. The fact that there it abruptly was and that we had somehow to fight our way through it was so stunning, so overbearing, so complete a thrusting aside of all else, that all else for the moment lost all interest and all importance. Yet as the terrible endurances of fighting and—what is often harder—waiting for the fighting went on for weary days and months, never seeming nearer to their end, even the stout worn fighting men began, in their few quiet intervals, to ask themselves how it was, and why and

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because of whose fault, this terrible thing had happened. They began to ask themselves, each other, their prisoners. Whenever we get any account of a questioning of prisoners it now almost always includes this question—who began the War? Prisoner Fritz replies, as he has been taught, that France, Russia and England, but most especially England, began it by attacking Germany; our own men when captured and questioned doubtless reply, as they have been taught, that Germany began it by invading Belgium and France: wherein are embodied the two contrary replies that will provide historians with the materials for conflict during the next two centuries. Were Fritz and Tommy and the popular historian a little more behind the scenes than any of them is ever allowed to be, they would know that those vast abstractions Germany, France, Russia and England have had no part in all this; that in truth they do not, for this kind of purpose, exist, and never have existed; nay, that even the chosen best and most powerful of them—their monarchs, popular assemblies, senates and people—do not exist either; and that the only effectual persons are in each nation three or four men who, and who alone, have secretly come to the determination and taken the decision that has launched all these poor brave fighting men at each other's throats. None of the rest—neither Monarch, Minister, Senate, Assembly nor People—counts at all. They would count if they knew; for all the forms and in the end all the force are on their side. But they don't know. They are not allowed to know. The elementary doctrine among the Wise Men who rule States is that none of these are to be trusted with things so much too high for them as the issues of Peace and War, or with any of the long-continued conspiracies and policies which finally involve those issues. These are in all countries—excepting only the United States—kept away from all except the chosen three or four. They are mysteries, and nobody can possibly understand them but these few mystery men; still less handle them. They are also so infinitely entangled in and complicated by the competing

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policies and conspiracies of other countries, friendly and unfriendly and all wanting for themselves something they ought not to have, that even the ablest of the mystery men often finds himself at a puzzle what to do, or even—which is much easier—what to say. How then can the vulgar be trusted with any part of that tangle of lies and deception which is called diplomacy, how, above all, with the final instant decision, to be taken perhaps in half an hour, whether they themselves shall pay and sweat and fight for our own particular thread in the tangle? Every mystery man feels and knows that to be impossible. And so the temple of Isis is built up on the old pattern. There is a vast court for the worshippers at large into which all of the true religion may come. Then there is a smaller inner court for the experts, and in that Ministers, Senators, Parliament-men whose privilege it is to be amused with the thaumaturgic wonders denied to the vulgar. Then the still smaller, innermost court reserved for the three or four Priests of Isis themselves. Finally there is the innermost, smallest chamber of all, the very sanctuary of the State whence all the oracles issue; and in that—nothing—not even a Monarch.

To ask who made the War is therefore to ask who are the dozen mystery men of Europe. To ask why they made it would be to follow their respective policies and conspiracies, whether their own or inherited from their predecessors, for many years past; and finally—if that were possible—to ascertain which set of conspirators and policy-contrivers so overawed or overreached the others that these others, despairing of dispatches and protocols, plunged all into War to cut the knots they had failed to unloose. This will never be known of a certainty. It will not be possible even to come nearer to guessing at it until, fifty years or so hence, the revelations begin, either of the mystery men themselves or of the Ministers or Monarchs they have moved about on the board.

What we do know beyond doubt is who made the War or England. It was Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane and

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Mr Asquith. It was they Three alone—they and no others of men now living. We know it from Sir Edward Grey himself through his candid last-moment avowals to Parliament.

The notion of putting the unusually vulgar, arrogant and greedy German mystery man into his proper place in a corner, and of keeping him there with the help of other mystery men—French and Russian and Japanese, and possibly Italians and others as well—this had become a notion—though yet but a vague one—with some whose position, office, diplomatic ambitions or birth encouraged them to conceive notions of the kind. It may very possibly have originated when, on completion of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891 and the consequent Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892, Lord Rosebery began in 1892 his tenure of office as an Imperialist large-minded Secretary for Foreign Affairs, with Sir Edward Grey as his Under-Secretary. It took perhaps a more definite form, during Lord Lansdowne's tenure of the Foreign mysteries, with the accession in 1901 of King Edward VII, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the King's personal European tour—without a Minister—of 1903; it probably assisted the Anglo-French (and therefore Anglo-Russian) Entente and Convention in 1904. Yet when, in December, 1905, Lord Lansdowne left the Foreign Office with the rest of Mr Balfour's Government, he left the notion still no more than a notion and so far only known, even as such, to the few, as an interesting conception not absolutely and altogether incapable, perhaps, of being carried further.

Scarcely, however, had the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry taken the place of Mr Balfour's when the Notion became developed into a Plan. Sir Edward Grey found himself called upon to deal with what he calls

“the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of
“the Algeiras Conference.”*

He was called upon certainly by France, and presumably

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, Monday, 3rd August, 1914, col. 1803.

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by Germany too, to declare what England would do in case that crisis led to war between France and Germany:

“ I was asked the question whether if that crisis developed
“ into war between France and Germany, we would give
“ armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing
“ to any Foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive
“ the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the
“ occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced
“ upon France, then on the question of Morocco—a ques-
“ tion which had just been the subject of agreement
“ between this country and France, an agreement ex-
“ ceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agree-
“ ment war was forced upon France at that time, in my
“ view public opinion in this country would have rallied
“ to the material support of France.”*

When a Foreign Secretary first says that he can promise nothing unless it is subsequently to receive the support of public opinion, and then adds that public opinion would, in case of war, rally to the material support of France, that amounts very nearly to a promise of such support; it holds out at the very least every prospect of the support being forthcoming.

When a Foreign Secretary was prepared to go thus far it was proper that there should be no mistake about it on the side of either of the two possible adversaries. What Sir Edward had told the French Ambassador therefore he also told the German Ambassador.

“ I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during
“ the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words,
“ to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador
“ at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but
“ I expressed that opinion.”

An opinion, however, was not enough for the astute M. Cambon. He wanted something that meant more—something that meant something. And he got it.†

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, Monday, 3rd August, 1914, col. 1803.

† *Ibid.*

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“ That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—and I think very reasonably—‘ If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some “ conversations ” have already taken place between naval and military experts.’ There was force in that. I agreed to it and authorized those conversations to take place.”

Sir Edward Grey had told both the French and German Ambassadors his opinion that England would rally, in the event of a war over Morocco, to the material support of France. He had authorized “ conversations ” between “ English and French naval and military experts.” He had thus suddenly converted a vague notion into a definite and detailed plan of operations when the occasion should arise. The Morocco crisis might disappear, but the conversations and the detailed plan of operations would remain, ready for use in any subsequent and perhaps graver crisis.

And now comes the astounding, incredible, yet avowed fact that none of this was told to the Cabinet either then or till at least five and a half years later.

“ As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

“ The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and

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“throughout that I took precisely the same line that had
“been taken in 1906.”*

From January, 1906, therefore, till the Agadir Crisis in July, 1911, “precisely the same” line was trodden. The military and naval conversations with France were continued, the detailed arrangements for actual operations of warfare were all the time being ripened and completed; and yet, during the whole of those five and a half years, the prospect held out to France of England rallying to her material support, and the continued elaboration of a plan of operations to be pursued in that event, were completely concealed from the Cabinet and from everybody else. All this time the Three mystery men knew. Mr Haldane, Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey knew. But nobody else knew anything: their own colleagues of the Cabinet knew nothing. The first they learned, so far as any outside their secrets can conclude, was what they read in the morning newspapers of 22nd July, 1911, wherein they learnt that on the preceding day Mr Lloyd George, speaking from a type-written paper manifestly supplied to him by the Foreign Office, had said through the City of London bankers to Germany†:—

“If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace
“could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and
“beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism
“and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where
“her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no
“account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically
“that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable
“for a great country like ours to endure.”

What happened at the next meeting of the Cabinet, and whether even then its members became fully aware of the completeness with which during five years of presumed free,

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, Monday, 3rd August, 1914. col. 1804.

† *The Times*, 22nd July, 1911.

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full and confidential intercourse and frank information, they had been hoodwinked by the Three mystery men, we cannot tell. There may then, or may not, have been complaint, protest, explanation, appeal, a smoothing over. There probably was. A change of conduct at all events there apparently was; for when the next great step came to be taken in November, 1912, the Cabinet was informed of it and agreed to it as we are told:—

“But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House.”*

This letter was what has been called the Offensive and Defensive Alliance on half a sheet of notepaper.

Sir Edward ended his statement of these facts by frankly avowing in almost so many words that the course pursued by the Three from 1906 to 1911, and by the Cabinet from 1911 to that day, had made War inevitable.

“There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. *We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that.* We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power.”†

The story in brief is one of action—hidden from all and

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, Monday, 3rd August, 1914, col. 1804.

† *Ibid.*, col. 1817.

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especially from the Cabinet—secretly taken by the Three from 1906 to 1911, and bringing England to unavoidable War in 1914. The Three had all the time been preparing for the War which they believed was so probable that it needed a detailed plan of operations beforehand, yet all the time concealing all from their confidential colleagues in the Cabinet.

Since these revelations Mr Lloyd George has made a statement which appeared in the March issue of *Pearson's Magazine* (page 264). He said—some time in December last—

“ This, I know, is true—after the guarantee given that the
“ German fleet would not attack the coast of France or
“ annex any French territory, I would not have been a party
“ to a declaration of war, had Belgium not been invaded,
“ and I think I can say the same thing for most, if not all,
“ of my colleagues. . . . If Germany had been wise she
“ would not have set foot on Belgian soil. The Liberal
“ Government, then, would not have intervened.”

Now Germany had not invaded Belgium, she had not even threatened to invade it, until seven o'clock in the evening of Sunday, 2nd August,* and the information of this fact, says Sir Edward Grey on the evening of Monday, 3rd August, “ was not in my possession when I made my “ statement this afternoon,” to which he added, “ the “ Government are prepared to take into grave considera- “ tion the information which it has received.” Mr Lloyd George would have us believe that it was upon this consideration and this alone that the “ Liberal Government “ intervened.”

That is not the fact. The Liberal Government had already intervened. It had already, on Sunday, 2nd August, pledged itself to France—to what Sir Edward Grey calls “ aggressive

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, Monday, 3rd August, 1914, cols. 1809, 1810, 1825.

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“action”—in these words: “If the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.” There was nothing about Belgium in that pledge. It was a pledge to France alone. It was given twenty-four hours at least before Sir Edward Grey had received his information that Belgium was threatened. It was given before the Government even came to consider that grave information. The pledge of intervention was given on the Sunday, the threat to Belgium was not known till the evening of Monday, nor even then yet considered. And when, four months later, Mr Lloyd George asks a listening world to believe that but for Belgium he and most of his colleagues would not have been parties to a declaration of war, nor the Liberal Government have intervened—well knowing that Government and colleagues together were already pledged to both intervention and declaration before unhappy Belgium was brought upon the scene—when he asks that, he makes far too great demands upon our capacity for forgetting what really happened. To intervention and war for France not the Three only but the whole Cabinet were irrevocably committed on Sunday, 2nd August. Of this there can be no doubt.

In truth, even before that Sunday the tree had fallen, and where it had fallen had to lie. For on the preceding Thursday, the 30th July, M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, had, as Sir Edward Grey wrote on that day to the British Ambassador at Paris, “reminded me of the letter I had written to him two years ago” [namely, the letter of 22nd November, 1912], and “would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose.” On the next day, Friday, 31st, came the famous letter from M. Poincaré to H.M. the King, appealing to H.M. in the interest of “the preservation of Peace” as well as of “the European balance of power,” for “unity” in the diplomatic action

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of the two countries.* And on that very day, Sir Edward Grey tells us, "I had even gone so far this morning as to "say to the German Ambassador that if France and "Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn "into it." This avowal was as frank as it was practically final, and it came two days earlier than the absolute pledge to France of the succeeding Sunday.

The terrible effect of this secrecy and deception was necessarily to prevent all adequate military preparation for the War thus foreseen and preparing. For no such preparation as the case manifestly demanded could be made without the previous knowledge of the Cabinet. This body, knowing nothing, could not be asked to do anything for the increase of the Army now become so urgently necessary. The secrecy of the Three was therefore the direct cause of the unreadiness of the Army which Lord Kitchener found when the War began.

What seems incredible yet is most true is that, during the whole of the incubation of the War from 1906 to 1914, one of the Three had been engaged in a deliberate plan for the surrender, at The Hague and in London, by Convention and Declaration and Act of Parliament, of some of those essential maritime rights which, if the War thus secretly being prepared for were actually to come, must be of vital importance to our country in the struggle.

* This important letter had been inexplicably excluded from the original publication of documents, but a version of it and of His Majesty's reply was issued in February, 1915. The version of M. Poincaré's letter is, as usual, horribly mangled throughout by the Foreign Office translator. The French President writes, for instance, "*Nous avons nous-mêmes . . . recommandé a "nos alliés*"; which, instead of being translated, "We have ourselves recommended to our allies," is translated "We ourselves have enjoined upon our "ally," a blunder which has not unnaturally caused one writer to insert "Russian" before "ally." And since it is common knowledge that Sir Edward Grey does not possess the French language he is, by this incurable Foreign Office habit of false translation, most unfairly condemned always to work upon a false text.

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Moreover, while one of the Three was trading and trafficking away the powers of the Navy at The Hague, another of the Three—Lord Haldane—was diminishing the Army in England and being highly praised for it. In March, 1906—with the military conversations, for active operations with France in a possible contingency, then actually going on, and well known to be so by Mr Haldane, he told Parliament that*

“There never has been enough careful thinking about
“this problem. . . . We spend a vast deal on the Army,
“and we want to spend less.”

while Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who as we are assured also knew of the French military conversations, said of Mr Haldane and the Army Estimates†:—

“My Right Hon. friend has done well. He has, broadly,
“reduced the Estimates as he found them when he came
“into office by £1,500,000 or £2,000,000. That was not an
“easy task, and it shows that my right hon. friend has an
“earnest anxiety in the direction of economy.”

The Navy indeed was not unready; only because both sides and all men felt that, Peace or War, that must be kept adequate and efficient. Yet even this did not escape peril. For it became in the spring of 1909 the subject of extreme difference between Mr Churchill, then at the Board of Trade, and Mr McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty. Mr McKenna, speaking on his estimates on 16th March, 1909, intimated that the Government had been taken by surprise by an unexpected increase in the German Navy which demanded immediate further efforts on our part in case there might be trouble forthcoming. He said‡:—

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, 8th March, 1906, cols. 674-5.

† *Ibid.*, 15th March, 1906, col. 1518.

‡ *Ibid.*, 16th March, 1909, col. 934.

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“The difficulty in which the Government finds itself placed at this moment is that we do not know, as we thought we did, the rate at which German construction is taking place.”

Mr Churchill thought it necessary, as President of the Board of Trade, to denounce this startling revelation in a way not less forcible because it was indirect. In a letter to Mr Ritchie of Dundee* he denounced the disingenuity of “the Dreadnought fear-all school” in refusing to believe in the value of pre-Dreadnoughts; accused the school—whereof Mr McKenna was a master—of sheer cowardice; and indicated as their last and most monstrous error the notion that there was such an antagonism of interest between the British and German nations as could only be resolved by “a supreme trial of strength towards which the tides of destiny are irresistibly bearing us.” There were no such tides, he held. To hold the contrary was an abject repudiation of Liberalism and civilization together. There was no such antagonism, and if such were ever created it would only be through the vicious activity of a small number of individuals and the culpable credulity of others. As for supposing, as Mr McKenna had done, that modern fleets could be built secretly and as if by enchantment, it was childish. The letter is worth quoting as an instance of a very bold and unusual disclosure of the extent to which colleagues in a Cabinet love and admire and support each other.

“I do not at all seek to disparage the qualities of the latest type of battleship. Every battleship is, or ought to be, an improvement upon its predecessor. But where I quarrel with the Dreadnought fear-all school is in their disingenuous refusal to assign due value amid the chances and hazards of war to every serviceable ship that carries a good gun. . . .

“In view of these tremendous margins of safety, the cries of sheer cowardice with which the air is filled contribute

* *The Times*, 15th April, 1909.

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“a good deal more to the gaiety of other nations than to the dignity of our own.

“The second cardinal error now current on these matters is to suppose that modern fleets can be built without anybody knowing anything about them, and without anybody paying for them, so that, as if by enchantment, without apparent effort or sacrifice of any kind, some huge unexpected squadron might steam suddenly out of secrecy on to the sea. Such ideas are childish.

“I have left the most monstrous error to the last. It is this—that there is a profound antagonism of interests between the British and German nations which can only be resolved by a supreme trial of strength towards which the tides of destiny are irresistibly bearing us. . . . No more abject repudiation, not only of the whole message of Liberalism, but of the very structure of civilization could be demanded of us. It is not true. There is no natural antagonism between the interests of the British and German peoples. . . . If a serious antagonism is gradually created between the two peoples, it will not be because of the workings of any natural or impersonal forces but through the vicious activity of a comparatively small, number of individuals in both countries and the culpable credulity of larger classes.”

Here was what is called “a nasty one” for Mr McKenna. Here too was an accidental, unintentional suggestion that if ever a First Lord of the Admiralty were wanted of adequate courage and capacity to conduct a trial of strength—however unlikely—and to steer the Navy through the tides of destiny, one might be found at the Board of Trade. As found he was two years later, when the tides of destiny had brought us within shorter distance of the supreme trial. We may reasonably suppose that this did not strengthen the ties of affection between Mr McKenna and Mr Churchill; we may even surmise the contrary, and be prepared to believe that Mr McKenna at least has retained some feelings of soreness at his own treatment and ousting. If not he is singular among eminent politicians.

At that time and for long afterwards Mr Winston Churchill and Mr Lloyd George were undoubtedly the two members of the Cabinet who most strongly resisted Mr

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McKenna's demands for greater expenditure on the Navy. Mr Lloyd George, indeed, continued on that line until the very last moment before the War broke out. Having without doubt many times rebuked Mr McKenna in the Cabinet, he rebuked Mr Austin Chamberlain in the House of Commons for so much as contemplating a continuance of expenditure on armaments. This is what he said only twelve days before the war broke out :

“ The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham said, in future what are you going to tax when you will want more money? He also not merely assumed, but stated that you could not depend upon any economy in armaments. I think that is not so. I think he will find that next year there will be substantial economy without interfering in the slightest degree with the efficiency of the Navy. . . . I think it is a very serious thing for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, who is a man of considerable influence in the councils of a great Party which shares the responsibilities for the Government of this Empire, to assume that this expenditure on armaments is going on, and that there is not likely to be a stop to it. . . . ”*

By this time Mr Churchill had probably been admitted, as a fourth, into the secrets of The Three. If so he must have smiled at so belated and untimely a rattling of his own abandoned Peace Thunder.

The great Avowal to the Cabinet of the Dreadful Secret hitherto confined to the Three came, as already said, with Mr Lloyd George's speech of July, 1911. What happened upon that avowal we know not. We can only guess. Something certainly must have happened when the awful disclosure of treachery and falsehood was made. The character, the public declarations and the political record of many of the deceived Cabinet Ministers were such as made it most unlikely that they would tamely submit to such treatment as they had suffered in the past, or fail to take adequate securi-

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, 23rd July, 1914, cols 723, 724.

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ties against its recurrence. Some action must certainly have been taken by such men. What that action was, and what part was taken in it by Mr Vernon Harcourt, Mr Lloyd George, Lord Beauchamp, Mr Runciman and Sir John Simon; how near the Cabinet may have come to breaking up at that moment we do not know. All we do know is that no one of these ministers did in fact resign in 1911 and that they must therefore have been somehow satisfied. Whether, if that be the case, they were right to be thus satisfied; whether they were justified in continuing in office with the Three who had so long deceived them; whether they did not owe it to their own honour and safety then to abandon the Three; and whether by resigning and breaking up the Government they would not have prevented all that subsequent series of events which finally brought about the War, may be a question. Whether they were also right in remaining quiescent, accepting and approving when, long after the disclosure to themselves of the "commitments to France," the Government whereof they were still members assured Parliament and country on 10th March and 24th March, 1913, again on 28th April, 1914, and yet again on 11th June, 1914,* that there were "no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper "the freedom of Government or of Parliament" nor "any "obligation not public and known to Parliament which "compels it to take part in any war"—whether they were right in acquiescing in these replies, certainly is a question and a very serious one. But they did it. They did not resign, the Three were forgiven, their action condoned, and Mr Churchill's tides of destiny carried us into the War. Upon that Lord Morley and Mr Burns left the Ministry; but they two alone left it. Yet even then the Cabinet was still in danger from the remnant of the deceived Ministers who still remained. Nor was it perhaps finally saved from impending

* Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, 10th March, 1913, col. 39; 24th March, 1913, col. 1306; 28th April, 1914, col. 1489; and 11th June, 1914, col. 453.

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disruption till Mr Bonar Law by his letter of Sunday, 2nd August, offering to join in a coalition, enabled Mr Asquith to save the Cabinet by pointing out to his mutineers the danger this involved of a destruction not only of the Government but of themselves and of the Liberal Party for ever. Whether this was so and whether things went thus we do not know; we can only guess and surmise. What we do know is that the Government was again saved and again went on its appointed course.

The Three had prevailed. They had turned all difficulties, disposed of all opposition and carried through their plans. For England at least they had made the War. And they had procured the assent to its making of all that remained of the Cabinet so long deceived.

The point and the appalling significance of the story lie in the proof it affords that we live under a political system which leaves the greatest of all issues in the absolutely uncontrolled hands of one or two or three, acting secretly and without the knowledge of what they are doing being shared by any of those on whom the real burden must fall, or even by their own most confidential and trusting colleagues. For the wisdom of the Many we have substituted the conspiracy of the Few.

Unless our countrymen have wholly changed their character, the day will assuredly come when all the points still remaining doubtful and mysterious will have to be cleared up, a full disclosal of all insisted upon, the responsibilities established, and blame and punishment allotted to those who are shown to deserve them. But that time is not yet. We yet have the War upon our shoulders.

The War itself—now running into its ninth month—cannot honestly be said to look as though it were nearer to its end than it was three months ago. It still remains a deadlock, and as near as may be the same deadlock as it was then. There has been a swaying backwards and forwards in the lines of the struggle; a brilliant but all too bloody

The War—So Far

capture of Neuve Chapelle—or rather its recapture, subsequent to its original loss some time in the winter—with an avowed total loss to ourselves in killed, wounded and missing of nearly 13,000 men—yet without an advance upon Lille following thereupon. There has been the fall of Przemyśl also in March. There have been other successes of which we have heard much, all along each of the two fronts, in Flanders and France and on the German and Austrian frontiers. But there has been no decision. *The Times* military correspondent who, at the outset, confidently predicted that the Russians would be in Breslau by the end of October, is still waiting in April for the fulfilment of his prophecy. The confident Generals who foretold that the War would be over in April have extended their date to July. Generals and correspondents alike now acknowledge that we have to do with a brave, capable, confident enemy who will take much beating where he is, and even more when, if ever, he has to retire towards the Rhine and fall back on his main defensive positions and fortresses. Neither the variations in the position occupied by the warring forces nor anything the world in general can learn or guess of their spirit or their resources encourages the hope of a speedy end to the War; but rather opens up a new prospect of its indefinite prolongation.

Let it be remembered that we are fighting not one war but many, not alone in Belgium and France, but also in Egypt, in Persia, in the Cameroons, in East Africa, in Central Africa (Nyassaland), in South-West Africa, and now in the Dardanelles and the adjoining territories. It is not one war on one front, but eight wars on eight fronts, without counting the little wars of our colonies. Each one of these eight wars needs its army, which we can ill spare; each one a detachment from the Grand Fleet of naval forces which we cannot safely spare at all. What limit is there to all this? Are we to disperse our forces throughout the three quarters of the World?

Suppose

SUPPOSE

THE task before us is one of such difficulty and danger as is even now not fully realized.

We have that in hand which will tax all our resources and all our resolution for long, as well on land as on the Sea, and as things now look, even more by Sea than by Land.

We are all filled with a proud and proper confidence in the final decision. But so, too, by all accounts, are the Germans. What if events or accidents turn out more favourably for them than we expect? We are most especially confident that, at least at Sea, the decisive event will now, as ever, give us the victory. But suppose for a moment that it did not. Suppose the very worst possible.

Suppose that at a given moment the English Fleet had been so reduced in numbers, partly by mines and submarines or Zeppelins, and partly by detachments to distant seas, that the German Fleet should think it possible to come out to battle.

Suppose that, mainly again through the novel uses of mines and submarines, the English Fleet were defeated—defeated despite great losses by the enemy, but yet defeated.

An invasion of England would assuredly follow. In England we should make a desperate resistance to the invader. But with a million or perhaps two million of our best soldiers engaged on the Continent, it would perhaps be ineffectual.

In such an extremity we should certainly recall our troops from the Continent—if we could get them back.

But to get them back when by the defeat of our fleet we had lost command of the sea which they must cross, would be an undertaking as hard as their transport thither—when we still had that command—was easy.

Suppose then that we left them there, deprived of all the equipment and munitions of war that England has hitherto supplied to them, and dependent on such only as they could draw from the Continent.

The War—So Far

Suppose, then, England, after a splendid but hopeless resistance, subjugated and occupied by a German army up to and including London.

It would not then be the end of us. For even then our detached ships might sail for home, come together, and either suffice to keep in awe the much-diminished German fleet, to cut off the German supplies of ammunition by sea, or even, were another naval combat essayed, to defeat the remnant of the German navy. In which case the situation might be fully restored. With all the English Dignitaries and Government prisoners in their hands, the Germans might have extracted from them such conditions of peace as they pleased, even conditions involving permanent vassalage of England to Germany. But were the reassembled overseas detachments from the fleet in the hands of an Admiral who knew his duty to his country, no such engagements would avail with him. He would repudiate them as made under duress, and would either rescue his country from Germans and Government together or would perish in fight.

Suppose that to fail, then indeed the end of us is at hand.

Suppose now that, while we have lost control at sea, our military allies on the Continent have succeeded on land; that Russia has invaded Germany with a serious invasion; has already occupied Breslau and Posen and is preparing to march on Berlin. Suppose France has—with the help of our English troops—driven the Germans back from Belgium and is in occupation of Cologne and Coblenz. In such a state of things negotiations for peace would certainly ensue. Peace itself would probably ensue. Russia and France have, it is true, undertaken to make no separate peace without England. But with England in German occupation, England without a fleet, what could they do? England, in such a case, would have ceased to count. France and Russia must, and would, make their own peace without her—if for no other reason at least for this, that she would then be in no condition to make any peace at all. They could not help

Suppose

themselves. They would no doubt do their best for her. But their best could be but little. It would certainly not include restoring her broken Sea Power.

The settlement of Europe would be a military settlement, mainly dictated by Russia and France; not without compromise and tenderness for their great military neighbour Germany; not without some efforts for ended England; yet with the consciousness that at last this terrible spectre of Sea Power was laid, never again to trouble military nations. Germany would be made to pay a price for Peace—Alsace and Lorraine, Belgium perhaps in return for Holland, with possibly other fragments of European or Colonial territory. England would pay her all; not only her Sea Power but all that belongs to it in European position and dominion beyond the seas.

Not one of these suppositions is at present conceivable.

But unless we are victorious at Sea they are all conceivable.

Our Fleet is our all. That gone nothing is left. That gone, no armies nor land victories will save us. With that maintained, and left to be handled by the Seamen, we need not fear a world in arms.

At all costs we must see that our Fleet is now rescued from Parties, Politicians and Caucus, and committed to the Seamen who alone know how to use it or even to preserve it.

All, all lies there.

London. Wednesday, 21st April, 1915.

DIPLOMACY

“ **F**EINDRE d’ignorer ce qu’on sait, de savoir tout ce
“ qu’on ignore; d’entendre ce qu’on ne comprend pas,
“ de ne point ouïr ce qu’on entend; surtout de pouvoir au delà
“ de ses forces: avoir souvent pour grand secret de cacher
“ qu’il n’y en a point; s’enfermer pour tailler des plumes, et
“ paraître profond, quand on n’est, comme on dit, que vide
“ et creux: jouer bien ou mal un personnage; répandre des
“ espions et pensionner des traîtres; amollir des cachets;
“ intercepter des lettres; et tacher d’ennoblir la pauvreté
“ des moyens par l’importance des objets. Voilà toute la
“ politique, ou je meure! ”

(*Œuvres de Beaumarchais*, Vol. II, p. 104.
Le Mariage de Figaro, Act III, scène ii.)

THE FLEET FREED

CAPTURE AT SEA RESUMED AT LAST

“ Britons, proceed; the subject deep command.
“ Awe with your navies every hostile land.
“ Vain are their threats, their armies all are vain;
“ They rule the balanced world who rule the Main.”

(“ Alfred,” a *masque* by James Thomson and David Malet, at Clifden (August, 1740) for Frederick Prince of Wales, son of George II.)

ENGLAND has resumed her rights of capture at Sea.

The Fleet is set free to make the War effectual.

Nothing so momentous or of such vast consequence has been done since the War began, nothing so well calculated to bring it to a speedy end. Nor could anything give so much satisfaction to those of us who, long ago in Peace, and still more urgently during the War, have urged that this must be done. For only by the resumption of those ancient rights can Sea Power be affirmed, the whole might of our country be brought to bear, and our enemy be so coerced and distressed as to bring the War to an early end and an honourable and lasting Peace.

How, by incredibly short-sighted, rash and unwise proceedings, taken without the authority of the People, the Parliament or the Monarch, and through secret acts never known to any of us till they had been actually done, these rights were pretended and believed to have been for ever

The Fleet Freed

renounced has been recounted in these pages.* The almost forgotten Declaration of Paris, 1856, has been exhumed, its history given, its consequences shown, its invalidity insisted upon. The Hague Conventions, 1907, and the Declaration of London, 1909—all contrived and carried through, like the Declaration of Paris, secretly and without authority—have been treated at length; their hypocrisy, contradictions and invalidity exposed; and their effect demonstrated to be a final surrender of such remains of Sea Power as the Declaration of Paris had left. From the very worst of the mischief—namely, from the submission of every act of our Navy to the decrees of an alien Hague Prize Court set over our own and even over the King in Council—the Navy was indeed rescued through a popular campaign conducted in the press and the country, resulting, in December, 1911, in the rejection of the Naval Prize Bill by the House of Lords, which thus at once declared that it was desirable that the Convention establishing that Court should *not* be ratified and also condemned by direct implication the London Declaration embodying the brand new version of the Law of Nations avowedly invented for the especial guidance of that Court. Nevertheless all the rest of the mischief remained. We entered into the War, therefore, with our Fleet still bound up as well to the remains of the Declaration of London as to the remaining Hague Conventions and the Declaration of Paris. And even when Germany, renouncing all faith and truth, declared her own solemn Treaty engagement of Belgian neutrality to be a contemptible scrap of paper, even then we were told, and the world with us, that the Declaration of Paris, the surviving Hague Conventions and the Declaration of London, though no one of them had ever had any authority or validity, must still be held to be binding upon our Navy and ourselves.

That was over seven months ago. For those seven months and more our Navy has been shackled and all our Naval

* See CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW, No. V, pp. 7 and 35.

The Order in Council of 11th March, 1915

efforts impeded by the conditions thus imposed upon them.

Now at last, and not a moment too soon, but rather many moments too late, every one of these instruments has been suddenly destroyed, scattered and blown to the winds by the breath of an Order in Council, promulgated under the authority of H.M. the King.

THE ORDER IN COUNCIL OF 11TH MARCH, 1915

THE text of this most momentous historic document must be read in full. It is as follows:

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 11th day of *March*, 1915.

PRESENT

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS the German Government has issued certain Orders, which, in violation of the usages of war, purport to declare the waters surrounding the United Kingdom a military area, in which all British and allied merchant vessels will be destroyed irrespective of the safety of the lives of passengers and crew, and in which neutral shipping will be exposed to similar danger in view of the uncertainties of naval warfare;

And whereas in a memorandum accompanying the said Orders neutrals are warned against entrusting crews, passengers, or goods to British or allied ships;

And whereas such attempts on the part of the enemy give to His Majesty an unquestionable right of retaliation;

And whereas His Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, though such measures will be enforced without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant life, and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity;

And whereas the Allies of His Majesty are associated with Him in the steps now to be announced for restricting further the commerce of Germany:

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His Majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order and it is hereby ordered as follows:—

I. No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port.

Unless the vessel receives a pass enabling her to proceed to some neutral or allied port to be named in the pass, goods on board any such vessel must be discharged in a British port and placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court. Goods so discharged, not being contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, be restored by order of the Court, upon such terms as the Court may in the circumstances deem to be just, to the person entitled thereto.

II. No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port.

All goods laden at such port must be discharged in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court, and, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, shall be detained or sold under the direction of the Prize Court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid into Court and dealt with in such manner as the Court may in the circumstances deem to be just.

Provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of Court until the conclusion of peace, except on the application of the proper Officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this Order.

Provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property laden at such enemy port on the application of the proper Officer of the Crown.

III. Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port, carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Any goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court, and, unless they are contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, be restored by order of the Court, upon such

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terms as the Court may in the circumstances deem to be just, to the person entitled thereto.

Provided that this Article shall not apply in any case falling within Articles II. or IV. of this Order.

IV. Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after the 1st March, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court, and, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, shall be detained or sold under the direction of the Prize Court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid into Court and dealt with in such manner as the Court may in the circumstances deem to be just.

Provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of Court until the conclusion of peace except on the application of the proper Officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this Order.

Provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property of enemy origin on the application of the proper Officer of the Crown.

V.—(1) Any person claiming to be interested in, or to have any claim in respect of, any goods (not being contraband of war) placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court under this Order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in the Prize Court against the proper Officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him, or for such other order as the circumstances of the case may require.

(2) The practice and procedure of the Prize Court shall, so far as applicable, be followed *mutatis mutandis* in any proceedings consequential upon this Order.

VI. A merchant vessel which has cleared for a neutral port from a British or allied port, or which has been allowed to pass having an ostensible destination to a neutral port, and proceeds to an enemy port, shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage, be liable to condemnation.

VII. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to affect the liability of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently of this Order.

VIII. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the relaxation

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of the provisions of this Order in respect of the merchant vessels of any country which declares that no commerce intended for or originating in Germany or belonging to German subjects shall enjoy the protection of its flag.

Almeric FitzRoy.

(London Gazette, Tuesday, 16th March, 1915).

What now does this Order do?

It orders generally that, after the 1st March, 1915,

Art. I. No merchant vessel whatever, whether neutral or enemy, shall be allowed to proceed with any goods whatever on any voyage to any German port whatever;

II. No merchant vessel whatever, whether neutral or enemy, shall be allowed to proceed from any German port whatever with any goods whatever laden at any such port;

III. Every merchant vessel whatever, bound to any port whatever other than a German port, if carrying any goods whatever which are either enemy goods or goods with an enemy destination (even though not contraband of war) may—or may not—be required, instead of proceeding on her voyage, to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port; but this Art. III is not to apply to any case falling within Arts. II or IV;

IV. Every merchant vessel whatever, from any port whatever, other than a German port, with goods of enemy origin or enemy property destined to any port whatever, may—or may not—be required to discharge her goods in a British or Allied port.

Be it noted and remembered that no blockade has been notified or in fact established for any German port whatever, except in German East Africa (along the whole line of coast, 360 sea miles long, including Pemba and Zanzibar, and running to the Rovuma River), a blockade of which was declared in an (unsigned) Foreign Office notice in the *London Gazette* dated 23rd February, 1915.

It is therefore not by virtue of any rights conferred by a blockade that these things are to be done.

Be it noted further that, by Art. VII, nothing in the

The Order in Council of 11th March, 1915

Order affects the liability of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently of the Order. The Order therefore leaves intact all existing rights under the Law of Nations, with all their effects; and takes other and additional powers having other and additional effects than those authorized by existing law.

These other and additional effects are illustrated by Art. VI, which orders that "a merchant vessel"—any merchant vessel whatever—which "has cleared for a neutral port from a British or allied port or" which, wherever she has cleared from (i.e. even from a neutral port) has "been allowed to pass having an ostensible destination to a neutral port, and proceeds to an enemy port, shall if captured on any subsequent voyage, be liable to condemnation."

This is a vast change beyond anything ever yet authorized by the Law of Nations. But an even vaster change is sought to be effected by Art. V. For this article orders that "the practice and procedure of the Prize Court shall, *so far as applicable*, be followed *mutatis mutandis* in any proceedings consequential on this Order." This is a direction to a Court of the Law of Nations to vary its practice and procedure so as to fit in with an Order which, as already pointed out, avowedly goes beyond the Law of Nations. How far the Court can accept so arrogant an interference remains to be seen.

Then comes Art. V, which orders that "any person"—any person whatever, friend or foe—"claiming to be interested in, or to have any claim"—any claim whatever—"in respect of any goods (not being contraband of war) placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court under this Order . . . may . . . apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him or that their proceeds should be paid to him," and it is immediately after this that there comes the provision varying the practice and procedure of the Prize Court to fit the Order. This Article V is manifestly intended to override and overbear and

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destroy the decision of the Court in such cases as that of the *Odessa* and so to enable the Government to pay the claims of persons holding a lien on condemned goods such as that held by Messrs Schröder in the *Odessa* case. The Government, finding no countenance given by the Court to such a transaction, had set up a "Prize Claims Committee" in the Foreign Office to deal with such claims despite their rejection by the Prize Court, a proceeding not a little insulting to the Court. This Art. V, however, directs the Court itself to do what the Prize Claims Committee had been intended to do, and would obviate the necessity for bringing in the Committee to override the Law by considering claims which the Law has rejected, and by raiding the Prize Fund in order to pay them. Having done this, the Government will probably allow the Committee to lapse. Whether they really have done it, and whether the Court will allow itself to be made the instrument for making a very essential alteration in the Law of Nations in order to gratify the desire of a Government to recognize and satisfy particular claims, must remain to be seen.

Finally, it is to be most particularly noted and well remembered that this Order in Council founds and justifies itself, not at all on the Law of Nations, or on the Law or usage of the Sea, or on any principle or precedent whatever; but solely on "an unquestionable right of retaliation" derived, as is very truly alleged, from the "violation of the usages of war" by Germany in destroying belligerent and neutral vessels, passengers and crews in the waters surrounding the United Kingdom. That such conduct does give a right of retaliation cannot be denied. Whether what is done, or affected to be done, by the Order in Council amounts to retaliation on the offender; and whether, upon other grounds, it is a well-judged act are other questions.

What is really meant by all this is frankly avowed by Sir Edward Grey. It is, he says on 15th March, "initiating

The Effect of the Order

“a policy of Blockade” (Dispatch 15th March, 1915, to Mr Page, United States Ambassador);* and again, on 13th March, “The British Fleet has instituted a blockade, “effectively controlling by cruiser” cordon “all passage “to and from Germany by sea” These words are indeed his reply to Mr Page’s uncertainty expressed on 8th March, as to whether the Order can be “construed to be a blockade.” Sir Edward Grey’s reply is that it *is* a blockade, and he timidly and tentatively suggests that it is even an effectual blockade yet with this quite new and vast difference, that H.M. Government “declare their intention to refrain “altogether from the exercise of the right to confiscate “ships or cargoes which belligerents have always claimed “in respect of breaches of blockade. They restrict their “claim to the stopping of cargoes,” and even then not “outside European waters” which are held as “including the Mediterranean.” There can be no wonder that Mr Page on 8th March thinks this “a course of action “previously unknown to International Law,” or that he should characterize the situation thus created as “paradoxical,” full of “other perplexities,” and likely to lead to “a very complicated situation.”

This then is a Blockade without penalty for its breach. That it is only a Paper Blockade is denied, and the point is very arguable; for in these days that may well be an effectual blockade from a distance and “by cordon” which formerly would not have been so. But that it is a course novel, paradoxical and full of perplexities likely to lead to awkward complications, is not and cannot be denied.

THE EFFECT OF THE ORDER

LET us now try to understand what is henceforth to happen under this Order in Council, both on the Seas and elsewhere.

* Paper Cd. 7816 of 1915, pp. 23, 24, 26 and 27.

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On the Seas our fleet will henceforth detain, visit and bring in any merchant ship sailing after the 1st March, 1915, when the visit to her has shown probable cause for the belief that she is:

I. A neutral ship bound on a voyage to a German port;

II. A neutral ship from a German port with goods on board laden at such port;

III. A neutral ship on her way from anywhere to a port other than a German port (i.e. to a neutral port) carrying either goods being enemy property or neutral goods with an enemy destination;

IV. A neutral ship on her way from a neutral port (or from a British or allied port) to anywhere, having on board goods of enemy origin or enemy property;

VI. A neutral ship, cleared from a neutral or an allied port for a neutral port after proceeding, contrary to her clearance, to an enemy port; or

VII. Any enemy ship or goods or neutral ship or goods which were liable to capture independently of the Order, and before it was made.

Here then are five new categories of ships to be henceforth captured on the high seas and brought in to the Prize Court, which the vessels of our fleet have hitherto been forbidden to capture. All in this new category are neutral ships. It need not be thought or alleged against them that they are breaking a blockade or carrying contraband of war to the enemy. Every neutral ship carrying any cargo whatever to or from any German port whatever is ordered to be captured (Arts. I and II). Every neutral ship carrying to a neutral port any enemy property or any goods with an enemy destination (even though not contraband of war) is ordered to be captured (Art. III); and even if she is on her way to a British or Allied port she *may* likewise be captured if any of her cargo is of enemy origin or enemy property (Art. IV). Finally Article IV—without apparent necessity—reiterates the general orders in Articles I and II for capture of any neutral carrying cargo

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to or from any German port ; in a particular order that she is to be especially captured if, with false or deceptive papers, she has in fact come from such a port.

The main point and novelty of this bold Order in Council is that for the first time it resumes the right to capture enemy goods in neutral ships which was assumed to have been renounced by the unauthorized Declaration of Paris, 1856. The second, central, and principal article of that Declaration laid it down that "the neutral flag covers "enemy's goods, with the exception of Contraband of "War." This Order now declares and orders that the neutral flag shall *not* cover enemy's goods but that, on the contrary, a ship carrying such goods under the neutral flag shall be detained, brought in and submitted to the Prize Court.

Wherewith away goes the Declaration of Paris, 1856—and for ever. It will be useless for its advocates, whether among the astute military States who contrived it as a deadly blow to England's Sea Power, or among the foolish of our own countrymen who allowed themselves to be persuaded that it somehow mitigated the horrors of War—it will be useless for either of them to pretend that, because it has been professedly destroyed only as a measure of retaliation, it will, or may, yet survive when the War brings retaliation to an end. A Declaration applicable to War alone which, after seven months' submission thereto, has brought the conviction that England cannot make effectual war and yet remain bound by it, and which has had to be destroyed and swept away from out the War by an Order in Council—a Declaration which in such a War has suffered such treatment can never be revived for another and milder War. Whatever may be hoped or pretended the Declaration of Paris is gone for all time and all wars. It can never be revived. It is dead, buried and damned for ever.

For so great a Deliverance from so great a bondage we must indeed be thankful.

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The Deliverance has perhaps not been effected either in the best, the most prudent or the safest way; which way had indeed recently been made harder to take through further surrenders on points of detail. But it has been effected, which is the main thing.

With the Declaration of Paris there fall—destroyed by this Order in Council—every one of the flying buttresses whereby it was but a few years ago thought so effectually to support it as to make it a rule for all time.

That had been completely done, as was supposed, by the fourteen Hague Conventions of 1907 which were completed and crowned by the Declaration of London of 1909. The story of these fifteen shameful instruments has already been told. They offered up at the shrine of the military Powers—not alone of Germany but also of France and Russia—the last remains of England's effectual Sea Power; and they did this at a moment when those who made the sacrifice were conscious of and preparing measures for that actual deadly war in alliance with two of these very Powers against the third to which we have now come. Of all the secret inexplicable acts of politicians these seem the worst and the least excusable. Had they been accepted without resistance, and the manacles thereby put on the Fleet left there throughout the War, the ruin of England must certainly have ensued.

Happily events have taken another course. There was resistance in Parliament; there has been resistance in the Fleet. And now the manacles have been broken by the very hands that assisted the enemies of England to forge them.

The proposed International Prize Court at the Hague—by far the greatest danger of all—was first strangled in the House of Lords. This was the first and greatest of the recent services which that House has done to the country, in reversal and nullification of the decision of a cowed and servile House of Commons which had passed the Naval Prize Bill establishing the Court. The Declaration of London—an arrow made to fit that very bow and no other—was condemned by

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the Lords together with the Court for which it was formed. Yet when the War arose the Foreign Office issued an Order in Council (of 20th August) adopting the Declaration and ordering its enforcement—though with “modifications” which destroyed it. The Declaration, it was pretended with a solemn face, still stood good. So, it was pretended, did the Hague Conventions. These pretences all were called upon in the name of the King to adopt and, what was worst, the Navy was ordered in the name of the King to act upon them—or rather to remain under them inactive in its most effectual functions. For seven months the Fleet has been thus restricted and restrained, to our own great mischief and to the great ease and comfort of our enemy.

And now, suddenly, all is gone. The Order in Council of 11th March has taken charge and carried all away. Of the eight Hague Conventions dealing with Naval War three had already foundered through various misfortunes and oppositions and there remained only five of them afloat, whereof those most manifestly directed against England and her sea-power were No. 8, authorizing the unrestricted laying of contact mines in any seas, and No. 11, restricting the right of capture at sea so as to forbid the capture of enemy dispatches and to require them, whether found in a neutral or an enemy ship, to be forwarded by the captor himself to the enemy. These two Conventions the Order in Council wholly dismisses. It was because (to use Mr Asquith's words of 1st March) Germany had “taken a further step,” and one “without any precedent in history, by mobilizing and organizing, not on the surface but under the surface of the sea, a campaign of piracy and pillage”—carried on equally by mine and submarine—that the Order was issued. Thenceforth it became impossible to claim England as any longer adhering to the Convention for which Sir Ernest Satow had voted authorizing the sowing of the high seas with

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mines under no restriction whatever, as well in a campaign of piracy and pillage as in any other.

As completely does the Order deny and repudiate Convention No. II, restricting the right of capture in Maritime War. For, dismissing the inviolability of enemy dispatches in transmission as "postal correspondence" as well as all other inviolabilities, including those of fishermen and of religious, scientific or philanthropic vessels, affirmed by the Convention, this Order prescribes generally on grand, broad lines, the detention, capture and bringing in of any vessel whatever that comes along carrying the goods of German commerce.

As to the Declaration of London, the Order riddles it through and through. With this Order that Declaration cannot co-exist.* Nor can any one of the Hague Conventions touching Sea Warfare. They are all gone together, blown away to nothingness.

For which good and great destructive service H.M. Government are entitled to the grateful thanks of all those who have throughout held and taught that only by shaking free from the two Declarations and the Conventions could the Fleet be freed to do its work and England enabled to put forth her strength.

HOW THE DELIVERANCE CAME

HOW this all came about after seven months of persistence in a war for existence with a Fleet forbidden to do its most effectual business, and why it was not done in August instead of in March, remains to be told.

* H.M. Government has indeed already, on 8th February, 1915, by a reply in the House of Commons given by Mr Primrose admitted that this Declaration was now not of any authority, and suggested—contrary to the fact—that it had not actually been adopted, but only an announcement made as to the conditions whereon H.M. Government "were prepared" to adopt it. This was a very official answer.

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It came about because the War opened many eyes, hitherto closed, to those indispensable needs of the case, which many authorities had previously denied; partly, also, because the Navy itself which had always well known those needs began in all ranks and by every means that its own traditional silence and discipline permitted, to call for its own liberation to do its work; and partly because the Germans themselves, in their unbridled savagery, foolishly offered such provocations as no English Government could tamely endure and live, and thus impelled Mr Asquith rather to override his own Foreign Office and to undo even its recent work than submit to the German ferocities. To do that in August would have been hard in the face of Foreign Office opposition: to do it in March had become necessary whether the Foreign Office would or no. And so it was done, with every device indeed that the Foreign Office could suggest to save its own face and the faces of Sir Eyre Crowe and his military ally M. Renault; but done it was.

The events that have brought us painfully to and happily past this point are well worth attention.

The reasoned claim for the repudiation of the unauthorized and unauthoritative instruments that shackled the Fleet, long pressed, and as long rejected, contemned and ridiculed during Peace, became on the outbreak of actual War invested with a new interest for those who had never yet attended to it and with a new weight and importance for more who had hitherto lightly dismissed it; whereof some who had before not thought it necessary to give a thought to the case now looked into it and came to conclude that the claim was good. Some of these there had indeed been even in December, 1911, or the Lords would never have defied the Foreign Office and undone, by rejecting the Naval Prize Bill, its hapless handiwork in the Hague Prize Court Convention and the Declaration of London. More joined them as the stress and the imperative need of the War became felt and, from August, 1914, onwards, the innate sea-sense of the English people more and more asserted

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itself. This was not disclosed through the ordinary channels of House of Commons reports, of meetings in the country or of leading articles in the newspapers—for all of these have unfortunately submitted to be silenced on all things during the War. But those who took the trouble to learn it soon knew of the growing impatience touching the work of our splendid Fleet and of the growing conviction that those must be right who had long asserted that it was so tied up by the politicians and the diplomats as to be prevented from using its strength. From which to a passionate desire that it should be untied was but a step.

Then the Fleet itself, through its understanding chiefs, took a hand. It began very privately and confidentially respectfully to suggest and most humbly to represent things, which finally led to a hard, long, silent wrestle between the Fighting Man on the one side and the Writing Man on the other—all behind the scenes, without speeches in the Commons, meetings at the Albert Hall or so much as any leading article beyond those in the *Morning Post*, to encourage what seemed, and long was, the weaker side of the Seaman.

When the War began, the true nature of War had been forgotten, set aside and hidden away for nearly a century. The Fighting Men intended to make it, as they well knew they could, a real, severe, warlike War in which they should use their known, proved, irresistible strength by cutting the enemy's sea communications, stopping his sea-trade and thus causing so great a distress as would reduce him to extremity and bring about an honourable and lasting Peace in the shortest time. The Writing Men wanted to make it, what they had long contemplated and had indeed long prepared, a sham, mild, peace-like War in which the Seaman should be shackled and held back, the enemy's sea-communications left open and his sea-trade continued—all which they believed would render it less barbarous, more civilized and less troublesome to worried Ministers of State and the précis-writers and dispatch-copiers of Foreign Offices. To

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this general end they had fifty years before entered into the Declaration of Paris, 1856, which forbade the capture of enemy goods in neutral ships and thus left the enemy trade to be freely carried on in such ships. They had, moreover, so soon as this particular war came in view in 1906 and when they became aware that they would probably have to fight in alliance with the two great military Powers France and Russia—both of them necessarily, and from all time, the enemies of sea power—begun to make yet further surrenders of the Sea to the Soldier, their new friend. They arranged and accepted the Hague Conventions and the Declaration of London whereby the uncontrolled power of the Soldier on land was still further exaggerated and the controlled power of the Seaman at sea still further restricted. In both directions they went to lengths never before dreamed of, to the great satisfaction of their new Soldier Allies and the equally great disquiet of those who had learnt as well from the nature of the case as from the actual events of history that the sole power of England is at sea, that with this power fully exercised her power is irresistible, and that with this shackled she has no power at all against the Soldier States of the Continent.

Only when the war had actually begun did the Fighting Seamen of these islands begin to realize and to understand what had been done to shorten their arm and paralyze their strength. They had never before either fully known or duly realized what the Writing Landsmen had done to them. Now, finding themselves somehow stopped at every turn, while the Fighting Soldiers on land were exercising their powers with a completeness and ruthlessness never seen before—now they began to inquire how it was that they were thus tied up and held in leash. Then only did they become fully aware of the new shackles that had been put upon them while, during a century of Peace, they had slept. And then they became indignant at the tricks that had been played upon them. They became aware, too, that so long as they remained

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thus shackled they could not do the duties for which they existed, which their country expected of them, and which alone could answer the expectations either of the country or of themselves. Wherefore, as became the honest fighting gentlemen they were, they very respectfully yet very clearly called to be set free to do those duties.

Then began what may be called a Tug-of-War between the Fighting Men at Sea on the one side and on the other the Writing Men ashore, who had so long been left unchallenged to protocolize away in the dark the strength of the country, and who now found themselves challenged to defend their acts, if they could, with such half-hearted aid as they were now able to get from the now very doubtful and hesitating Party Man.

The Fighting Men have proved the stronger. Step by step they have pulled up to the line the Writing Men who, as their way is, still continued nevertheless to call Heaven to witness that they had not budged an inch. And now at last—though only after tugging for seven months—they have pulled them clean over the line and far beyond. The pull has brought them not only up to the Law of the Sea and of Nations, but over it. The Writing Men have let go all holds. They have tumbled into a muddled, tangled mass of arms, heads, legs, articles and arguments whence it will be hard to free them. But to contend now that they are still where they were is beyond the power of Protocols. They have freed the Fleet; that is the principal thing. They have freed it to stop the enemy's communications by the capture of enemy goods in neutral ships and thus to stop his trade and truly to distress him. That is all we ever asked or wanted. If the Writing Men have gone beyond that and mean the Fleet to stop neutral trade as well as enemy trade, that is their affair. They began by writing the Fleet into paralysis. If now, in writing it out of that into a necessary freedom, they have written themselves into a difficulty, why then let them write themselves out of it as best they may.

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Meantime the only thing that matters is that the Fleet is, for the first time, free to carry on with the real business of war.

THE GERMAN INTERDICT

THE German threat which ostensibly provoked our Order in Council deserves attention. It was issued, *urbi et orbi*, by wireless on 4th February, as well as in a Memorandum to neutral Governments. It sounded, as German threats always do, very terrific; and it opened with an appeal to the Law of Nations. All such documents always have done so, always do, always will, and always indeed must do; since there is no other appeal possible or conceivable between independent and sovereign States. This trite fact is stated for the benefit of those who airily and presumptuously declare that there is no Law of Nations; though even these if pressed will allow that there ought to be one and, if still further pressed, that they could make one. The fact that Nations do in all disputes continue to appeal to such a Law shows their common consent that it does exist. That there are constant violations of it only proves that it is like all other laws, often as imperfectly observed as it is hypocritically invoked. But there it must be, or righteous and wicked alike would not equally invoke it.

Germany, then, begins by declaring that the British Government:—

- (1) “defies all the principles of international law;
- (2) “has announced in a number of Decrees that the *London* “Declaration concerning naval warfare is binding on its “naval forces. But in reality it has renounced the Declaration in its most important particulars;
- (3) “has put a number of articles on the contraband list “which . . . according to the *London* Declaration may not “be designated as contraband;
- (4) “has further actually abolished the distinction between “absolute and conditional contraband;

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- (5) "does not even hesitate to violate the *Paris Declaration*,
"as its naval forces have seized, on neutral ships, German
"property that was not contraband;
- (6) "has declared the entire North Sea to be a war area,
"and made the passage of neutral shipping through the sea
"between Scotland and Norway, if not impossible, yet so
"difficult and dangerous that a blockade of neutral coasts
"and neutral ports has been practically initiated in violation
"of all international law.
- (7) "The obvious purpose of all these measures is, by illeg-
"ally paralyzing legitimate neutral commerce . . . to strike
"at the economic life of Germany and finally, through
"starvation, to doom the entire population of Germany to
"destruction."

The definite charges in the third and fourth paragraphs of this indictment are true enough. They had indeed been shown to be so in these pages* published on the very same day as this indictment, and the very same inference had been there drawn as is embodied in its second paragraph—from which inference there is indeed no escape. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

But the German impudence is none the less in complaining of England having "renounced the Declaration of "London" when she herself has renounced and repeatedly violated not only that but every "scrap of paper" on which her dishonoured name appears. The truth is, as has been repeatedly affirmed and demonstrated, that, as regards England, the secret, unaccepted, unratified Declaration of London never had any validity at all; that after its condemnation by Parliament it became of no practical consequence at all; and that the Foreign Office juggling with its absurd lists of contraband only made them more absurd without making any part of the Declaration more binding on this country. The thing having been "renounced" by both sides, there was only an end of something that had never been more than a still-born abortion. Whereat we English as naturally rejoiced as Germany grieved, wailed—and appealed to the Law of Nations!

Whether there had been, before 4th February, any capture

* CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW for February, 1915, pp. 19-21.

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by England of innocent enemy goods under a neutral flag, we doubt: none such has come under public notice. However that may be, the Declaration of Paris, like that of London, made without authority and never ratified, never had any real validity. Moreover, if it was in fact violated by England in its second article it had been violated for forty years by Germany in its first article, which violation destroyed the Declaration from that moment.

The sixth paragraph makes a charge for which there is some foundation; for it is very questionable whether any Power has ever any right—apart from blockade—to declare any portion of the high seas a war area, prohibited to neutral vessels on lawful voyages. But to argue that this, as it was done by England, amounts to a blockade is an extravagance.

The charge in the seventh paragraph that it is our intention to strike at the economic life of Germany we accept and admit. That is what we do mean. That is what Sea Power is meant for—to distress and exhaust the enemy—not by mining and murdering either himself or the neutral, but by striking at his sea-communications and through them at his economic life. There need be, there should be, no paralyzing of legitimate—but only of illegitimate—neutral commerce. And as certainly there will be no destruction of the entire population of Germany by starvation. There will be, in a much milder form over a larger area and with greater effect, exactly the same stress as was put by Germany upon Paris in 1870-1. There will be distress, there will be exhaustion, there will be civil commotion in Germany as there was in Paris. But there will be no destruction of the entire population by starvation. Long before that comes there will be surrender, submission, Peace.

After the indictment and the appeal to the Law come the threats. Germany, we are told by herself:—

- (1) “must face the question whether it can any longer
“persevere in its hitherto strict observance of the Rules of
“the London Declaration; and

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- (2) "sees itself forced to various measures aimed at England
"in retaliation against the English procedure." Wherefore
- (3) "Germany now declares all the waters surrounding Great
"Britain and Ireland (including the entire English Channel)
"a war area;
- (4) "beginning from 18th February, 1915, will endeavour
"to destroy every enemy merchant ship that is found in this
"war area, without its being always possible to avert the
"dangers to persons and cargoes . . .
- (5) "Neutrals' attention is called to the fact that it is
"advisable for their ships to avoid entering this area, for even
"though the German naval forces have instructions to
"avoid violence to neutral ships—in so far as they are
"recognizable—the risk that they may become victims of
"an attack directed against enemy ships, cannot always be
"avoided."*

This is no notice of a blockade, effective or non-effective, lawful or unlawful, of any coast or any port.

It is an Interdict of the British seas, laid upon the whole world, with notice that it will be enforced by destroying out of hand anyhow, without notice or warning or inquiry, without disclosure of the character of the destroyer and mainly by the secret assassination of mine and submarine, every unarmed British merchant ship found in the interdicted waters—and also every neutral merchant ship which chooses to take the risk of breaking the interdict.

The pretence that the German naval forces are instructed to avoid violence to neutral ships is the merest *façade*. For, since there is to be no inquiry, there will be no possibility of ascertaining what ship is and what not neutral. Moreover a mine cannot either inquire or avoid; it does its work blindly, destroying neutral and enemy alike, without question asked. It is indeed unnecessary to insist on this point for the document itself avows that it is contemplated and expected that neutrals will be made victims as well as

* In the absence of any issue to the public of Foreign Office papers containing these documents, they have been transcribed from the very careful version compiled from the Marconi Company's message (containing the text in the columns of the official *Reichsanzeiger* reproduced in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*), published by *The Economist*, of Saturday, 13th February, 1915.

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belligerents—and they are merely told that this cannot be avoided, and that they have only themselves to blame for daring to be found in the interdicted area.

This, then, is an Interdict laid on the whole world, friend and enemy alike, to be enforced by sinking at sight. That is undeniable and undenied.

The answer thereto of the neutrals is plainly, adequately and admirably made by the United States in a Note to Berlin. Here it is:—

“To declare or exercise the right to attack or destroy any
“vessel entering the prescribed area on the high seas, without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality,
“and the contraband character of its cargo, is an act so
“unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is
“reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of
“Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. . . .

“If commanders of German vessels of war act on the
“presumption that the flag of the United States is not used
“in good faith, and should destroy on the high seas an
“American vessel and the lives of American citizens, it
“would be difficult for the Government of the United
“States to view such an act in any other light than an
“indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would
“be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly
“relations now happily existing between the two Governments.

“The United States Government would be constrained
“to hold the Imperial Government to strict accountability
“for such acts, and to take any steps that might be necessary to safeguard American lives and property.”*

The United States have never allowed their foreign affairs to be managed for them in secret by a conclave of casual clerks under the imperfect control of a Party Minister, but have subjected them and their managers to the examination and control of a Foreign Relations Committee whose action has always been of the highest value and efficacy.

* See *The Economist*, 13th February, 1915, p. 265.

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Long experience has shown the vast superiority to our own of that system and of the dispatches it produces. The contrast between our own Laocöon strugglings among the serpents of red tape, their former blunders and present muddlings; and the plain, clear, unmistakable pronouncements of the States is here most marked. The United States—again appealing to the Law of Nations, be it observed—condemns the attack or destruction of “any vessel on the high seas” without determination of its nationality and cargo as “unprecedented in naval warfare”; and declares that any such destruction of “an American vessel and the lives of “American citizens” will be “an indefensible violation of “neutral rights”; and that the United States will hold Germany “to strict accountability for such acts” and will “take any steps that might be necessary to safeguard “American lives and property.” Nothing could be simpler, plainer, better or more strictly in accord with the rights of neutrals and the Law of Nations.

From the very outset of the War the Germans have deliberately and of set purpose treated, not alone the Law of Nations and the Laws of War, but every law, human and divine and every sentiment of humanity with complete and avowed contempt, claiming indeed quite openly that they meant what they themselves deemed to be their “military necessity” to override and abolish all Law, Morality and Humanity together. Most especially and particularly did they condemn their own most recent treaties and conventions. Whether it were the treaty whereby they had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, now to be violated as the very first act of war, or the Hague Conventions, or the most elementary of the merciful usages and laws of war, they repudiated all and plunged from the first into every act of arson, robbery, murder, assassination and cruelty that they could anyhow, anywhere commit. There was nothing new in their announcement, first made on 4th February, that they would from the 18th February murder inoffensive neutrals by mine or torpedo; they had

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done it from the very first day of the war. These "violations of the usages of war," this piracy and this murder were all as old as the war itself. Nor was there either anything new in the German declaration that the waters surrounding the British Isles would be treated by them as a military area in which all commerce should be forbidden, all merchant ships should only be found at their own peril, and when found should be without further ado secretly assassinated and sunk and their crews—neutral or belligerent—either drowned without mercy or, as a great concession, set adrift in their own boats if that happened to be convenient to the assassin. This too had been done all along. It was not new on the 18th February. From the 4th August up to that date those Germans had, so far as is disclosed by the official and newspaper records, already sunk on the high seas by mine and torpedo—but mainly by mine—no fewer than a total of 84 merchant and fishing vessels (whereof 43 were British and 41 neutrals) with much loss of life. In addition to which the Germans sank in the same period by the same means 14 British men-of-war. We ourselves had never sunk any unexamined merchantmen; yet we had indeed done something in principle not very different from Interdiction with the whole North Sea when we warned merchant ships at their peril not to pass a line from the Hebrides to the Faroe Islands and thence to Iceland, with the suggestion that this line was to be closed by a line of mines—in 600 fathoms of water! In none of all these things therefore was there anything new at all. What there was new was the new determination of the British Government to resist all these things, whether lawful or unlawful, with the whole of the tremendous pressure of the Fleet now for the first time set wholly free.

When this great thing was at last done it was done with a very surprising suddenness, as though something had unexpectedly given way in the foundations of the earth and

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had dragged down in its earthquake all the great temples of diplomatic wisdom and all those methods of deliberation so dear to those without principle or plan, and especially dear to those great minds who rule our destinies and whom Oxenstiern called upon his son to admire in the words, "*Vide mi fili quantulâ sapientiâ mundus regitur.*" The ship of State was suddenly found to be dismantled by her own officers. That mainmast of Diplomacy the Declaration of Paris was seen to be cut away and hanging in a wreck over the side; so too was that foremast the Declaration of London; and with them the mizenmast carrying the Hague Conventions. All had gone by the run. The diplomatic ship was a wreck—nothing left but the jury mast of the Order in Council of 11th March with the old tarpaulin of Right of Capture hurriedly hoisted thereon—and yet the ship looking up for her port.

In what a hurry and confusion all was done is shown by the fact that, on that very 11th March when the Order in Council was issued, there was also issued a Royal Proclamation of the same date setting forth yet another list of "absolute contraband in addition to those set forth in our Royal Proclamation aforementioned," which is to say, set forth by the Proclamation of 23rd December, 1914. This new and additional list classed as absolute contraband Lubricants and Castor Oil, both which by the Declaration of London were classed only as conditional contraband; and it classed also as absolute contraband (1) Raw Wool; (2) Tin Ore; (3) Hides; (4) Ammonia and (5) Oleaginous Seeds, Nuts and Kernels, five things which Article 24 of the same Declaration declared "may not be declared contraband of war," either conditional or absolute or at all. This made the sixth of those lists of contraband, each solemnly pronounced, and each as solemnly destroying its predecessor, set up by the British Government to show how much it had always known its own mind. The first was in the Declaration of London; its successors in the five successive Proclamations of 4th August, 21st September, 29th October and

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23rd December, 1914, and 11th March, 1915, which together present a farrago of contraband, conditional and absolute, now one and now the other, such as would puzzle the astutest clerk ever made a C.B. for signing a postal convention. Up to the 11th March, however, there was a reason for these successive stretchings of the contraband list. Up to that date, the Foreign Office solaced itself and amused the world by pretending that the Declaration of Paris was and remained in force; and since that Declaration forbade the capture in neutral ships of all enemy goods *except* contraband of war, the Foreign Office mind saw clearly that the one way to pretend to maintain the Declaration and yet to evade it, was to enlarge the list of contraband, and thus ever to increase the categories of goods within the exception and therefore still liable to capture within the Declaration. That is the sort of thing the Foreign Office mind sees quite easily, and delights to elaborate; wherefore it proceeded blithely to plunge into successive debauches of contraband and thus to do its best to undo its own work in the Declaration of London. But, when once the great Order in Council was resolved upon, all that undoing and every one of the debauches became not only useless but a mere shameful to-morrow's recollection. For the Order in Council went far beyond anything of contraband. It ordered the bringing in and handing over to the Marshal of the Prize Court of everything, contraband or not. The sixth list—carefully prepared, no doubt—now lost all its purpose and meaning. Why it was persevered with is a mystery. Possibly it was because the list was there ready, and it would be a pity that the King should not be asked to sign it—more important instruments have often been signed for no better reason; and, after all, the more documents and the greater tangle, the greater the mystery and importance of the Foreign Office. So these two instruments received the Royal sign-manual on the same day, in the same hurry, although the greater Order rendered the lesser Proclamation a mere piece of nugatory trifling.

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Other and more serious indications there are which suggest but too plainly an insufficient consideration of the great problems and greater faults which the besom of the Order in Council was now to sweep away beyond the horizon. That every merchant ship whatever going to any German port whatever—as well as in some cases to other ports—that all these are from 1st March forward to be forbidden to pursue their voyage and are to be required to discharge their cargoes in a British court into the hands of the Marshal of the Prize Court—that seems completely and abundantly clear. So far so good. That is the sort of thing the Fleet has long desired to do and which it has as long been claimed in these pages that it should be set free to do. Moreover the reason assigned by the Order for setting the Fleet free to do this is precisely that which has always been put forward for the claim, namely, the need for a full exercise of our Sea Power “in order to prevent commodities “of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.” So far very good. The Fleet can effect that prevention, not wholly indeed but quite sufficiently to shorten the war: and is now to be free to do it by detaining and bringing in every neutral ship whether bound to or from any German port whatever. So far extremely good. Nothing could be better, or more completely concede the claim and the desires of those who have urged the freeing of the Fleet.

AFTER CAPTURE—WHAT THEN?

BUT if, up to this point, all is quite plain, what is to follow is all a mystery. The Marshal of the Prize Court will have an interesting task and one of complete uncertainty. For the goods from a neutral on a voyage to Germany detained and placed in his custody under Article I may either (1) if “contraband of war,” suffer some fate not mentioned, but presumably confiscation to the Crown—if the Crown

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demands it, which is uncertain; or (2) "be requisitioned" for the use of H.M."—whether on payment of their value or without is left uncertain but, if the hints given are worth anything, only on payment; or (3) "be restored by Order" of the Court to the person entitled thereto." Whether, if the goods are enemy goods, they are to be restored to the enemy is left uncertain; but that would seem to be the intention. Yet, if that be indeed the intention, then the Marshal will be in the position of having to return to the enemy goods which the Court whereof he is the officer holds to be good prize of war and to have become confiscate to the Crown. What the Court may have to say to such a proceeding will be interesting. It is particularly to be noted that, for goods discharged and placed in the custody of the Marshal under Article I, there is not (as there is for those under Article II) any provision enabling them to be sold and the proceeds paid into Court. Goods coming under Article II may be turned into money and go, in that shape, into and under the control of the Court. But goods under Article I must remain goods, and must remain in the custody of the Marshal alone to await their fate, without ever coming into custody, as would appear, of the Court at all. A strange situation.

On the other hand, goods laden at and proceeding in any ship from any German port are under Article II also to be intercepted, brought in and placed in the custody of the Marshal. These also may be (as before) "requisitioned." But these the Prize Court may direct to be sold and the proceeds paid into Court and dealt with as the Court may "deem to be just." But yet not quite that either. For the proceeds must not be paid out of Court "until the conclusion of Peace, except on the application of the Crown"—unless the goods are shown to be neutral property. Also the Crown may apply, if they are neutral property, for their release.

The meaning and intention of this seems undoubtedly to be to submit the detained goods or the proceeds of their

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sale, not to the judgment of the Court, but to the discretion of the Crown; and especially if they are enemy goods. In that case, the Court can hardly condemn them as good prize unless their condemnation is demanded by the Crown; and the Crown (meaning the Government) is, as we know, not inclined to make the demand—has not, indeed, even yet made it, although certain of success, in the case of the 83 German vessels* interned since the beginning of the war. Nay, even if, by some untoward accident, the Court should be in a position, without demand by the Government, to condemn, and should in fact condemn, the enemy goods as good prize and confiscate to the Crown, even then the proceeds of their sale are not to be paid out of Court “until the conclusion of Peace,” unless the Crown applies for them, which, as shown by the example of the detained ships, it is unlikely to do. Why? Why?

What is the meaning of all this excessive tenderness for enemy property? Why all these barbed wire entanglements thrown up around it? What does it mean? Is it intended to accumulate in and out of the Prize Court a vast Prize Fund—only to be distributed in part to the Banker and the Bill-broker on the application of the Crown, but not a farthing of it to the Seaman—and then at the conclusion of peace to use it as a vast bribe to Germany to be kind and merciful to us in the terms of Peace? Or is there really still, somewhere in the Foreign Office or elsewhere in Government circles, a set desire to do Germany as little mischief in the War as possible and to save up and restore to her all the captures which so much blood and pains have made? The mystery is great; where there is mystery there must arise suspicion; and the Government must be called upon frankly and fully to explain themselves and their apparent desire to screen German property from the Law and fortunes of War.

Article III deals with “every merchant vessel on her way to a port other than a German port” (i.e. to a neutral or

* Statement by Lord Islington in House of Lords. H.L. Official Report, 24th February, 1915. Cols. 555-6.

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even to a French, Russian or Japanese port) with goods either enemy property or “with an enemy destination.” These vessels “may”—though not necessarily shall—“be required to discharge the goods in a British or allied port,” and if the port be British, then the goods (without any provision made for their sale) are to be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court, “and, unless they are contraband of war”—in which case their condemnation will presumably be applied for—or unless they are “requisitioned”) “shall be *restored* by order of the Court” “... *to the person entitled thereto.*” This seems to mean that the enemy property shall be restored to the enemy and that the Court shall order such restoration. On what compulsion it shall is not hinted. Assuredly not under the compulsion of the Declaration of Paris, violated and destroyed by their compulsory detention. Possibly by an order from Mr McKenna to Sir Samuel Evans.

It is provided that none of all that is in Article III shall apply to “any case falling within Articles II or IV,” leaving us distinctly to conclude that it *is* to apply to cases under Article I as well as to those under all the other six Articles besides I except II and IV.

Article IV applies to “every merchant vessel” sailing from “a port other than a German port” (including as before all belligerent and all neutral ports) with goods “of enemy origin” or “enemy property,” which vessel “may”—again not shall—be required to discharge in a British or allied port, the enemy goods which, where the port is British, shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court and laid under identically the same subsequent conditions as prescribed by Article II, excepting only that, whereas in Article II the release on application by the Crown of neutral property is alone provided for, the provision in Article IV provides for such a release of “neutral property of enemy origin.”

Article V gives a *locus standi* to “any person claiming to be interested in or to have any claim in respect of” goods

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in the custody of the Marshal, and empowers him to claim the goods or their proceeds; which claim, if the Government in their tenderness for the Banker with a lien should not resist it, must apparently succeed, although on its own merits and unless a "walk over" were thus provided for the Banker the claim would be disallowed. This article is apparently intended to replace the odious device of setting an unskilled and incompetent Prize Claims Committee to override the Prize Court decisions. If intended to be used as itself seems to suggest it will be worse than the device, for it will be a very grave abuse of the procedure of the Court erected into a regular system.

Article VI touches on "a merchant vessel which has "cleared from a British or allied port," for a neutral port, or which has "an ostensible destination" (whatever that may mean) "to a neutral port," and which nevertheless—as she may very lawfully and innocently do—"proceeds to "an enemy port." The article declares that this vessel "shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage, be liable to "condemnation." As to which it can only be said that this is wholly new, entirely arbitrary, inconsistent with the principles of the Law of Nations and with Prize Court decisions and an entirely novel and very injurious doctrine for the neutral.

Article VII declares the existing liabilities of vessel or goods to capture or condemnation to remain unaffected by the Order, and

Article VIII leaves open a "relaxation" of the Order for the vessels of "any country which declares that no commerce "intended for or originating in Germany or belonging to "German subjects shall enjoy the protection of its flag."

It will not occur to any that this new code of War is of great simplicity and plainness. It will rather occur to many that it is of unprecedented complication; and to some that it has been deliberately made so in order to give to "the

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“proper Officer of the Crown” the whip hand at every turn over the Prize Court and to provide in every panel a secret back door by which that proper officer may get round the Law, the Prophets, the Order, the Court and even the Court’s own Marshal. But we must not be too suspicious.

What is very noticeable is the superhuman effort made to avoid inflicting on the enemy anything more than the bald inconvenience of having his commerce stopped and to ensure that any of his goods which, incidentally to this, fall into the hands of the Marshal of the Court shall never, if it be any way possible to avoid that, be confiscated but that they shall all, or their proceeds, be carefully saved up for him and restored to him when Peace is made. We are to capture all but to keep none, to “prevent commodities of “any kind from reaching or leaving Germany” and—in order to show that there is no ill-feeling—to take faithful charge of them and undertake their strict restoration, untouched and undiminished except perhaps by the Marshal’s warehousing fees.

Yet none of all this greatly matters. The stress put upon Germany, even with this limitation, through the cutting of all her sea roads and the stoppage of all her sea-borne trade—if effected as intended by the Order in Council—will be tremendous, irresistible and, in the end, final. It will be that even though we confiscate and keep for ourselves none of those goods of hers that we capture at sea, but only hold them as prisoners. They will still be lost to her effectives in the great army of Trade even if not added to our own. They will still be such a loss, they will still amount to so vast and cumulative a loss—constantly, silently and remorselessly progressing—as no Trade can suffer and survive. Her total trade in 1913, import and export, was probably represented by a sum near to £1,000,000,000. In 1896 (since when no figures have been afforded) no less than 65 per cent of her whole export and

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import trade was carried to or from her by sea and only 35 per cent by land, with the land trade moreover constantly tending to diminution in its proportion. The stoppage of her sea-borne commerce would therefore represent a vast present loss of trade, quite possibly of a full £650,000,000 in a year, only very little whereof could be—especially in present circumstances—filled up by land carriage. The effect upon all in all parts of the country of such a loss cannot be put into figures. It is far more and far more ruinous than any figures could convey. And, although it would be more consonant with the wishes of some of us, and more consistent with fair play and the laws of war whether by Sea or Land, that we should keep what we capture, yet it is not that which mainly matters. What does matter, for the war, what will assuredly shorten it by distressing Germany where she will most feel it, is, so long as the war lasts, to prevent her from getting the stuff. The property in the stuff—whether immediate or final—is of altogether secondary consequence. The Germans round Paris in 1870-1 captured, confiscated and retained for themselves no food sent to Paris—for none whatever was sent nor, during the siege, could be. What they did was only to forbid and effectually to prevent everything—including food—from reaching Paris. That sufficed to reduce the city. And so, as certainly and effectually as Paris was distressed into surrender by the stoppage of land-supplies, so certainly and effectually will Germany be distressed, and at last to the same point, by the stoppage of sea-supplies. There was no starvation in Paris, but there was everywhere and among all an evenly-spread distress which at last became unbearable and caused all to see the need for and to insist upon surrender. It will be so in Germany if the sea-stoppage effected by the Order in Council comes, as it will presuming it to be duly enforced, anywhere near in its effects to the land-stoppage of 1870. There will be no German starvation; but there will be a general, universal, irresistible German demand for Peace on the best terms obtainable. The loud

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red glories of the soldier are as nothing compared with the silent grey pressure of the seaman. No victories in the field, though with hecatombs of slain and feats of heroism seen, known and rewarded with the highest honours an earthly sovereign can give, can compare for real consequence and final result with this. They are but local events, however splendid, affecting but those chosen few of the peoples in conflict whose lot it was there to meet; this is general, nay universal, and affecting every man, woman and child of the people against whom it is directed. With the land victory the whole world rings, the song of the poet idealizes and ennobles it, the State brings to it the richest garlands a whole nation can tress, heroes are created by it, families to endure for generations are founded upon it, dynasties arise from it, history opens for it a new and splendid page illumined in new and splendid colours to which the unstinted admiration of the world is fully given. The victory at sea, in the few—much fewer—great occasions when it occurs, has also its glories, though always less than the land victory. But neither of them is of any real consequence compared with that of the unseen, unheard-of, silent, almost unknown Sea Power in stopping sea-trade when fully exercised by the men of the sea. Grim, rough, often uncouth, always unornamental, without so much as a cock's feather or an adequate allowance of gold lace to compel admiration, these men who apply this power are away and mostly forgotten. Yet it is they, far off in the waste of waters, poking into blind creeks, holding up traders, blocking harbours, watching, chasing, waiting on their watch, day after day, night after night, months together with no rest or relief, always fighting their deadliest enemy the sea, only now and then gladdened and rejoiced by the delight of battle with their far less dreadful and deadly foe man; doing it all with nobody to look on and no place to hope for in history's page; and doing it all, not to pile up thousands of slain or to wear out the enemy by the extermination of the foe's life—but all for the dull end of intercepting and cutting

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off, driving back and in, and at last, by painful, ceaseless, unremitted, unseen endeavours, finally destroying his oversea-trade in common, vulgar merchandise, bales of cotton, tons of ore, bags of grain and such-like things in which no poet has ever yet seen any glory or heroism—it is these men, and these alone, it may be almost said, who do the real work that really tells. If they succeed with their bales of cotton all else may fail yet final success be assured. Once that achieved it is probably the visible Major-General and the great Field-Marshal who will sprout forth in the new crop of cock's feathers, gold lace, dukedoms or what not that the war has produced; while these will mostly go back to their grey, forgotten lives with little or no remembrance, save in their own minds, of the perils they faced and the work they did. But, for all that, it is they who did it, whatever cock's feathers and dukedoms may pretend. And those who are fit to judge will know that this which was the essential work was theirs and that of no others, however glorious. Napoleon—no mean judge—knew it well. “I know something about it,” said he at St Helena to Lord Amherst in 1817, “and I know the effect of your blockades.”—whereby he meant compendiously to describe the stoppage of sea-communication and trade—“You put a country in “the condition of a body rubbed with oil, which can no “longer breathe.”

RUSSIA STANDS OFF

THE great Military Nations have, as has been repeatedly pointed out in these pages, and as it is now necessary to recall, always necessarily been the deadly foes of that Sea Power which alone competes with their own Land Power; so much so that our own present military allies—France and Russia—joined their prospective and present enemy Germany at the Hague in 1907 in voting against England on a crucial point of Sea Law—to wit, the unrestricted conversion on the

Russia Stands Off

high seas of merchantmen into men-of-war. As they always have been so they always must be the foes of Sea Power; for that alone can curb their own Land Power: they must be against the Seaman; for he alone can bring the Soldier to book. And they still are against him.

Remembering this, there is a feature of the Order in Council of 11th March which must command serious attention. The Order itself declares that "the allies of H.M. are "associated with him in the steps now to be announced for "restricting further the commerce of Germany." The Order was scarcely issued, however, before Sir Edward Grey began to give indications that, of our two great military allies, the greater in Soldier-power was not yet, and probably not at all, "associated" with us in this new assertion of Seaman-power. The original Declaration by Note to all Powers issued on 1st March had already indeed intimated that Russia was not a party to it. For it was a Declaration by "the British and French Governments" alone* with Russia taking no part. Again on the 13th March—two days after the issue of the Order in Council, Sir Edward Grey says "the government of Great Britain have now frankly "declared, in concert with the Government of France,"† and yet again on 15th March he speaks off‡ "the British and "French declarations of the 1st March." All this seems to show quite conclusively that although France is, yet Russia is not associated with England in her new assertion of Sea Power nor any party to or participant in the measures announced in the Order in Council.

This is of much moment and maybe of vast consequence. As things now stand, it may seem of little importance whether so relatively weak a naval Power as Russia does or does not take a part in or give her sanction to these new naval operations. But if the War is as completely successful as we expect, and the recasting of Europe now being visibly pre-

* Parliamentary Paper (Cd. No. 7,816 of 1915), p. 23.

† (Cd. 7,816), p. 26.

‡ (Cd. 7,816), p. 26.

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pared is effected, Russia, aggrandized by Constantinople, which we are avowedly seeking to conquer for her, together with Bulgaria, Roumania and much else in Europe and Asia Minor that must follow the fate of Constantinople—Russia will become so predominating a military Power in Europe, as well as in south-western Asia up to our own Indian frontier, as never was before known. If, now, following the policy of Catherine in 1780 she already refuses to recognize Sea Power when now for the first time resumed in its plenitude, and to be wielded in her own behalf, what will she do then, when her own land power has become so much vaster, when it is therefore at once easier and more important for her to be rid of its sole, effectual counterpoise; and when she can assuredly command the support, in that or in aught else, of France, then herself become the great second military power of Europe? It is conceivable that her own commanding position and manifest interest might dictate a persistence in the attitude towards Sea Power already thus indicated. It is possible that a general Peace Congress might again be used, as was that of Paris of 1856, once again for an attempt to rivet upon us the two Declarations of Paris and London and the Hague Conventions, and even to replace our fleet under the control of a revived Hague Prize Court. That attempt is conceivable; if due care be not taken, or the wrong persons sent to the Peace Congress, it will even be probable. And we, having been graciously allowed to use our Sea Power to win Constantinople and the rest for our allies, might find in the end that we have only used it for our own destruction. We must see that no such attempt succeeds.

Yet that much, and no less, as it is the logical, so might be the actual sequel of the abstention of Russia from concurrence with the Order in Council. We must hope not. We must trust our allies to leave us at the Peace the Great Power we are. We must trust them hopefully. As things are we can do nothing else.

The Neutral Powers

THE NEUTRAL POWERS

WHAT is perhaps to be apprehended is that the measures of procedure ordered by this momentous Order in Council may fail to gain the approval of our friends the Neutral Nations. The right of the Neutral to carry without molestation his own goods—excepting always contraband—to or from any unblockaded ports of either or all of the belligerents—this right has never hitherto been questioned. To do that has never yet been an offence against the Law of Nations, nor has the Law ever yet authorized any such forcible interference with or prevention of it by a belligerent as it authorizes when the Neutral is carrying enemy property, or contraband of war, or seeks to break a blockade. Hitherto the Neutral ship only could be, and only has been, detained and brought in because the visit and search of her showed probable cause for the belief that she was engaged in one of these offences against the detaining belligerent. Now, will say the Neutrals, our ships, though engaged on a wholly lawful and innocent voyage, are to be interfered with, their lawful voyage stopped and their innocent cargo impounded without so much as an allegation against them of any offence whatever. All which, they will urge, constitutes a grievance.

This is very true. It does constitute a grievance, and a new grievance. The better course, as some of us hold, would have been to revert simply and directly to the plain Law of Nations and thus to resume the position the United States herself has always held; when there would have been no novelty, when our doctrine could have been once again stated in the few and simple words of Lord Stowell's letter to the American Ambassador of 10th September, 1794, and when our practice would have reverted to the practical and simple methods of those days—standing interrogatories and all. This would have avoided the complicated tangle of

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procedure, with all the uncertainties attendant thereon, of our present Order in Council, would have created no new grievance at all, and would have presented itself as a mere return to the Law without any possible imputation that it was an adventure into Anarchy. And it would have sufficed.

One capital fact, however, there is, which is to be taken into account in justification of the Order in Council. It is that there are new arms used in this War which the Law of Nations never yet contemplated and for the use of which it has laid down no rules or usages; and that meantime these arms are being used in defiance of the amenities of war and wholly contrary to the principle and spirit of its usages as up to now practised. The Mine, the Submarine, the Aeroplane and the Zeppelin are so wholly new and are put to such wholly new uses with such wholly new manners, that they find the ablest jurists unprepared to say exactly how the Law of Nations, when it has, so to speak, recovered its breath, will deal with them and their ways. Assuredly it will in time deal with them; for, being founded on principle, it is admirably adaptable. But meantime these new Portents are as frightful as the Cross-Bow which when started in the twelfth century was forthwith condemned by the Church as an arm odious to God, or as the Musket which, when introduced in the fifteenth century, was deemed by Bayard so unlawful and unfair that he ordered all captured musketeers to be slain without mercy. In time Law and Usage will control and regulate the use of these still newer arms. Meantime Germans in their use acknowledge no law and reject all fairness and courtesy. They acknowledge no obligation to give notice—either by hoisting their own flag and firing the affirming gun, as the honourable old rule was, or otherwise; they do not fight openly at all, even against a defenceless merchantman, much less against a man-of-war: they lie in wait secretly for assassination, they murder man, woman or child, friend or enemy without distinction—and then disappear unnamed and unknown.

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Such horrible practices could not be allowed to continue without some attempt to deal with them. The Order in Council is what will prove a sufficient attempt. In effect it says—"Since you practice unscrupulous murder and piracy "on the high seas, we will again recur to our old system and "stop all your trade on the seas; and we will do this, as you "do that, by the sole exercise of our own power and authority "as a measure of Retaliation for your misdeeds." It is a very mild measure indeed. For it aims at Property alone, leaving Life wholly untouched. It is a very mannerly measure, for it will be and only can be enforced by the open, orderly bringing of the Property into court with all due form and ceremony. There is no lurking assassination, no loathsome murder about it of the defenceless. It is a plain, open and seamanlike plan.

It is, moreover, adopted as much for the sake of the Neutrals as for our own: their ships, like ours, and more often than ours if their relative numbers be taken into account, have been sunk and their crews in whole or in part drowned out of hand. They are in the same boat with us, and owe to us, for taking charge of the boat against their murderers and ours, some gratitude which will assuredly not be lacking.

Finally—and this is perhaps the most important consideration of all—the Order in Council will do no harm whatever to any neutral vessel. There is not one of its eight articles which confiscates the neutral ship, or even so much as suggests that any sort of penalty is to be inflicted upon her—with the sole exception of Article VI, and even that does but hint that she may be "liable to condemnation " for concealing her real and actual destination by false papers and declarations. The neutral ship going to or from Germany is indeed now to be forbidden to continue her voyage, is to be brought in to a British port, and made there to discharge her cargo. In that she suffers no harm. And since the whole Order is permeated by an especial tenderness for the cargo—even if guilty enemy property—there can be no

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question of at least the same but probably much greater tenderness being extended to the innocent neutral ship. The neutral ship will undoubtedly be released. She will, as undoubtedly, and according to the Law of Nations, have her freight paid to her in full as though she had completed her interrupted voyage. And besides that, it cannot be doubted that she will receive adequate and handsome compensation for any loss or inconvenience the interruption may have caused her. In no conceivable case will she be any the worse off for the interruption; in most cases she will probably be better off. The cargo when neutral property will of course—also in accordance with the Law of Nations—be released to its neutral owner. There is then no conceivable harm done to nor any conceivable cause of complaint left for any material damage whatever done to any neutral, whether owner of cargo or of ship.

There may indeed remain some desire to raise a claim for what President Kruger called "moral and intellectual "damage" involved in the interruption of what has hitherto been held lawful and innocent neutral trade with a belligerent, by methods which do not profess to be founded on the Law of Nations or the usage of the Sea, but only on the right to retaliate in our way upon those who, in contempt of Law and Usage have resorted in their way to assassination and murder. But in such a case no such shadowy claim, divested of all material damage whatever, could be seriously entertained or decently pressed. Least of all could any such be pressed by our cousins in kin and in sea power and our fellow believers in loyalty and mercy at sea, of the United States. To them the cry of the murdered will appeal with infinitely greater strength than any abstract empty right of a violated doctrine. And in the end they at least will once again remember that Blood is thicker than Water.

The American reply to the Notes transmitting the Order in Council—which, oddly enough, throughout gives the date of the Order as the 15th March instead of the true date of the 11th March—is dated the 2nd April. It is very

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moderate and very friendly. In effect it accepts the Order in Council, subject to a claim for compensation whenever the powers given by the Order shall be shown to have violated the Law of Nations. Nevertheless, it most properly criticizes some of the serious defects in the Order, and reserves the United States right to be judged by the Law of Nations alone.

For us the Order constitutes a return—irregular perhaps in form because of modern novelties and irregularities in warfare, yet effective in fact—to that very Law, and a resumption of the priceless rights which that Law has always sanctioned.

In any case the die is now cast. There are no two ways about the effectual use of sea power. We have, after too long hesitation, come back to the one only way of laying an inhibition upon all German sea-borne trade. It will be effectual. Its effects will not be sudden but they will be certain and ever-increasing in intensity. All the bonds that our Fleet has too long borne are broken and cast away. They can never be restored. The Fleet is at last free. And day by day as the war proceeds, it will be seen that the arm of England is not shortened nor her strength diminished and that, as before so now, she can from the Sea reach and defeat her enemies in the remotest confines of the vastest continents.

BRITISH LIBERTY

“ . . . Our liberty cannot be taken away by the force or
“ fraud alone of those who govern; it cannot be taken away,
“ unless the people are themselves accomplices; and they
“ who are accomplices cannot be said to suffer by one or
“ the other. Some nations have received the yoke of servitude
“ with little or no struggle; but if ever it is imposed upon
“ us, we must not only hold out our necks to receive it, we
“ must help to put it on.”

(Bolingbroke's *Dissertation Upon
Parties*, Vol. III, p. 199.)

THE LAW OF NATIONS:

SEA LAW AND THE FAILURES TO ALTER IT

“When two Powers are at war, they have a right to make prizes of the ships, goods and effects of each other upon the high seas. Whatever is the property of the enemy may be acquired by capture at sea; but the property of a friend cannot be taken, provided he observes his neutrality.

“Hence the Law of Nations has established:

“That the goods of an enemy, on board the ship of a friend, may be taken.

“That the lawful goods of a friend, on board the ship of an enemy, ought to be restored.

“That contraband goods, going to the enemy, though the property of a friend, may be taken as prize; because supplying the enemy with what enables him better to carry on the war is a departure from neutrality.

“By the Maritime Law of Nations, universally and immemorially received, there is an established method of determining whether the capture be, or be not, lawful prize.

“Before the ship, or goods, can be disposed of by the captors, there must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may be heard; and condemnation thereupon as prize, in a Court of Admiralty, judging by the Law of Nations and Treaties.

“The proper and regular Court, for these condemnations, is the Court of that State to whom the captor belongs.

“

“By Courts of Admiralty acting according to the Law of Nations and particular Treaties, all captures at sea have immemorially been judged of in every country in Europe. Any other method of trial would be manifestly unjust, absurd, and impracticable.”

[Extract from a report made to King George II, in 1753, by

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Sir George Lee, Judge of the Prerogative Court; Dr Paul, H.M. Advocate-General; Sir Dudley Rider, H.M. Attorney-General; and Mr Murray (afterwards Lord Mansfield), H.M. Solicitor-General; quoted by Sir W. Scott and Sir J. Nicholl, in a letter in 1794, in answer to an inquiry upon the subject from the American Ambassador, Mr Jay, as being, in their judgment, the most correct and succinct statement of the general principles of proceeding in Prize Causes in British Courts of Admiralty. Phillimore's *International Law*, Vol. III, p. 666.]

THE Law of Nations is, and ever has been since there were Nations or any Law between them, that when one nation is at war with another either may capture all the goods of the other anywhere on the high seas. For the high seas are no nation's territory but are of common use to all. Wherefore the Law of Nations always was and still is that a neutral ship cannot there give any protection to enemy property; that in any such ship such property remains as liable to capture and condemnation as good prize as if it were found in an enemy ship. Yet, out of tenderness to the neutral and therefore friendly power, the neutral ship, when detained, brought in and the enemy property taken out of her, is to have her freight paid as though she had completed her voyage, and is to be dismissed unharmed as though guiltless. If, indeed, the neutral ship is found to have been breaking, or attempting to break, a blockade or to be engaged in the contraband—or unlawful—trade with the enemy of supplying his armed forces with arms and munitions of war by carrying them overseas to a port of naval or military equipment, then a different set of considerations arises and a different treatment is accorded to her. But that is another story.

The right of capture of enemy property does not depend on the nature of the Property, whether this or that, but solely on the fact of its being enemy property. As such it falls under the general sentence of confiscation of all the enemy's property promulgated by the Declaration of War itself. Let it be remembered that that Declaration also

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confiscates the enemy's life. Before that Declaration, to shoot and kill a German anywhere is murder punishable with a halter; after it, to shoot and kill a German in fair battle is a good patriotic British deed to be rewarded with praise by Field Marshals and Home Secretaries, and perhaps with the Victoria Cross. Before that Declaration, to seize German property on the high seas was robbery of the worst kind—nay, it was piracy which made the perpetrator an enemy of all mankind; after it, to capture German property on the high seas became a British duty. Whatever justifies killing the sniper in the field justifies with infinitely more completeness the capture of the property on the sea. If there be any right at all to take life on land, there cannot but be an equal right to take property at sea. Nor, let it be repeated, does the quality of the life or of the property affect the right. The Pomeranian sniper may be a worthy man, the father of an excellent family, possibly a Professor of Heidelberg, which in Germany is held to be the very highest type of humanity known on earth; it matters not: we shoot him when we can, and hope for Victoria Crosses and Mr Asquith's approval. The Property may be of the most innocent and necessary character. It may be a cargo of soap and small tooth combs for Berlin, where both are notoriously needed; it matters not: we capture it and confiscate it because it is the enemy's. That suffices.

This, then, is the Law of Nations. The sanction of that Law is the common consent of all nations, indicated in Treaties, Conventions, Dispatches or Arguments, and authoritatively declared by the Prize Courts of the Nations, whose duty it is to apply and administer, not any Municipal Law peculiar to the nation in which the Prize Court sits, still less the desires or notions of the Government of that nation—but the settled principles of the Law of Nations, to which all consent and whereby all are bound, the one towards the other. Of this Law the binding force as between all has been again and again asserted and admitted

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in thousands of recorded dispatches, protocols, Conventions and Treaties, and has never once by any been denied. There have indeed been many times differences between the nations as to what the True Law of Nations is, just as there have been and are constant differences between the individuals of each nation as to what is in each such nation the True Municipal Law of that nation—the Law of Property, of Inheritance and so forth. There are, moreover, in each nation provisions and methods whereby the municipal law may be from time to time altered in detail so as to be adapted to new and altered circumstances while preserving the principle, or even altered in the very principle itself. The individual Law-giver—the Solon, or Lycurgus, or Napoleon—having authority from the whole people of the State so to do, has made such alterations of detail or of principle in former times; the Assembly or Assemblies, having a like authority, and wherein the whole people are intended to be represented, have made such alterations in our modern days. And in each case the alterations whether of detail within the principle, or even of the principle itself, stand good and effectual for the people of that nation itself. But they are good and effectual for them only. They are binding upon no other people or nation whatever, since each other has an equal right with this to its own laws made by and for itself.

The Law of Nations stands on the same ground. There is no Solon, no Lycurgus, no Napoleon of the Nations. Each is sovereign and independent of the others. The Law of Nations, consented to by all, and sanctioned by the consent of all, applies nevertheless because of that consent to all of them, whatever and however varying the letter or even the spirit of their own national laws may be. For the Law of Nations there is therefore only one means whereby an effectual alteration may be made. That means is the agreement to the alteration of every nation concerned, in other words the common agreement of all the nations of the earth. For each is to be bound by it and, being sovereign and

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independent, none can be so bound without its own consent. Nothing less, therefore, than the consent of all and each will suffice for any departure from the spirit or any reversal of the principle of the Law of Nations up to then accepted, enforced and acted upon by all. It is not enough for one or two nations to convince themselves that such and such an alteration is needful or desirable. They must convince all, or nothing is effectually and conclusively done. In this there is no other way. Some one or two nations have no right to impose their own conviction upon other nations equally sovereign and independent with themselves; nor if they had the right have they even the power; for to do so would be to deny and to destroy the sovereignty and independence of those other nations; and equally to deny and destroy their own therewith. So long as the other nations stand out against any alteration, resist it and refuse to accept it, the alteration is not made, and the Law of Nations, the creature and result of common consent, remains, for want of common consent to the alteration, exactly where it was before the alteration was proposed. "As to the position" (says Robert Ward in his treatise of 1801) that "where the majority of treaties "have fixed upon any given point between the powers that "contract, it shall form the law for those which have not "contracted, it is really too absurd to demand one "moment's attention."

Quite manifestly this must be so and no otherwise. Nor are concrete examples wanting to show that in fact is so. As already said of the Law of Nations, the Law of the Sea, an essential—indeed the most essential—part thereof, had from the very beginning, ever since Nations and Laws for them had been known, this for its central doctrine—that War gives to each nation at War the right to capture and to confiscate to its own uses all property of the enemy nation found at sea, whether in the enemy's own ships or in any others whatever. That was the Law of Nations expressed and recognized in the

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great Sea Code of the *Consolato del Mare* propounded at Rome and Amalfi in the eleventh and at Marseilles and Barcelona during the thirteenth century (if not earlier) and accepted and acted upon by all without doubt or question thenceforth for four hundred years. Then an attempt was made to alter it.

In the seventeenth century the Dutch claimed an alteration in this ancient law. In 1654 De Witt on behalf of Holland suggested the new doctrine, "Free ship free goods" or in other words the restriction of the right of capture and confiscation to such enemy goods as might be found in enemy ships alone, and the exemption from capture of any such goods when found in neutral ships. It was at once pointed out that De Witt himself had, only two years earlier, in 1652, when war with England was approaching, declared that Holland would regard with suspicion any neutral ships, whatever their cargo or destination, which might so much as be found "on the coasts of England or its dependencies," and that if any neutral were found "laden partly or entirely with any munitions of war or foodstuffs," they would be liable to capture and confiscation by the Dutch Courts. It was noted, moreover, that this new and sudden departure in the contrary direction was avowedly proposed by the Dutch because it was feared by them that, were the existing law adhered to without their proposed alteration, "the United Provinces of Holland would lose the advantages they obtain from trading with all nations." The proposal therefore seemed to be one made not upon its own merits nor because the Dutch believed it to be good and sound in itself; but rather because, having themselves acted upon and even exaggerated the law when themselves belligerents, they now desired to escape from it and to alter it in their own interests now that they themselves were, and whenever in future they themselves might be, neutrals. The proposal for alteration seemed therefore inconsistent, uncandid, dishonest and purely selfish on the part of

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Holland. But even had it been completely otherwise in all respects, yet the alteration could not be made unless all other nations consented to it. That at least was not questioned. That was undenied by all, assumed by all as a matter of course. The Dutch proposal for alteration was therefore made to England and to France. England, then under the rule of Cromwell, who knew what war was and what its laws and was not easily to be fooled, curtly and even contemptuously refused to agree to the alteration. France also refused. And, with even the beginning of a common agreement of the nations thus denied, the Dutch statesmen sadly dropped their dream of freely carrying in Dutch ships the commerce of a world at war. The attempt to alter the Law of Nations had failed because there was no general acceptance by all nations to the change, but on the contrary an immediate refusal of acceptance by two of them, and no hope of acceptance by the others. The Law of Nations remained as it was.

A second attempt at the same alteration met the same fate, for the same reason. It was made ninety-eight years later by Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. England, being then at war with France and Spain, had detained and brought in for adjudication certain Prussian ships and their cargoes alleged to be enemy property. Frederick, with characteristic Prussian arrogance, declared in a memorial sent to the English Government in 1752 that, because of this, he had seized large sums of money due from himself to certain English merchants, and would refuse to pay to those merchants the interest due to them on the Silesian loan. This went beyond De Witt's proposal for an alteration in the Law of Nations. It was an arrogant and altogether unfounded allegation that the alteration was already in fact made and, besides that, an insolent robbery of British merchants by way of reprisals for the alleged breach of the non-existent alteration. The procedure was true Prussian. But the elder Mr Pitt was then a member of the English ministry. That ministry therefore repudiated

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the insolent Prussian claim by the famous reply thereto of the Duke of Newcastle in 1753; the Prussian Minister abandoned the revived claim for free ship free goods; King Frederick resumed payment of the interest on the Silesian loan; and the incident ended. The Law of Nations still remained as it was.

A third attempt at the same alteration, and at some others, was made eight-and-twenty years later, but always with the same result. In 1780 the Empress Catherine of Russia, finding England then at war with France, Spain and her own revolted American colonies, once again raised the same demand for an alteration in the law embodying the already twice rejected doctrine of "free ship free goods" and now added to it the claim that the convoy of a neutral man-of-war should exempt all merchant ships thus convoyed from all inquiry or question as to themselves or their cargo. She induced Denmark to join in her demand in that same year, Holland and Prussia in the next year, and Sweden later. All these five States joined together in what was called the Armed Neutrality, and bound themselves to maintain, if need were by force of arms, the new doctrines. England, however, although with three great enemies on her hands, did not hesitate to oppose the five others who now threatened her rights of offence at sea. She continued to affirm and to exercise those rights. And when "eighty-nine" brought the first warning of the French revolutionary wars, followed in 1792 by their actual outbreak, Russia herself led the way to a dissolution of the Armed Neutrality by a Convention with England reaffirming the law as it stood. And in the ensuing struggle against the Jacobins of France all the five Powers that had combined to force the abandonment of maritime rights proceeded to exercise against France the very rights they had sought to abolish. The Law of Nations still remained as it was.

In 1800 a fourth attempt was made—always on the same lines—by the Second Armed Neutrality, revived for that

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purpose by Russia. One of its immediate results was the destruction in April, 1801, by Nelson at Copenhagen, of the fleet of Denmark which had again become a party to the Armed Neutrality; and this was immediately followed by the Convention of 5th June, 1801, whereby Russia once again affirmed the maritime rights that had thus again been brought into question. The Law of Nations still remained as it was.

Thus for a century and a half the Law had survived untouched the repeated open attempts to change it. It had survived owing to its unswerving defence against one and all by England. For England was well aware that her growing sea-power depended wholly upon the exercise of her right to capture the enemy's property at sea as sanctioned by the Law of Nations. She attached so much importance to the full exercise of this right that she was ready to face all Europe in arms rather than surrender it. And her resistance was justified by the event.

Yet the attempts upon the right were not abandoned. The military nations of Europe, as conscious as England of the tremendous power it gave to her not only against Navies on the Sea but also against Armies on the Land; jealous and fearful of that strange and terrible competition of ships with battalions which England alone could set up; jealous possibly of the wealth and importance as well as of the strength that the use of the sea had brought to the little sandbank in the North Sea which did not so much as possess one of those armies to which they attached sole importance and which, as they held, should be the only instruments of war; and all equally concerned to exalt their own military power at the expense of this insular naval power—these military nations still secretly cherished the purpose and entertained the hope of rendering it ineffectual. Their desire inevitably bound them all together in an unavowed permanent league against the one naval power. Their purpose was so to stretch and enlarge the Law of Nations as to cover every act of force, every spoliation,

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cruelty and barbarity when exercised by Armies on Land; and yet so to shrink and lessen it as to bar any effectual use of power by Navies at Sea. That, as the English had seen, and as the Military Powers all saw, was only to be effected by such an alteration in the Law of Nations as had been attempted and had four times failed. But those attempts had been frank, violent and open. The next, if it were to succeed, must be by secret sap.

It was so made in 1856. Without the knowledge of the English people or Parliament, without any opportunity afforded for a repetition of the speeches whereby Pitt and Fox in the Commons, and Nelson and Grenville in the Lords, had in 1801 resisted the previous attempt, it was now renewed. Furtively and secretly, and without any authority for their act, Lords Clarendon and Cowley signed the Declaration of Paris of that year embodying the assertion of the very doctrine—free ship free goods—which England had for two centuries persistently resisted and always defeated. The document they signed was no Treaty; it was no Convention; it was ratified by the Emperor Napoleon III, perhaps by other sovereigns, but never by any English Monarch; it was a presumptuous and wholly unauthorized abandonment by these two Lords of secular English policy and principles. It was only an unwarranted declaration, made by them personally together with certain representatives of certain military nations, that the Law of Nations was now at last altered. This was the thing attempted to be done. This was the essential thing. Yet in this thing there was failure, not only complete but avowed. For the Declaration itself declared of itself, that it “is not and will not be obligatory except between the “Powers which have or which shall have acceded to it.” It was thus confessed to be no alteration at all of the Law of Nations as acknowledged by common consent of all nations; but only an arrangement by which no nation was to be bound which did not accede to it. It is on exactly the same footing as the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800;

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binding between those States that had agreed thereto so long as they chose to remain bound—as none of them in fact did for any length of time—but yet binding on no other State. This was no alteration in the Law of Nations. It could only become that by the common acceptance and universal accession of all nations. It must have that or the alteration would not be made. It must, at the very least, have the accession of all the nations most immediately and most seriously to be affected by it—at the very least of all the great Maritime Nations. These it had not; and upon that rock it split. It has never yet been acceded to by the United States. Despite the repeated and most urgent appeals by the other foxes that have lost their own tails the United States has wisely and prudently stood out in possession of its own. Certain Presidents and Governments of the States have for various reasons at various times coquetted with the Declaration of Paris, or have even temporarily (as in their Spanish war) acted in accordance with it. But no one of them has ever dared to propose to the United States Senate to accede to it. Without the assent of that Senate no such accession can be made. And, as it is impossible for any United States Envoy, Minister or President to do for his country without the authority of the Senate what Lords Clarendon and Cowley affected to do for theirs without any authority whatever, so it is not to be expected that the Senate itself will now or at any future time succumb to the insidious blandishments which have been ineffectual, however often repeated, during fifty years. However that may be, the essential fact remains that the accession of the United States is still withheld; and, so long as that is lacking, the absence of that alone suffices to prevent the Declaration of Paris from taking place as part of the Common Law of Nations accepted by the common consent of all. It remains, if anything, no more than, so to speak, a private arrangement, affecting only themselves, between the nations that have with due authority acceded to it. Despite all, the Law of Nations still remained as it was.

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Other and later attempts to alter the law have since been made. They have all been as ambitious as the event has shown them to be ineffectual. At the Hague Conference of 1907 there was a great rally and gathering of the Military Powers animated by a twofold purpose—the exaggeration of Military Power on Land and, as was hoped, the final destruction of its sole competitor Naval Power at Sea. It was a revival of the old conspiracy of Frederick the Great and of Catherine against the predominant and, in effect, therefore—at least in Europe—the sole Naval Nation. England was now convened to her own destruction; not, as in 1856 at Paris, secretly to a deed done in the dark, but openly, authoritatively, solemnly in the sacred name of—Peace! And England accepted the invitation. All but a few had forgotten what War is. Many English tradesmen had conceived the notion that Trade had superseded War. Some philanthropists had imagined that War—if ever it came again, which they doubted—might be, and should be, conducted, at least so far as Trade was concerned, as though it were Peace; and that, while soldiers and sailors might conceivably, though improbably, yet come again to fighting their fellow-countrymen should, in that event, go on trading as though there were no fighting. The Liberal Party, which contained the larger proportion—indeed nearly all—of those who held that the Millennium was thus to be approached, had just been brought back to power in England with a greater preponderance in numbers than had ever yet been known in Parliament. The moment was as favourable. Instead of a Cromwell, a Pitt, or a Fox, there were now a Grey, an Asquith and a Haldane owing allegiance to, and forced to woo the support of, a strong, subscribing and vocal Peace Party. The opportunity was great; it might never recur. It was made the most of.

By a refinement of cynicism the Conference called at The Hague to alter the Laws of War, which was intended to deal, and which in fact did deal, with nothing else whatever, was called a Peace Conference. It was solemnly adjured to

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seek "the luminous star of Universal Peace," and it at once proceeded to provide for nothing less than Universal War. To this Convention Sir Edward Grey sent an eminent Quaker and a handful of by no means eminent Foreign Office clerks and instruments with general instructions to agree, on behalf of England, to the surrender of all those maritime rights which hitherto she had for centuries so stoutly and so successfully defended despite all threats against all comers—together generally with any other such rights as the Military Nations might desire to see destroyed.

What distinguished this last attempt from all others that had gone before was that this time a determined effort was made to avoid the vice that had to those others been fatal—the vice of being partial and not general. This time the attempt was made to get a general, and so far as might be a universal, agreement to what was intended to be done. Not, as before, one or two or three nations, but every possible nation was convened to the Love Feast at The Hague. Forty-five independent sovereign states were brought together, big and little, of all colours and all degrees of civilization or savagery. Yet even then the list was incomplete. Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Domingo, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Luxembourg, Nicaragua and Panama, Salvador, Serbia and Switzerland were invited; but not Tibet, Muscat, Morocco, Liberia, Liechtenstein, San Marino or Andorra, not even Wurtemberg; Saxony nor Bavaria though these were all in law, and some of them in fact, as independent and sovereign as half a dozen of those invited, and far more competent and respectable. Forty-five states were convened, though (since Honduras omitted to send a representative) they were in fact only forty-four who met. The 156 delegates who represented them talked and wrote for four months. They turned out fourteen Conventions, including one to set up an International Prize Court, which was to go as it pleased and (as M. Renault, the delegate of the French military power,

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frankly avowed) was "to make the Law" for Seamen and the Sea, and was not to be fettered by any "legal system of proofs." Most of the Conventions escaped attention; but as to that one which set up the International Prize Court to make the Law for itself it was at once suggested that it would be better to make the Law for the Court. Wherefore Sir Edward Grey convened in London a new assembly of nations—not indeed of forty-five but only of ten this time, the remaining thirty-five being now told that they must stand out because they were not "principal naval powers." These ten then proceeded to cook up the Declaration of London "concerning the laws of naval warfare." It professed to alter much of the Law of Nations as hitherto existent. All the alterations were so many surrenders of Naval rights. And to crown all there was appended to it an inspired commentary by M. Renault, the representative of France, one of the Military powers to which those rights were to be sacrificed.

The thing, as was now fondly believed, was done. There only remained, so far as England was concerned, a few Acts of Parliament to pass and all would be complete and final.

But the very first of the Acts of Parliament—to authorize the things necessary to carry out The Hague Prize Court Convention—was rejected by Parliament. The Hague Prize Court could therefore not be constituted. And the Declaration of London, made especially for the especial use of that Court, was left in the forlorn condition of a derelict Law without any Court to enforce it. This broke the back of the diplomatic donkey laden with all these brand-new laws and conventions. Four more bills, without which four more of the fourteen Conventions could not be carried into effect, were formally introduced into Parliament only to be forthwith dropped. The whole fabric collapsed visibly. Of The Hague adventures and the London exploits there remained nothing but the wails of Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr Hurst weeping for their children because they were not and yet trying to pretend that they still were.

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Then suddenly the "Luminous Star of Universal Peace" went out. Grim War supervened. All felt at once—all except the Foreign Office, which only felt it later—that the time for trifling was past. The very event for which all the Conventions—such as remained of them, and the Court—now shipwrecked, and the London Declaration of the Law had been prepared, now came to test their value, their efficacy and their force. Before that test they all disappeared like snowflakes in a flood. All the conventions intended to prevent war by mediation, arbitration and other devices went without question, by common consent of the nations about to war with each other, all of whom were equally aware of their futility. Not the slightest attention was—at the very moment for which they had been provided—paid either to No. 1, for the pacific settlement of international disputes, or to No. 2, for the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts, or to No. 3, relative to the opening of hostilities—nor in fact to any other survivors of the whole batch. But the fate of the Declaration of London was the worst of all. In vain the Foreign Office, always equally enamoured of that great shadow, bleated in an Order in Council a pretence that it still existed. The whole world broke into a scornful denial of the pretence and the Declaration together. The United States especially dismissed the Declaration. "This Government," it wrote on 22nd October, 1914, "will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States, irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration of London"; and Mr Page's Note of 2nd April, 1915, which cites the claim of 22nd October, does but amplify and repeat it. The United States in a word curtly, completely and finally dismiss the Declaration out of the field of authority and treat it as non-existent and of no account. Our Government had at the outset affected to adopt the Declaration only on the strict condition that it should be

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destroyed. But at length the Foreign Office, by the mouth of Mr Primrose,* explained that it had not really adopted it, but only had been "prepared to adopt" it, and that to the modifications which destroyed it there would probably soon be added others which would destroy it over again. As indeed did soon occur through the Order in Council of 11th March, which stamped into powder both that Declaration and its elder sister of Paris, together with the remains of all the Hague Conventions.

And so the Law of Nations still remains to-day what it was.

All the attempts upon it have finally failed, to the complete confusion of all who have made them. Deformed often, and sometimes defaced; daubed again and again with Conventions and Declarations which hid it for a time only to disappear with the first shower; pronounced sometimes to be non-existent, many times to be negligible; defended for centuries against the whole world by the Sea Island that Destiny herself had appointed its sole guardian, yet at last abandoned as shamefully even by that Island; caricatured at The Hague; betrayed in London; and there, as was thought, finally brought to an end, laid away into a grave and superseded for ever by brand-new inventions—the Law of Nations has yet broken at last all its grave-clothes, has once again started up, has shaken off the trappings and fripperies so elaborately wound about it, and is found to be once more what it always was, the sole body of Laws that ever existed to govern the nations in their dealings one with the other, whether in Peace or in War. There it stands once again liberated from its cerements, freed of trumpery, in all its natural beauty and majesty, the nearest human embodiment of the Laws of God and of Nature ever erected on the pedestal of Right Reason—simple, sufficient, admirable in all its proportions. The labours of the wisest and ablest of mankind have gone to its making, and not in vain. The acutest intellects, the highest

* Parl. Debates. H.C. Official Report, 8th February, 1915, col. 230.

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conceptions of morality, the profoundest sense of justice and equity, charity and humanity tempered by custom and experience have come together to perfect it. The historian, the jurist and the moralist have worked together, and all between them have elaborated in the Law of Nations the greatest Masterpiece of Mankind.

To that Law, and to that alone, it is that all the nations still appeal. They can still do no otherwise. To that at last they must all come. They have doubted it, denied it, disfigured it, violated it and come as near as they could to destroying it by their many inventions. The inventions have gone. That remains. Of that all still acknowledge the force. To that the common consent still gives complete sanction. Whatever else disappears, that remains: immutable, eternal.

RIGHT REASON

“**T**HERE is a true law—Right Reason—conformable to
“ Nature, inscribed in all hearts, immutable, eternal;
“ whose voice teaches and prescribes that which is good,
“ deters from the evil which it forbids, and whether by its
“ orders or by its prohibitions, never addresses itself in vain
“ to the good nor remains impotent even with the wicked.
“ This law never can be contradicted by anything nor
“ repealed in part, still less entirely abrogated. The Senate,
“ the people, cannot release us from our obedience to it.
“ It is itself its own interpreter, its own commentator. It is
“ not one thing in Rome, another in Athens; one to-day,
“ another to-morrow; with all nations, at all epochs, it
“ reigns; one, eternal, immutable. The Master of the
“ Universe, sovereign of creation, willed, sanctioned,
“ promulgated this law, and man cannot deny it without
“ renouncing himself and putting off his human character.”

(Cicero, *De Republica*, Book III,
Chap. XIV.)

MORE MARTIAL LAW

THE TIGHTENING GRIP ON JONES

IN the preceding number of this REVIEW we recounted the destruction of constitutional rights and liberty by a democratic Government, and the appalling array of bonds which, under the plea of Defending the Realm, had been drawn around the person of Jones—the Average Citizen. This supersession of Constitutional Right by Martial Law may be presented under another simile—the stripping of Jones. We may regard Jones naked—stripped of constitutional rights, shivering unprotected on that native soil which has been made hospitable to him just by reason of the ample covering of rights and liberties, painfully woven through long centuries, which has shielded him from the blasts of despotism and the chill winds and rains of bureaucratic oppression. This is the more than disagreeable spectacle which a “Liberal” Government and a Parliament hypnotized by the Political Truce have furnished for our disedification.

Since we wrote last the stripping process has been varied. The culminating indecency of taking from Jones his right to trial by judge and jury and ordinary civil process of law, even in cases involving the death penalty, has been, in a measure, atoned for. The right to this cherished form of justice has been restored, after a fashion, in an Act amending the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, making the fourth Defence of the Realm Act promulgated within seven months. And while Jones is offering up his thanks-

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giving for that mercy we may note one or two circumstances connected with this governmental sign of grace.

The amiable idea of abrogating the right to civil trial by jury occurred to the Apostles of Liberty who rule our land quite early in the war. It was arranged under the first of the Defence of the Realm Acts, and was regarded as such a slight matter that the Attorney-General subsequently forgot it, and thought the outrage only dated back to the Consolidation Act. No one seemed to mind. The general public was engrossed in war news; Members of Parliament of whatever party thought their patriotic duty consisted in murmuring "How delightful!" to any proposal the aforesaid Apostles might make. And the Apostles were thus encouraged to make a further attempt on the liberty of Jones. Defence of the Realm Bill No. 3 abrogated the right to jury trial even in the case of capital offences. The People's House received the proposal also quite cheerfully: not a Member regarded it as worth even a remark. The other House took a more serious view, and the criticisms and protests of peers whose words carry weight gave the Government an uncomfortable quarter of an hour, and rendered somewhat less than accurate the Attorney-General's subsequent remark in the House of Commons that the Bill "was passed by general consent." But the rushing ruse was successfully practised. There was really no time, the Lords were told, to discuss amendments, or for anything else, but just to get the Bill through, as the adjournment was fixed for an hour or two later. So the monstrous proposal passed upon the Statute Book.

But by now certain peers, if no others, were aroused, and when the House of Lords met in January, Ministers saw that they meant business, and, to avoid legislation being promoted over their heads—the introduction of which would expose them badly before a democratic public—they themselves promised to introduce at some convenient time a Bill to blot out their own iniquitous Act. And so "the time arrived" (we quote the Attorney-

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General's euphemism) when the Government might "make certain modifications." They appear in the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act.

The Act provides that a British subject charged with an offence under the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, shall be entitled to claim to be tried by a civil court with a jury, instead of being tried by court martial. *Of course*, every one exclaims now. And it is of course, unless our Constitution and our fundamental rights are to be torn into shreds as small as Germany tore its scrap of Belgian paper. But what of the Government which a few short months ago proposed this destruction, and rebuked the peers who criticized the forcing of the proposal through Parliament with unprecedented, indecent haste? What of the People's Representatives in the Commons' House, who had not one word of protest, or even perfunctory comment, to offer upon the proposal when it was before them? What of the Opposition and its leaders? What of the Press, of all parties, which is so ready to lash itself into fury and to thunder invective over trifles of political dispute, but had not had a word to utter concerning this proposal, and the greater part of it not even space to chronicle the advent of the outrage? Jones can breathe more freely now that the wrong has been (to some extent) righted; but in the light of this experience can he any longer repose a blind faith in his rulers, and give them *carte blanche* to order the affairs of State in these perilous times according to their untrammelled whims? Clearly he cannot. Clearly he must replace faith by sceptical vigilance. And so this amazing episode aptly teaches an urgently important lesson. It is in the light of it that other proposals of the Government must be approached; and, remembering it, no one will accuse us of lacking patriotism if we subject these other proposals to scrutiny.

But we have not yet finished with this Act for restoring the right to approach the Courts of Justice. It will be noted that the right of civil trial is confined to British subjects.

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Why? It is not so under the general law. And, during the war, there have been perfectly satisfactory trials by jury of foreigners—at the Central Criminal Court, for example. Why this churlish and dangerous refusal of a proper civil trial to an alien, who may be a subject of one of our allies, or of friendly neutral nations? Rapidity of action under trial by court martial was the Attorney-General's plea for refusing to give way; but arrest would be as rapid, and trial nearly so, in one case as in the other. And this desire for the swiftest possible punishment of a suspected person, which Sir John Simon avowed as the Government's chief reason, gives an insincere colour to his second argument—that juries are likely to be prejudiced against prisoners with foreign-sounding names. Mr Duke tried to fortify Sir John Simon's weak case by imagining an invasion of England, and spies acting in the sphere of operations; to which there is the obvious reply that foreign spies could be laid by the heels as rapidly whether their subsequent trial was to be in a law court or a barracks. Further, the Act itself provides for its own suspension by Royal Proclamation in the event of invasion or other special military emergency arising out of the war.

In practice the differentiation between British subjects and aliens for the purposes of this Act and this war, must be largely nugatory, seeing that dangerous alien enemies may have taken out their naturalization papers. And the principle of differentiation is a distasteful one, whether we regard its weakening effect upon the inviolability of the right of trial by jury in this country, or upon the liberal justice—the courtesy of international relations—which gives to an alien in this country in peril of his life or liberty the same right of defence which a citizen enjoys.

The provision for suspension of the Act in case of invasion or other special military emergency, is an important qualification of the restored right which deserves attention. An amendment to the clause proposed in the House of Commons by Sir Ryland Adkins evoked a new exhibition of the

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Government's determination to wield despotic authority. The motion was to insert, after the words "special military emergency arising out of the present war," the words "by which the civil courts are rendered unavailable"; and Sir Ryland Adkins supported his amendment by an admirable speech, pleading for a continuance of the unbroken practice of centuries, and for the maintenance of that rule of law under which the authority of the civil courts can only be suspended when, owing to invasion or tumult, those courts are unable to act. But his plea fell upon deaf ears. The Government refused the amendment, and by its refusal emphasized the truth of the assertion already made in this REVIEW, that the Constitution has been fundamentally violated, and that that unknown thing, Martial Law, has been intruded upon it.

Our Constitution provides—in the nature of the case any Constitution must implicitly provide—for some authority to take the place of an authority temporarily unable to act; but, except in face of this fact of actual inability, nothing, according to our Constitution, can derogate from the authority of civil justice. Now that has been changed, and though this Act affects to restore the authority of civil justice which its predecessors had taken away, the restoration is subject to the inhibition of the Executive—"in case of special military emergency arising out of the present war." Whenever it pleases the Executive to declare that such a vague contingency as an "emergency" has arisen, the civil courts will be thereupon closed. So despotism—the untrammelled will of a man or men in power—is fixed upon the nation even more firmly. There is but one law—what the Executive chooses at the moment to decree.

This is what Mr Attorney-General Simon called "taking adequate steps." But "adequate" is not an adjective of extension and quantity, but of proportion, and a man of such usually well-chosen words as is Sir John should have been more careful. "Adequate" means har-

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monious adjustment of means to end, not rough excess. This particular form of despotism is not a necessary means to the end of national defence, and Sir John failed, in his reply to Sir Ryland Adkins, to bring forward anything to justify his Government's claim, although he said what he could, even to the point of uttering such a shocking inaccuracy as to deny that the original Bills setting up martial law had been passed in a hurry. Can he have forgotten the hustling and the brow-beating of the peers on the 27th of November, when they begged the Government to pause, and not rush such a Bill through the House in a few hours?

Of course another set of Regulations has been issued, in order to carry out the new legislation. These Regulations are very careful to preserve the power of trial by court martial, and the concession of civil trial seems to be made as grudgingly as possible. An accusation of an offence against the multifarious Regulations is first to "be referred" to the competent naval or military authority, who shall "forthwith investigate the case, and determine whether" or not the case is to be proceeded with, and if it is to be "proceeded with, whether or not it is an offence of such a minor character as can adequately be dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction." If this authority determines that it is to be proceeded with, and is not of the minor character referred to, then it is for the "offender" (this is the inaccurate and prejudging way in which an accused person is described) to claim (if a British subject and not amenable to naval or military law) a civil trial; if he does not make a claim, he is tried by court martial.

Finally there comes yet another set of Regulations by Order in Council of 13th April (gazetted on the 14th), two of which deal with the concession of civil trial to alleged offenders. One of them enacts that if the suspected person is to be tried by a civil court and jury, he may (in England and Ireland) "without any warrant from a justice of the peace be detained in any of His Majesty's prisons as a

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“person committed for trial for felony”—though of course he has not been so committed. We thus get yet another proof that the Government intends to import into its proceedings as many of the essentials of martial law as it can.

So the garment snatched from the shivering Jones has now been replaced in such a perilous condition as to fastenings, that he must be as much concerned at the prospect of a puff of wind blowing it away again as he is thankful for its restoration.

Meanwhile the stripping process has been carried a step further. Before Defence of the Realm Bill No. 4 had had time to get upon the Statute Book, Defence of the Realm Bill No. 5 (known as the Defence of the Realm (Amendment No. 2) Act) had been introduced to the Commons by Mr Lloyd George. This measure has aroused more general interest than its companion; for it concerns Jones, not as a possible suspect or misdemeanant under the Regulations, but in his daily capacity as a man of business. It is a different kind of measure, and criticism upon it—for criticism is inevitable—may be of a milder calibre. But first let us remind the reader of what the Act does.

The Consolidation Act of November last had given power to the Admiralty and the Army Council to require that the output of any factory or workshop manufacturing arms, ammunition, warlike stores or equipment, or any articles needed for their production, should be placed at their disposal; it also gave these Departments authority to take possession of, and use, the factory or workshop or its plant. In the Regulations made under the Act there is a provision for payment to the occupier of a factory or workshop whose goods are requisitioned of such price as, in default of agreement, may be decided to be reasonable by a High Court Judge; where the factory or its plant are taken, it is ordered that the occupier and his servants (including directors where the occupier is a company) shall obey the directions of the Admiralty or Army Council as to the

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user of the factory or its plant—in each case under pain of an offence against the Regulations for refusal to comply.

To these powers the new Act adds the following:

“to require any work in any factory or workshop to be done in accordance with the directions of the Admiralty or Army Council, given with the object of making the factory or workshop, or the plant or labour therein, as useful as possible for the production of war material;

“to regulate or restrict the carrying on of work in any factory or workshop, or remove the plant therefrom, with a view to increasing the production of war material in other workshops or factories”; and

“to take possession of any unoccupied premises for the purposes of housing workmen employed in the production, storage, or transport of war material.”

Put into untechnical language, this means that the naval and military authorities may not only take possession of factories and workshops engaged in the production of war material, and their plant and output, but they may take possession of *any* business premises and plant, and turn them into war material-producing concerns. Jones may be a maker of articles so far removed from war as perambulators or umbrellas: it matters not; if his premises can be utilized for making ammunition-belts or periscopes or rifles or red-tape, or if the plant in them can be conveniently used for the purpose, if set up in another factory, the conversion may be made, at short notice, on official command, and Jones find himself no longer the proud master of his peaceful business, but a War Office servant, forging weapons of destruction under military control. The process is called the Mobilization of Industrial Resources.

This Act has provoked yet another set of Regulations. They mostly repeat the powers conferred in the Act, but an interesting addition may be noted. Jones may be required to furnish to the naval and military gentlemen any particulars as to the output of his factory which they may like

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to demand—the usual severe penalties being provided in case of failure to comply.

Jones is a patriot, however peaceful. And he doesn't kick at this novel form of conscription—though, in view of the demands already made upon his liberty and his purse, he may well be excused a breathless exclamation of "What next!" But he cannot help facing with some seriousness two questions: (1) If he has not yet been "mobilized," will his turn come, and when? (2) What will be the result of it all upon his business? The uncertainty implied in question No. 1 is a depressing, and may be a seriously irritating, factor in his daily life, until he actually is "mobilized." Question No. 2 is likely to give him, after mobilization, some serious moments of reflection and speculation, as he turns over the leaves of his ledgers and wonders how his old and forcibly abandoned trade will stand when the war is over. Will his customers come flying back with the dove that brings peace?

Was the Act necessary? That its proposals are "drastic" (to use the parliamentarian's favourite term) is pretty obvious—"probably the most drastic that have ever been put to any House of Commons" was Mr Bonar Law's description. He also described them as "tremendous powers, and powers which, if abused, would do incalculable harm to the industries of this country."

But was the Act necessary? The answer—if we go no farther than its author's own recommendations when introducing it—must be "No." We are not proposing it, he told the House, "because we have experienced any difficulty with any individual employer or workmen." He did not plead necessity at all—not in his introductory speech, that is; afterwards, when, to his surprise, the hitherto obsequious House ventured upon criticism, he took a more pronounced note, and suggested necessity. But we may rely upon his first speech.

Then was the Act, if not actually necessary, yet so desirable as to override the manifest objections to it?

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“We think it is better,” Mr George said, “even for the
“employers that it should be done in obedience to an Act
“of Parliament, rather than at a request from the Govern-
“ment.” And then follows the reason: “Because those
“[employers] that are limited liability companies especially
“have to consider their shareholders, and they have respon-
“sibilities to them, and they have also to consider their
“trust deeds and articles of association, and there are
“difficulties of that kind which can only be overridden by
“the express direction of an Act of Parliament. We have,
“therefore, proposed to take these statutory powers, not
“because we anticipate difficulties with employers, but
“purely and simply in order to enable employers themselves
“to get over difficulties which they might otherwise ex-
“perience.” Purely and simply that! We have already
referred to Ministerial misuse of the word “adequate.”
Here is another extraordinary instance. In order to get
over the difficulty of asking a manufacturing company to go
outside the limits of its Articles of Association—(seeing
how widely such articles are always drawn we doubt if there
would be many cases)—manufacturers of every kind are
forced under severe penalties to hold themselves in readi-
ness to hand over their works and plant to military autho-
rities, to work under those authorities at an unaccustomed
trade, and to incur, without definite promise of proper
compensation, any resultant loss to their own business;
whereas the purpose sought could have been just as well
achieved by a simple Act of Indemnity to any company
directors who, in altering the output to military require-
ments, might go beyond the scope of their Articles of
Association! But not even an Indemnity Act was neces-
sary: the simple procedure of a petition by the company
concerned to the Chancery Court under Section 9 of the
Companies (Consolidation) Act for an extension of the
objects of association would be enough. Curiously, one
manufacturing company adopted that course, after the
passing of the Act, and notwithstanding it; that company’s

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solicitors should surely have apologized to their fellow practitioner for so cruelly demonstrating the superfluity of his blatantly puffed measure.

In view of the subject matter, an engineering simile will be most apt: such legislation is using gigantic crushing machinery to kill a beetle. If Mr George had said that employers were making difficulties about helping the Government with its military requirements, we could have understood his proposal; but he expressly denied the existence of any such difficulties. One is therefore forced back upon the suspicion that this Act is merely another unnecessary interference with the liberty of individuals, by the Apostles of Liberty, who prefer socialism and coercion to individualist freedom, and who see in the necessities of the war an opportunity of exercising their love of socialistic despotism. The statement of Mr Hodge, one of the socialistic Labour Members, that "We on these benches ought not to be very much concerned at the rushing through of bills of this character, because it gives effect to the contention of many of my friends regarding collectivist effort," is a significant comment in this connexion. It is also a reminder of the danger to which the country is exposed of having socialism riveted upon it after the war, through allowing its unnecessary introduction during the war.

The ungoverned passion for turning military measures into statutes, thereby hardening exceptional acts of war into a system of martial law, which obsesses the Government, has another curious illustration in the Act we are now considering. It contains a provision exempting manufacturers from liability for non-delivery of goods when, owing to the military authorities taking possession of the factory, or of some other factory supplying the material, delivery under a contract has become impossible. Mr George believed that "under the common law they would be exempted from any liability"; and his belief was well founded. Any counsel would have referred him, for example,

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to the case of *Hick v. Raymond and Reid* ([1893] A.C. 22), which put that rule of law beyond any doubt. The mischief of needlessly providing in an Act of Parliament for what the law already provides, is that it produces doubt in regard to other cases similarly protected by the common law, but outside the purview of the particular Act, and furnishes colour for an argument that in these other cases there is no protection, since the specific inclusion of some cases implicitly excludes others.

There must be made yet another criticism of the Act—a double and a more radical criticism. If the powers contained in the Act were so desirable in March, why were they not equally desirable last August, when the need for munitions of war was as great, and the supply less? And if such leisurely action as is implied by the delay was justified, why was it necessary for Mr George to come down to the House on the 9th of March, to urge the House to pass through all its stages on that same day a Bill of this “most “drastic,” “tremendous” character, which the House had never seen (the leader of the Opposition only having been given one copy the day before), and of whose contents the House could gain only a confused notion as it was read out in Mr George’s speech? Has any Parliament, or any nation behind it, ever been treated so contemptuously? In the course of the debate Members’ appeals for a little time and opportunity to consider the Bill met with a gracious response from the despot in charge, that the House might have another twenty-four hours—but no more—in which to digest the Bill, consult men of business, and prepare amendments, and rush it through its final stages; and it is pathetic to read a Member’s expression of thanks to the “right Honourable Gentleman for the time that has been “given for the discussion of this Bill.” Well, the House has brought this treatment upon itself. It has allowed its tyrants to break down the Constitution, to introduce martial law at lightning speed, and generally to do anything they choose, without a murmur from the Guardians of the

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People's Liberties; and it cannot afterwards look for respectful treatment by the Tyrants. But the plain citizen cannot help wondering at this abuse of parliamentary forms. Bill after Bill is pushed through in this hustling way. Sometimes various excuses for the impropriety have been mentioned, but one waxes sceptical over the genuineness of these excuses when the same indecent rush is applied to a measure which, if it was necessary, could and should have been introduced months before the day upon which Mr George chose to fling it at the House for immediate and unquestioning acceptance. It savours strongly of a deliberate policy: "We, the Cabinet, are going to do just as we like, when we like; there is one law, and one law only, left in the Constitution—our Will."

Let us not be misunderstood. We object to nothing being done, however "drastic," which is necessary for the defence of the Realm in the present crisis. On the contrary, we urge now, as we have urged before, that it is the duty of those in authority—military authority of course more particularly—to take any measures which the exigencies of the war demand. But that is a different thing from allowing politicians in office to rip up the citizen's liberty for the fun of the thing; to declare by Act of Parliament that all sorts of interferences and outrages upon freedom may be committed by all sorts of officials with impunity, and whether necessary or not; to embody in a statute "tremendous powers" when the end could be achieved without these powers; and to do it all by a process of rushing which makes proper discussion impossible. As to "mobilizing industrial resources," by all means let us mobilize our industrial resources to the uttermost that is necessary. We should like to see in this country (as the Prussian statesman told his Diet with regard to Germany) every man, woman and child taking his share in the one all-important work of prosecuting the war to a triumphant conclusion. But let us observe due proportion of means to end. This mobilization of industry was in

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process before the Act. All sorts of industrialists, large and small, were cheerfully engaging, without statutory compulsion, upon War contracts—from merchant ships doing transport work to opticians making gun-sights. From Sunderland it was reported in *The Times** that, before the Act, the needs of the nation had been given the first place, so that in some shipbuilding yards work which had been begun for private firms was deliberately undone. Ships in course of construction were scrapped, and their place was taken by work of a different character, embarked upon under Government orders. And, as Mr George said that no difficulty had been experienced with manufacturers, we may take Sunderland's experience to have been typical of the country at large.

We may go further. Sir Arthur Markham went a good deal further when he intervened in the debate on Mr George's "urgently necessary" "emergency" Bill. He told the House of certain well-equipped works, employing a large number of men, which were on the Admiralty and War Office lists, and which during the past thirty years had done a great deal of work for both Departments, yet which until the end of the year had *never received a single inquiry from the War Office or the Admiralty with regard to making munitions of war!*† Yet this firm was suffering so much from slackness of trade last autumn that it started making engines and machinery for stock purposes. To this damning indictment Mr George had not a word to say in reply. Let us quote Sir Arthur's own description of the meaning of the Bill. "The War Office and the Admiralty "never took the trouble to organize the industry, and the "Government now, owing to that failure upon the part of "those Departments, seek to take over the works of other "people." That is how the business man views the politician's performance. There you get a truer view than is

* Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 13th March, 1915, Vol. 70, No. 34, col. 1464.

† 13th March, 1915.

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afforded in the chorus of wooden congratulation which on all occasions now emanates from a cowed and bemused Press. (We had to go to *Hansard* for Sir Arthur's Markham's revelations: the newspapers we consulted did not report it.)

Since the passing of the Act another instance, fortifying Sir Arthur Markham's, has come to light. "A Government "Contractor," writing in the *Spectator*,* refers to "one of "the finest factories we have for the production of steel" which "has been idle now for months;" and he asks if "the "Government know of this factory's equipment, its capabilities, or even of its existence," and wonders if it is "the "only idle rolling mill in Scotland that is prolonging the "war." It is therefore not surprising that the Scottish steelmakers' associations should have taken a census of spare plant suitable for the production of ammunition, and found the productive capacity of the plant amply sufficient, since "there are many machinery shops with plant only partially "employed on urgent contracts."†

The mobilization of industry in existence before the Act was imperfect simply owing to the slackness or muddling of the War Office or Admiralty, or to those Departments being so tightly in the grip of the armament "ring" that they did not dare to go outside, when the delays in delivery by the "ring" firms, with bigger orders than they could promptly fulfil, made such extension necessary. Had the War Office or Admiralty chosen, they could have speeded up the provision of armaments and munitions by extending the range of their contracts. And the War Office representative who went to Newcastle to "urge the magic touch of "goodwill and patriotism" must have felt somewhat crestfallen when Lord Durham bluntly told him "he ought to "have been there seven months ago."‡ We could do with a little more of this plain speech.

Why, then, propound an Act of Parliament—an Act, too,

* 3rd April, 1915.

† *The Times*, 10th April, 1915

‡ *Ibid.*

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with penal regulations attached? For this Act is incorporated with the rest of the Defence of the Realm legislation, and the Regulations made under it provide that the severe penalties of the general Regulations shall apply. Our poor friend Jones is, in this matter, also, enmeshed in a penal system which provides for any punishment up to penal servitude for life, at the will of a civil judge or a court martial, if in any way he proves refractory. All this does not stimulate patriotism or the spirit of self-sacrifice, our greatest and most necessary assets. It is an old principle that the fewer the laws, the greater is the respect for them, and conversely. That principle applies here. Dragoon Jones, if and when it is necessary, but only then; for the rest, let him feel himself a free man, taking his part in the world's great war of freedom. Mr George said, "You cannot have [victory] unless everybody in the country is prepared to suffer all kinds of inconvenience and, if necessary, sacrifice." Of course not; but that is no reason for multiplying, by penal enactment, the kinds of inconvenience for the fun of the thing, nor for changing sacrifice, which in most cases would be cheerfully made, into compulsion, where the compulsion is not necessary.

One more quotation from Mr George—though it was a slip of his tongue. In discussing this Industrial Mobilization Bill in Committee, he said, "It is the fact that we are 'immune from legislation'—calling forth a heartfelt cry from Sir Frederick Banbury, "I wish we were"—Mr George meant to say "invasion." The rest of us, like Sir Frederick, can echo the sentiment as applied to both nouns.

THE CENSORIAD

ISING the Censor, I who lately sang
That Government from which the Censor sprang,
That Government, benevolent and mild,
Which has produced this most audacious child,
That Trust-the-People Government which was
The sole expositor of Freedom's cause.
Ah! Liberalism, who could think that thou
Wouldst break thy chaste celibatarian vow
To fondle with a proud maternal joy
This child of Mars, this stern red-headed boy!—
Unnatural offspring, like the Minotaur
Begotten by the roaring bull of war—
Or deem that scarce a twelvemonth has gone by
Since Army-versus-People was the cry,
Or yet recall that one short year ago
The Germans were our friends and Ulster was the
foe!

But so it is.—Behold him on his throne,
He rules opinions and he rules alone,
Buckmaster (suitably so-called) the Great,
Omniscient and omnipotent like Fate.
Like Fate, the abhorrèd shears are in his hand,
Wastepaper baskets round his footstool stand,
Above his head Oblivion, like a pall,
Sheds the chill damps of darkness over all,
While rank on rank his under-censors throng,

The Censoriad

Like quiring cherubim without a song,
Each with inferior powers of silence armed—
For the wide lands of ignorance are farmed—
Yet each rejoicing in his little plot
Of deeds immortal doomed to be forgot.

Thus all the paracletes of silence stand
To serve their cause and do their lord's command,
And here the thronging journalists resort
To make their sacrifice and pay their court.
Here Massingham and Spender humbly kneel
And all the pangs of doubtful lovers feel;
Here Northcliffe to a greater bows his head
And learns what must and what must not be said;
And here *The Times*, *The Mirror* and *The Mail*
Are kept in bondage till their news is stale.
In vain the Lord of Papers makes his moan
Upon his marrow-bones before the throne;
In vain he argues, though he argues well,
That wars are waged that newspapers may sell;
In vain he demonstrates that modern thought
Like mackerel must be cried the day 'tis caught,
And that the best of writing kept a day
Grows bad like soldiers' meat and must be thrown
away.

In vain the tribe of Lawson plead that news
Owed its first penny paper to the Jews,
And now like them should be allowed to make
Some money from the war for Freedom's sake.
In vain all Fleet Street with abundant tears
Trembling before this awful court appears,
Humbly to urge that when the worst is said
Writing like brewing is a harmless trade,
That daily papers are like beer and give
The people their diurnal laxative,
Muddle the head they may, yet vanquish fear
And keep the nation in the mood to cheer,—

The Censoriad

Without their customary ale and ink
The British people might begin to think.
In vain our self-respecting Fourth Estate
Advanced such lofty arguments to Fate.
He waved his pencil o'er the trembling men,
That pencil which is mightier than the pen,
And turning to his minions from the crowd
Gave thus the limits that the law allowed :

“ In this great war the British Empire spills
“ Its blood for certain Liberal principles :
“ The first is that all Liberals abhor
“ The barbarous and bloody arts of war ;
“ The second that our conduct of the same
“ Has put all previous Tory wars to shame ;
“ The third that Russia and France must make
“ The greater sacrifice for Freedom's sake,
“ Because conscription which is right in them
“ In free peace-loving England we condemn ;
“ The fourth is that the war at sea be made
“ Like Peace, and kept subordinate to trade ;
“ The fifth is that the German domiciled
“ Becomes more harmless than a little child
“ (He oft has proved his patriotic zest
“ By contributions to the party chest) ;
“ The sixth that when this wicked war is o'er
“ All things will be exactly as before ;
“ The last, and here my emphasis is strong,
“ Is that the Government can do no wrong.

“ In naval war—all articles must state—
“ The Admiralty is immaculate,
“ And when a ship goes down it should be said
“ 'Tis best *nil nisi bonum* of the dead ;
“ They will not suffer in their silent grave
“ Beneath the cleansing and oblivious wave,
“ If hints of rashness leave the First Lord free
“ From envious responsibility.

The Censoriad

“ On military matters lightly touch
“ And do not praise the soldier overmuch,
“ Lest men forget that victory began
“ With Haldane’s wondrous Territorial plan.

“ Of all let your unsullied page be free
“ That might give courage to the enemy;
“ If the Prime Minister should dine with Speyer,
“ If Portsmouth Dockyard should be set on fire;
“ If Lang or Lyttelton for Wilhelm pray,
“ If Haldane should be seen at tea with Grey,
“ If Handel Booth should awkward questions ply,
“ If Falconer should fail in making dye—
“ Such rumours mention only to deny.

“ These rules obeyed, our reign must long endure
“ In darkness safe, in ignorance secure.
“ As when an airship cleaves our misty skies
“ And menacing in airy circles flies,
“ Our dim conflicting fogs confuse her sight
“ And we are hidden by the shades of night,
“ So cloaked in ignorance our people rest,
“ And knowing naught believe that all is for the
 best.”

The Censor ceased, the audience was o’er,
Lord Northcliffe curtseyed backwards to the door;
The Spender Brothers paused awhile to cheer,
While Gardener chirped a timorous Hear, hear!
And honest Massingham was heard to say
”Twas quite the greatest speech since Gladstone’s day.
Then eastwards stumbling with uncertain feet
And minds more darkened than the darkened street,
They took their ways to publish what they knew,
Which being told them must of course be true.
Meanwhile the Censor slumbering on his throne
O’er England kept his watch and ward alone,
Supreme Defender of the Great Unknown.

THE CHEMIST

THE word Chemist conveys to the average person the conception of a shopman who will sell him Epsom salts or a pill. Such a notion did not exist in the days of Queen Elizabeth when Chemistry began to be seriously studied as a modern science, and would have been received with polished incredulity at the time when Charles II aided by his patronage the formation and constitution and activities of the Royal Society. It was not until many years later that the pharmacist arrogated to himself the title of chemist which he has the impudence to retain. There is no civilized nation except our own which confuses the two terms, nor was there any confusion in our own tongue until some 80 years ago. Our words were druggist or apothecary. In French "Chimiste" and "Pharmacien" are entirely distinct. In German "Apotheker" and "Chemiker" are never confused; and it may be remarked that the Germans have an excellent word, "Chemikant," for a pseudo-chemist of which an abundant supply is available. The same degradation of an honourable word is found in the illicit employment of the term "Engineer." That has reached its worst pitch in the United States, where every man who looks after an oil engine or drives a locomotive is accorded that appellation. It has not gone quite so far in this country, but the ordinary daily Press constantly confuses the highly skilled and trained professional man with the mechanic. Those who have knowledge of the feelings of engineers in the proper sense are aware that they resent this confusion, and

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exactly the same attitude of mind prevails among those men who have devoted their career to the pursuit of the science of chemistry in its various branches, which may be didactic in the case of professors, or executive in the case of consultants whether at the service of the public or privately rendering their advice to industrial firms. At the present time in this country the status of chemists is deplorable. Sir William Tilden has given publicity to a fact which is best stated in terms of the Government advertisement which follows:

- “ Inspection Department, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich.
- “ Wanted, immediately, temporary assistant chemists.
- “ Applicants must have had a thorough training in inorganic and organic chemistry and must be accurate analysts. University graduates or Members of the Institute of Chemistry will have preference.
- “ Wages £2. os. 6d. per week. Application giving particulars of training and experience and accompanied by copies of not more than three recent testimonials should be addressed to the Chief Inspector, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich.”

As is pointed out by Sir William Tilden, this puts a man who is not merely of academic training but is assumed to have such experience as to make him an accurate analyst, on exactly the same footing as an artisan; yet private information obtained on this point shows that the standard of skill demanded is such as would be reckoned exceptional even in private laboratories where skilled assistants have specialized in different branches of analysis for 20 years. It follows naturally that the men employed on these terms take the employment merely to obtain some practice in their profession at the public cost and then leave to be replaced by others having the same object in view. As a contrast, the benevolent regard for skilled labour which is something that the ordinary Government official can dimly understand—though he would be sorely put to it if asked to handle any tool but a pen to initial a useless memo-

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random—may be exemplified by the following advertisement:

- "Experienced scientific instrument makers are required
- "at once for employment in Electrical Department H.M.
- "Dock-Yard, Portsmouth.
- "Terms 39 shillings per week of 48 hours, plus 20 shillings
- "per week subsistence for men engaged from a distance."

No reasonable person would say that these wages are excessive; but adopting this view what is one to say about the chemist employed at £2. os. 6d. (mysterious sum!) per week and required to work 4 hours overtime for nothing and without that useful "20 shillings per week for subsistence"?

The relation of the chemist to the present war is manifest and a happy opportunity was afforded to Professor Meldola when he delivered his Presidential address to the Institute of Chemistry on 1st March—an opportunity which he was quick to seize. He pointed out that when the dyestuff scheme was started by the Government it was proposed to have a Board of business men and that there should be some sort of advisory Committee whose help might or might not be invoked. Could any more topsy-turvy arrangement be conceived? The men constituting the Board must be chemists—there are plenty with ample business capacity—and it is the advisory Committee who should be traders who can tell the Board what dyestuffs they want and in what quantity. It may be easily conceived that the ordinary "business" man would have a fit when confronted by such a proposal; yet of its soundness there is no question nor can be when it is remembered that the most successful chemical factory in this country was founded and controlled by a chemist. The same thing is common form in Germany. Every man who is "akademische gebildet" may become "ein Geschäftsman" and if he happens to be trained as a chemist naturally attaches himself to some industrial concern which depends for its success on chemical operations. What is the

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result? The decline and ultimate extinction of the profits? The decay of the undertaking and its final ruin? By no means. With that man at the head not of any department but of the works itself, come to the investor those fat dividends which anyone who cares to look at the *Chemiker Zeitung* for the last few years can verify, dividends not on the skimpy scale of our premier railways, but fat comforting dividends which run from 10 to 30 per cent, sometimes on watered capital. Contrast that with the deplorable state of many of our large undertakings which are either chemical factories or depend on chemical processes and having the chemist in an advisory and subordinate position. They are almost relieved from the labour of distributing dividends and an early and easy demise awaits some of them. The old belief that a chemical works like a brewery would (to annex a phrase of Mr Arnold Bennett's) "stand an indefinite amount" of bad management," is now of merely historical interest, and those who cling to it are as pathetic a figure as are the members of a doomed race of amiable aborigines.

As a contrast to the status generally accorded to the chemist, consider the scope of his work. There is scarcely an industry which is not in some way or other dependent on his knowledge and advice. All modern methods of manufacturing iron and steel need the inventive power and control of the metallurgical chemist who is but a species of the genus. And that control must be a real one if the manufacture is to prosper; it must not be confined to the mere testing by analytical methods of the material produced. It must direct the choice of processes and regulate their operation. Such other structural materials as copper and its alloys, and non-metallic substances such as cement, cannot nowadays be made of good quality and at an economic price without chemical *control* in the fullest sense. The trades in glass and pottery, in leather, in brewing and distilling, soap making and the like, are instances of the same need, and the very large trade in what are known as heavy chemicals and fine chemicals is too obvious an example to need more

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than a word. But on the top of all this are trades that are supposed to be purely mechanical. The Lancashire cotton industry, the huge calico-printing industry, the woollen industry, the engineering industry and a dozen more, all depend ultimately on the quality of the finished material, which *they* use as their raw material. Who can ensure that they will obtain the material they need, save the chemist directing and controlling the works where such material is made?

Some of the smaller but nevertheless important trades, such as those making cycles and motor cars, have, on account of their modern origin and highly special work, realized the necessity of chemical control so thoroughly that in the largest and most successful of such factories there are testing works and chemical laboratories as well equipped and run by as competent men as are to be found in public establishments of the same kind. For all that the average manufacturer is densely ignorant and crassly prejudiced, and vastly prefers to blunder on to bankruptcy rather than accept expert guidance. It must not be supposed that such ignorance is confined to the trader; it permeates all classes. As an instance may be cited the fact that two supposedly educated and highly placed Government officials when discussing the burning question of the day—explosives—confused trinitrotoluol (T.N.T.) the bursting charge for shells, with nitro-cotton, the basis of all modern propulsive explosives, and this in the presence of a chemist who might be forgiven a smile. As another example potash salts have been put on the contraband list and bichromate of potash is included, although no chemist, nor any but a chemical lunatic, would dream of using it for preparing other salts of potassium. The men who fall into mistakes so gross are less to blame than the system of education which regards such ignorance as no slur, while these very men would despise a chemist who failed to understand an ordinary literary allusion or a Latin tag.

But in spite of discouragements thus carefully provided,

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mostly by modern pedagogues, the evolution of the chemist has been rapid. At the inception of the science he was an empiric, sometimes a mystic, and often as big a quack as Paracelsus. With the final destruction of the Greek idea that science is a matter of words, and the substitution of the Baconian truth that it is a matter of experiment and verifiable facts, came that knowledge on which, as has been said above, the greater part of our industries is ultimately based. There is not a gun, there is not a ship of the modern stamp which would be in existence at this moment but for the modern chemist; so modern that it must be recalled that the Bessemer process was devised in 1856, the Siemens-Martin process about ten years later, and the Thomas-Gilchrist process in 1878. Without these methods steel of the quality and in the quantity needed in modern constructions of all kinds from a bridge to an armour plate simply could not be made.

So universally dependent is the world for its existence and progress on chemical knowledge that if such knowledge were suddenly obliterated the world would be reduced to a set of recipes which might serve for a time but could in no way assist advance in any direction, and which would be no more useful for the changing conditions of life than a clepsydra for the function of a chronometer.

But if in this country there is so much ignorance concerning the status and function of the chemist and though it deserves to suffer for its neglect, yet it has had the enormous advantage of begetting from time to time some of the greatest of chemists, and its virility has produced men like Boyle, Priestley, Cavendish, Davy and Faraday, all chemists of the first rank. The keynote of their greatness is their originality. Robert Boyle, contemporaneously with Marriotte in France, discovered the relation between the pressure and volume of gases. Cavendish in analyzing air with the eudiometer which still bears his name, worked with such accuracy and recorded his observations so faithfully that there is no reasonable doubt that he isolated argon,

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although he was unable to identify it. Davy's name and his isolation of potassium are familiar to every first-year student. The liquefaction of gases, long regarded as "permanent" was first accomplished by Faraday, and there is a fine old print showing the young laboratory assistant demonstrating this to Sir Humphry Davy, who is scratching his head and looking very far from pleased—for he was a jealous man and would have much preferred to accomplish the feat himself. Those who are themselves chemists could add to this list and bring it up to date. It is sufficient to say that the fundamental quality of originality is native and ineradicable and that there is no sign of its decrease in this country. Often with scanty equipment and in intervals snatched from laborious and routine professional work, our chemists have made and are making valuable researches, valuable directly as a means of extending the science and sometimes useful in their commercial applications. A distinction must be drawn between "research" of a mild kind used as a mode of educating young men and giving them the opportunity of producing a post-graduate thesis which, while aiding in their training, will introduce them favourably to their older and more experienced colleagues; and that difficult and arduous research which is directed to the wringing from Nature's jealous grip a priceless piece of knowledge. Efforts have been made to quicken this process by building and fitting costly laboratories and allowing their use at nominal cost to those desirous of pursuing their researches and unable to provide their own equipment; but it cannot be said that the output of chemical work thus aided has been large or of good quality. Unsubventioned effort has proved its higher value in this as in other forms of useful activity, and although nowadays apparatus is more delicate and costly than 100 years ago, yet abundance of such apparatus and appliances for scientific work will but supplement the process of the original thinker and accurate worker; they are by themselves but snares for the mediocre and unintelligent who think that by turning a few stopcocks and

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inserting a few electrical plugs somehow or other a world-shaking result will be achieved.

The strange belief that abundance of mere machinery will produce a good chemist is not confined to this country. It is particularly rampant in Germany and has grown with the rest of the materialism which has in the last twenty-five years altered the whole mode of German life. The modern German laboratory, whether at a University, a public or municipal laboratory or a works laboratory—private laboratories are rare in Germany—has an equipment of the most elaborate character wherewith laborious persons conduct investigations in mass formation. If one refers the question to that fantastic abstraction the man in the street one will be told that chemical knowledge is an exclusively German possession. No person of education will deny that some of the best chemists in the world were Germans. But that nation seems to have lost the trick. The great days of Bunsen, of Liebig, of Kekulé and of Hofmann seem to be over. Without adopting the Stevensonian phrase and saying that the present generation of German chemists are “sedulous apes,” it is quite fair to say that there are many who come nearly within this definition. They are good copyists and diligent in making many elaborate observations, some of them accurate and even useful; but the spirit which is really pioneer and “bahn-brechende” appears to have gone out of them, very probably because of the interminable drill which the whole German nation has suffered for the last generation and a half. Routine teaching and the turning out of men who are incapable of anything but routinework is of course necessary; but the progress of a nation will be slow indeed if it have not among its members minds capable of bold and original action, not crushed by the weight of learned mediocrities.

In order that men of the right stamp should be encouraged to adopt chemistry as a profession it is not only needful that there should be adequate, though not necessarily lavish, equipment at places of learning, but that the professors and

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teachers should be keen in their work, and looking to that before their personal profit. At present too often they prefer to engage in private and remunerative practice with the resources at their command of the teaching establishment to which they are attached, and with a posse of students acting as unpaid assistants. This is not merely unfair to private practitioners who have to maintain their own laboratories and pay their staff from the fees they earn, but is also unfair to the layman, who believing that a Professor must be infallible, consults him and receives a report which actually represents the work of a third year's student who is just at the beginning of his practical training. This accounts largely for the contempt with which chemical work is generally regarded. And what can be expected of Universities in which Chemistry is referred to cacodoriously as "stinks"? The natural result is that the good men will not go in for it and the rather inferior man is badly trained. Of the hundreds of young men offering themselves for examination at the Institute of Chemistry, from all of whom the qualification of a degree in science or equivalent proof of training is required before they can present themselves, quite the most ill-trained and incompetent come from such Universities as are accustomed to regard science as somehow connected with a bad smell. All that must be altered of course; but it must be done at a fairly rapid rate or such seats of learning will no longer have their pick of the best adolescent brains in the country, fitted not simply to chop logic or write commentaries on some other Dryasdust's commentaries on an obscure author who used a Greek particle in an ill-considered sense; but to *do*—to plunge into the grand arcana of Nature—to breast her sea of mysteries—determined to return triumphant with precious pearls.

The indignation rightly felt at the contemptuous treatment of a noble science is assuaged when one reflects that what are called the "poor man's colleges" are doing admirable work and are turning out students who shape as well as any in the world. There is a story of one of these

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which will bear repetition. At the end of their course a number of young fellows decided to hold a feast in the laboratory. All were poor and agreed to contribute according to their means. One of the least wealthy—now holding a chair at a famous University—doubted his ability to produce say a tinned tongue, but pledged himself to make a *blanc-manger*. Having found the process a costly failure in the privacy of his lodgings, he fell back on laboratory resources and constructed an admirable imitation composed of gelatin, plaster of Paris and nitrobenzene. It was the crowning dish. All the company took one mouthful and then fell on the provider and interned him in a water-tank for the rest of the evening. Next day the laboratory boy, who was residuary legatee of the feast, was absent, and on his return excused himself on the ground that he “was not “used to these rich dishes.”

It is certain that a sound knowledge of chemistry carried to its utmost pitch in those who are big enough to assimilate and advance it, and in a lower but most necessary degree diffused through the rank and file, is now a national necessity. It is so fully a national necessity that no one with any pretence to be an educated man should fail to know its rudiments. He need have no more intention of becoming a chemist than the man who learns a little geography proposes to become a cartographer; but unless he knows it as a part of his curriculum he cannot be received as decently educated.

It is quite useless to talk of capturing trade which depends on chemical knowledge, such as the trade in dye-stuffs, synthetic drugs and glass, unless the chemist is put in command. We have leaders in plenty of proved ability and it is the duty of the community to consult them and put ample funds at their disposal to its own ultimate profit. To mince words is futile: the “business man” must be put in his place—which is business, not chemistry; the *dilettante* who dabbles in chemistry and has a certain “pull” because he is a politician or a lawyer or both—a dreadful and common combination—must go. There are no two words

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about it. The Government should at once call to itself all those men whose knowledge is undoubted and whose reputation is unsullied, and give them a free hand, putting at their disposal all the ordinary official machinery and providing sufficient money. The whole affair would be a bagatelle; it might cost £500,000 all told, rather less than the salaries of private members of the House of Commons for two years. With the greatest respect for these gentlemen one may ask with confidence which is the better bargain?

We come to the delicate question of honours and emoluments. In Stockholm is a handsome square called Berzelius-Plads; there is a statue of Priestley in Birmingham—the town which drove out that great man because it took a different view from his of the Almighty's aspect. Lavoisier's head was cut off at the time of the Revolution not merely because he was a *fermier-général* but because “the Republic “had no need of chemists.” If one compares the posthumous honours which are showered on a poetaster, a worthy and dull general, a sly intriguing politician, a figure head—is there not a column to the late Duke of York?—with the recognition afforded to chemists on whose knowledge and researches the whole fabric of civilization rests, one is staggered by the ignorance and lack of sense of proportion displayed. There is a piquant story concerning two gentlemen of identical name; one is a famous chemist; the other a respectable tradesman. A high Personage on leaving the former's house told one of his suite to see that his host should be suitably recognized in the next list of honours. The member of the suite evidently had never heard of the chemist whose name is known throughout the world—and the respectable tradesman was knighted. Those few chemists who have received this rather modest recognition, have as a rule been knighted not because they are chemists but because they have been Government servants.

As to emoluments it is difficult to speak. To grab for money is distasteful to any decent person; but it is impossible to carry on work of real value unless the worker

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can live with the full amenities of modern life. The present fees for chemical work of every kind from the young assistant to the trusted consultant are ludicrously small. The nation must be made to understand that, unless it is prepared to allocate to the chemist his rightful share of the riches which his knowledge brings, it will suffer in that one part which appears to be sensitive—its pocket.

WAR DOCUMENTS

FROM THE FIGHTING LINE

“AT the station we were driven into closed-in wagons, from which horses had just been removed, fifty-two men being crowded into the one labelled for 40 men in which the other four officers and myself were. So tight were we packed, that there was only room for some of us to sit down on the floor. This floor was covered fully three inches deep in fresh manure, and the stench of horse urine was almost asphyxiating. We were boxed up in this foul wagon, with practically no ventilation for thirty hours, with no food, and no opportunity of attending to purposes of nature. All along the line we were cursed by officers and soldiers alike at the various stations, and at Mons Bergen I was pulled out in front of the wagon by the order of the officer in charge of the station, and, after cursing me in filthy language for some ten minutes, he ordered one of his soldiers to kick me back into the wagon, which he did, sending me sprawling into the filthy mess at the bottom of the wagon. I should like to mention here that I am thoroughly conversant with German, and understood everything that was said. Only at one station on the road was any attempt made on the part of German officers to interfere, and stop their men from cursing us. This officer appeared to be sorry for the sad plight which we were in. I should also like to mention that two men of the German Guard also appeared to be sympathetic and sorry for us; but they were able to do little or nothing to protect us.

“Up to this time I had managed to retain my overcoat, but it was now forcibly taken from me by an officer at a few stations further on.

“On reaching the German-Belgian frontier, the French prisoners were given some potato soup. The people in charge of it told us that none was for us, but that if any was left over after the French had been fed we should get what remained. This is in accordance with the general treatment of British prisoners by the Germans, who always endeavour to attend to our necessities last, and to put us to as much inconvenience and ill-treatment as possible. We subsequently

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got a little soup and a few slices of bread amongst twenty-five British prisoners in the same wagon with me.

"On the 18th October, early, we arrived at Cologne, and the four officers and myself were removed from the wagon, and, after some delay, sent on to Crefeld.

"I said that fifty-two prisoners were in the wagon with me when we left Douay. These were: [here follow the names of four officers], myself, fifteen English soldiers and thirty-two French civilians of all grades of society. It is difficult to indicate or give a proper idea of the indescribably wretched condition which we were in after being starved and confined in the manner stated for three days and three nights. As is well known, one of these wagons is considered to be able to accommodate six horses or forty men, and this only with the doors open so as to admit of ventilation. What with the filth of the interior, the number of people confined in it, and the absence of ventilation, it seemed to recall something of what one has read of the Black Hole of Calcutta. . . .

"I am strongly of opinion myself that this brutal treatment of British officers and men on their way to a place of internment is deliberately arranged for by superior authority with the object of making us as miserable and despicable objects as possible. The French officers were treated quite differently.

"On arrival at Crefeld our treatment improved. We (that is, the five officers) were placed in a barrack room which was intended to accommodate six people. We found there were already in the building ten other British officers. . . .

"I would especially call attention to the barbarous way in which British soldiers are being treated in the various laagers by the Germans. The information given below has been obtained from the British orderlies who came to Crefeld as servants, and also from English and French medical officers who had been in the camps, which in many cases were composed of tents. The men all had their great-coats—and in many cases their tunics as well—and their money taken away from them, and are in great need of clothing, and particularly underclothing. It appears that the Germans supplied them with wooden clogs when boots were worn out. The men state that they slept on straw which had not been changed for months, and was quite sodden and rotten. All the men who came as orderlies were crawling in vermin and half of them were suffering from the itch. The medical officer had to isolate these men before they could be employed as servants. I was also informed by them that the feeding arrangements for the British soldier were very bad indeed, and as the men had no money to supplement their rations they were in a half-starved condition, which their appearance corroborated."—
Extracts from a report dated 24th December, 1914, made by Major

From the Fighting Line

C. B. Vandeleur of the 1st Cameronians, who escaped from Crefeld, Germany, in December last. White Paper [Cd. 7817], Miscellaneous, No. 7 (1915).

"I have been served out with a wonderful pistol, that fires fireballs. The other night I fired several, and they showed up the ground in front in a wonderful manner. . . . We fired a new kind of bomb at the Germans a couple of days ago, and last night one of our patrols reported twenty or thirty bodies in the place where it fell. . . . The Germans, they say, have now got a land torpedo that burrows under the earth and catches one just about the knee when it explodes. I don't know if it's true, but they are a remarkably ingenious people!

"Two of our men who had gone out to repair our barbed wire last night noticed a German sniper digging himself in. So they stalked him, and suddenly jumped on him, and brought him in praying for mercy. When asked why they did not bayonet him on the spot the captor explained that he thought it was too cold-blooded a proceeding, but added that he 'plugged him one on the jaw,' as he was shouting 'Mercy! mercy!' too loud. In appearance he was insignificant, but smelt very strong . . .

"This is a most extraordinary war; fellows every day in the ordinary course of their duties do things that in any other war they would get V.C.'s for."—Letter from an Officer in the Hampshire Regiment. *The Morning Post*: Saturday, 23rd January, 1915.

"We get rations up fairly well—in fact, it's only good food and the daily rum ration which keep the men together. Their endurance is magnificent. They don't 'go sick,' but just hang on till they drop. Sometimes, as happened last week, the fire is too hot for the ration party, and for twenty-four hours we get no rations. That, of course, just about 'puts the lid on'! However, we're jolly comfortable just now—my lads in a barn and myself in the cottage kitchen. Shells keep whistling over, but they are intended for a battery in the rear—so long as none fall on us we're all right. Should they happen to fall short, I fear we shall vanish with our billets in a cloud of light blue smoke and dark red brick dust! But this, of course, is all in the game, and doesn't stop the cooking. I am just now enjoying a cup of madame's excellent coffee—madame makes coffee as only a Frenchwoman can.

"We move on to-night to join the rest of the brigade, and go into billets in the local asylum for four days' rest. You can imagine the priceless opportunity afforded the regimental wits when the brigade staff billets 'Les Fusiliers Royale-Régiment de Londres' in the local asylum!!! The men's sense of humour—out of place and no end of a nuisance in the piping times of peace—becomes a priceless boon

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when on active service. In the whole of my service at home and abroad I have never seen T. Atkins to better advantage. A man whose cheery optimism will make him crack a joke in the small hours when things are bad and his best pals have gone, and after spending the night shivering in three feet of mud and water, is 'some' soldier and a worthy representative of the country he is fighting for. His warm-hearted generosity and unfailing courtesy to the civilian population have made him the idol of the people—it has been a revelation to me, and I always thought I knew Tommy pretty well. There are, of course, occasional 'skrimshankers,' but wonderfully few. For odd 'jobs o' work,' like cutting a dam (as we did one night) between the lines, one never lacks volunteers—though wielding a pick and a shovel with one's own people a few yards behind and the Boches a few yards in front is a job calculated to give any man a chilly feeling about the feet. The last time we did it we managed to release some 14,000 gallons of water, which duly rushed off in the right direction, and stopped sniping for a good few hours! It is not always so successful, of course—in fact I could almost swear that I've seen water run uphill in this country—I don't mean after the rum ration had been issued either!!

"I'm afraid I can give you no actual news—no 'scoops' from the firing line or anything like that, for trench work is like living in a bottle (and a water-bottle at that!) and only seeing out of the neck. One occasionally sees pictures of gay-mounted cavaliers fighting with the Army in Flanders in 1704, but I'm afraid *not* the work of 'eye-witnesses.' There are apparently few contemporary accounts of the fighting of those days, beyond the one comment as regards the Army that it 'swore terribly' (at which art I guess any of my lads would make good runners-up for a Grand Prix for efficiency), but it would be interesting to know how the commanders in those days kept their silk pantaloons and buff jackets such gorgeous colours in this Flemish mud."—Letter from a Captain in the Royal Fusiliers. *The Times*: Monday, 25th January, 1915.

"The snow came down in heavy flakes yesterday, not stopping until noon to-day—result, the river, floods, etc., all up higher than the highest level we have had. It is enough to cause despair, just as we thought we saw the end of those special anxieties. The men are truly wonderful; some of the — were playing football yesterday afternoon, three shells pitched among them, killing one man and wounding nine. Within a quarter of an hour they were playing football again. Of course, it was unaimed fire, but it gives you an idea of the callous value of life. We went to see a performance of 'The Follies' yesterday afternoon; the troupe was got up by the

From the Fighting Line

— Division, with the addition of two local ladies. It was awfully good; some of the talent above the ordinary, especially a corporal from the Army Service Corps. They have two performances a day, at 4 and 7, and the men come in batches when in reserve, and pay $\frac{1}{2}$ f. entrance; with the profits they run a cinematograph, an excellent thing, as it takes the strain quite completely off the men's minds for an hour or two."—Letter of an Officer. *The Times*: Monday, 25th January, 1915.

"H.M.S. ' — ' went along to Alexandretta last week and threatened a bombardment if they didn't blow up the railway and rolling stock. The Turks were quite comic—they protested that they had no guncotton, so we offered them ours. Then they said they had no person competent to do the job, so we offered to lend them an officer. Then they said the officer must be under the Ottoman Government, so the officer volunteered to take service temporarily under the Ottoman Government for one day. This actually took place and the N.O. landed in the dual capacity of British officer and Turkish demolition expert. He put on a Tarboosh to do the job and then resumed his naval cover to certify that it had been well done."—Letter from an Officer with the British torpedo flotilla in the Mediterranean. *The Morning Post*: Monday, 25th January, 1915.

"Three days ago had information there was a spy in the neighbourhood of one of our batteries. 'Took measures,' as they say, and informed all battery commanders that our spy was said to be a woman with a flaming red head, not very common in this part of Belgium. The day after these instructions I came back about lunch time (a time of day I am most punctual) and was told that a corporal and two men had a 'lady' for me to see with a red head; went out and found she could speak nothing but Flemish; went back to lunch, and at the pudding stage (bread and jam) some one tapped and said, 'Beg pardon, sir, but there is a corporal and two men with a lady for you to see.' I said I knew it already and went on eating. A few minutes later another tap and the same message. Thinking some one was trying to be funny at my expense, or that the corporal was tired of waiting, I used language and said if anyone else came and told me of the red-headed lady I would make the corporal wait all the afternoon. Finished an excellent lunch and strolled slowly out of the back door to tell them to take the prisoner to the Assistant Provost-Marshal—what was my horror to see three corporals, three files, and three 'red-headed females'! Each battery had caught its own. At this period the Regimental Sergeant-Major saluted and said in a hoarse whisper that if I wanted any more there was another in the

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next farm. This appalling collection of heterogeneous females, all red-headed and all ugly, completely unmanned me, but not for long! I sent the whole boiling off to the Provost-Marshal with a note that I had more arriving later. Result, a motor-orderly to beg me not to send any more, as he had already got a yard full of them and was at his wits' end to know how to feed or keep them quiet, for they were all fighting! (Spy hunting is off!)”—Letter from an Artillery Officer. *The Times*: Friday, 5th February, 1915.

“Our only companion [in the trenches] is a little canary we rescued from a deserted house, which had been almost shelled to atoms. On the cage was a ticket, ‘Please look after this little bird.’ It has made itself quite at home with us. When we leave the trenches we hand it over to the next regiment. So you may guess it’s made quite a fuss of. Last time we went into the trenches our canary was almost black through the smoke from shell fire, but it seems as cheerful as ever. I would so much like to get it home to you. It’s awfully funny, but while the shells are whizzing over our canary takes no notice and sings beautifully. Two days ago we had another visitor, a poor old sheep-dog, blind in one eye. We made it quite welcome, and fed it. When we left the trenches it followed us in the dark for about half a mile, and then we lost it. Our canary is sticking it like a brick. He is quite cheerful, and has been singing beautifully all the morning. Really it gets so black with smoke that it’s a job to distinguish it from a sparrow.”—Letter from a Private in the 2nd Rifle Brigade. *Daily Mail*: Thursday, 11th February, 1915.

“I may come home for my 168 hours’ leave, and the very thought of civilized life again amuses me. There are so many ‘necessary’ things I have not done for a long time. I fervently hope there will be no sheets on my bed and the bath-water won’t be hot. It would take a very low temperature to burn me now. I think I shall live away in some little corner where I cannot see any khaki.

“I haven’t been up a flight of stairs, seen a carpet or armchair, or tasted fresh fish for three months. I haven’t looked in a ‘real’ shop, or seen a smart woman, or heard music, or walked in anything harder than mud for three months. I haven’t tasted fresh water or even ‘fizz’ since I have been away. I haven’t seen an evening paper, I haven’t drunk out of a china cup, I haven’t eaten off a china plate. But the experience I have been through has been worth the sacrifice of all these things, and I wouldn’t sell a moment of it.”—Letter from an Officer. *The Daily Mail*: Thursday, 11th February, 1915.

“Since I last wrote to you we have been in action for about seven days, but have now come down to a place miles behind the firing line for a long rest. We might possibly remain here five or six weeks.

From the Fighting Line

"The general inspected us to-day and said a lot of very nice things about the regiment. As I had not taken part in 'the thundering good fight' we put up I did not blush. It appears some N.C.O. (no name mentioned) maintained the traditions of the regiment by turning his rear rank about and firing both ways at once. The general talked for quite a long time—it seemed to be interminable at the time—so that our fellows must have really done splendidly.

"I did forty-eight hours in the trenches—Thursday and Friday, 28th and 29th—and came out at dawn on Saturday to find — as fit as ever, shaving by the light of a candle in the cellar of our house—you see we, too, seek the seclusion of cellars. After a series of adventures he had dodged successive coast trains and finally, after paying his own railway fare, managed to rejoin us. So I am reduced once again to be a humble platoon sergeant.

"We went into the trenches again on the evening of 7th February and did seventy hours' duty. We came straight from the trenches here—a matter of ten miles. I have often read an account of a British company 'swinging through the village.' We swung from one side of the road to the other absolutely beaten—straggled along an endless road, and were finally billeted here in schools. We have since left the schools and are billeted elsewhere in the village.

"I contracted a rather bad cold during my last sojourn in the trench, and had no means of curing it, so I became gradually worse and lost my voice. Some good soul came to my aid with the suggestion that vaseline was a very good thing to ease a bad cough, so I ate a whole tin of it. I was by that time prepared to eat dubbin. It did ease me considerably, and now that we are here in a dry place and with a roof over our heads I am getting much better.

"The village blacksmith, who is also the proprietor of an estaminet (the troops call it 'jest a minute'), has given me a room in his house, where I can rest properly, but I cannot make full use of it, because I am not supposed to leave the company, although it is only billeted across the road.

"I dined—or rather supped—with the blacksmith and his family last night. I could not possibly imagine that I was in France. Everything suggested the Middle Ages in England, especially the grand coup at the end of the meal, when each member assiduously polished his plate with the remainder of the bread! My illusion of the 'moyen-âge' was heightened when I stole over this morning to discover them at a breakfast of ale, bread and butter and cheese. You may not perhaps find all this so 'bizarre,' as you have probably encountered it in Belgium, but as I gained my first impressions of France in the lazy, sunny Midi, I was very much impressed.

"Nothing very exciting happened while I was in the trenches. The Germans appear to have some very good marksmen, and caught a

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few of our fellows through the loopholes. German bombs are much more exciting. These are thrown by some sort of machine, and can be easily seen in flight. The men on the look-out shout 'Bomb up,' and then one invariably runs in the wrong direction, or falls full length in the mud and water. They make a terrific noise and send up a cloud of black smoke the size of a house. One fell near the parapet nearest me one day, and sent a lifeless Hun sky high. The German had evidently fallen three days ago in their last attack upon our position.

"The bombs cause great diversion. One of our subalterns was sleeping peacefully in his dug-out the other day, when a grenade paid him a visit. Someone shouted to him to get up and run, which you can imagine he did. The thing exploded before he had gone three paces and made a thousand holes in his clothing. Except for a few slight flesh wounds he was unhurt. Another fell right in the middle of the trench, and one man in his anxiety to reach safer quarters sat right on the thing. He managed to get up and run away unhurt. A second man was luckier still; he slept through the explosion not more than a yard away.

"Bombing does not, as a rule, last very long, for our artillery immediately takes a hand in the game and makes things too lively for them. One thing is very noticeable, the German artillery is singularly silent here. Our gunners seem to do exactly as they like. Can copper be so short in Germany? On the other hand, our people are pouring lyddite and every other 'ite' into their trenches and the villages in front."—Letter from a Sergeant of the Gloucesters. *The Daily Mail*: Monday, 22nd February, 1915.

"It is near dusk now, 7.30, and we have been two hours in action. Up comes every one from below, from casemates and turrets, to stare and rejoice, but they are all immediately hustled away to do what can be done to save life. All our boats are riddled, and none of them can be repaired for an hour. We do what we can with lifebuoys and lumps of wood paid astern, but it's mighty little; it's a lippy sea, and dreadfully cold. All this part was beastly. There were so many of them in sight, and we could do so little till our boats were patched. At last we could lower one cutter and the galley, and even then life-saving was no easy job. I was in the galley, and plunged about for twenty minutes to get one man. Altogether we got on board about a dozen, five of whom were really 'goners' when we hoisted them on board. The other seven have flourished and are really quite normal again now. Early in these life-saving operations the 'Nürnberg' heeled over on her side and sank. They were a brave lot; one man stood aft and held the ensign flying in his hands till the ship went under. It was strange and weird, all this aftermath,

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the wind rapidly arising from the westward, darkness closing in, one ship heaving to the swell, well battered, the fore top-gallant-mast gone. Of the other, nothing to be seen but floating wreckage, with here and there a man clinging, and the 'Mollyhawks' (vultures of the sea) swooping by. The wind moaned, and death was on the air. Then, see! out of the mist loomed a great four-masted barque under full canvas. A great ghost-ship she seemed. Slowly, majestically she sailed by and vanished in the night."—Letter from a Commander in H.M.S. 'Kent' to his mother. *Oxford Magazine*: 26th February, 1915.

"Give my love to —, and tell him to keep his head down and do as little shooting as possible unless he can see. My experience of night trench work is that *one listen* is worth a hundred looks at illusionary shadows and a thousand shots at them.

"Last time we were up in the trenches we were only fifteen mètres apart at the nearest point, and the Germans threw a cigarette-box to us, containing this message: *Si vous voyez nos cuisiniers sortir avec des marteaux pour faire du feu, ne tirez pas dessus et nous ferons autant pour vous. Nous ne ferons pas la guerre contre vous mais contre les Anglais.* (I should explain here that we had gone into French trenches to relieve the French Infantry.) This was duly sent to the battery of 75mm. behind us, who sent our reply in the shape of six shells. Just fancy—the French can do this with absolute safety at 6,000 yards, without endangering us, fifteen yards away. The French artillery is wonderful."—Letter from an English Corporal in Northern France. *The Morning Post*: Monday, 15th March, 1915.

"I notice that the papers tell you that we live in nice boarded 'dug-outs'—with doors and windows, tables and chairs, and I suppose mats to wipe our feet on. I should be overjoyed to notice a trench like that. I think if the mats were made to have 'Welcome' stamped on them it would sound even more complete. However, one must not grumble. We live and look well on what the papers call eggs and bacon; we always thought it was bully beef and biscuits; it comes in Fray Bentos tins, anyway. But after all we seem to keep well, and there are very few men with even colds in the regiment, and that after thirty-six hours' standing up to our knees in slush or water."—Letter from a private in Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. *The Morning Post*: 16th March, 1915.

"What a machine-like article the German soldier is! We were holding a position, being very weak at the time, when after many

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struggles the Germans broke through. That seemed to be the extent of their orders, for when they got there they just stood looking at each other, wondering what to do next. We sent them a few rounds, and the others seemed quite willing to have a rest until the war finished."—Letter from a private in the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. *The Daily Graphic*: 16th March, 1915.

"... A young fellow named —— was staying in my billet the other night. He was on his way to join 'B' Squadron of the —— Yeomanry, belonging to the 28th Division. He was just back from England, and had seen his brother there. The latter commands a destroyer and was at the bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles. He says that we are certain to get through to Constantinople, but that it would probably take us about two to three months. And then I think there will also be a good deal of land fighting. I believe our third Squadron 'C,' which is attached to the 29th Division, is going or has actually gone to the Dardanelles, but we have not heard definitely yet. In a way I rather envy them. Their campaign is certain to be full of interest, while ours here remains as dull, monotonous and unvarying as it was when we first landed three months ago. We are leading a very peaceful, uninteresting existence, like the peasants, in farm buildings. My billet is some distance away from the rest of the Squadron, so unless there is some job to be done I don't see much of our other officers, except occasionally when we call upon each other for a meal.

"The winter weather caused the ground to become so sodden and soft that an advance either by ourselves or by the Germans was altogether out of the question. Only one thing was possible and that was for both sides to sit or rather to stand in a crouching attitude in trenches watching each other—generally through periscopes. Artillery duels have been constant, and occasionally attacks and counter-attacks of a purely local nature have taken place. As yet there has been no attempt on either side at a general advance. I doubt whether the guns could be moved yet, although during the last week the ground has dried up and hardened wonderfully. Hitherto, therefore, the Cavalry have not been used for their proper purposes, and have only been put into the trenches because there was no other work for them to do, and because till recently we did not have sufficient infantry available. At one time it seemed that even we, the divisional cavalry, should have to take our turn in the trenches, but it was realized that our numbers were so small that we should soon be exhausted, and therefore useless to carry out the various divisional duties allotted to us. The average losses in this division, apart from sickness, have for the last 3 months been 20 a day. The Cyclist Company, which is attached to us, and which has

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been used in the trenches for bomb-throwing, has lost about a third of its numbers. Apart from sickness, we remain intact.

"Although we have done no heroic or very dangerous work yet, our duties have been numerous and varying. Hardly a day has gone by when we have not been directed by a wire from Headquarters to do some job. We have to fetch all the drafts of officers, men, and horses from railhead and conduct them to their various positions. All the traffic of the division is controlled by us. It is up to us to see that there is no congestion, and some of the roads are so narrow that traffic can only proceed in one direction. If a road gets shelled, we have to go out and prevent traffic from passing down it, diverting it by other roads. The telephone wires are guarded by us. We are also sent out to look for and catch, if possible, enemy snipers. Whenever a serious attack takes place, we saddle up, remain out all night near by (this has happened about four or five times), and are used as dispatch riders or whatever the particular emergency may necessitate.

"These at present are our everyday duties—nothing very romantic or exciting about them. When the time comes for advance we shall get greater opportunities for distinguishing ourselves in a perhaps more heroic way by fulfilling our proper functions of reconnaissance and inter-communication. Apart from the above duties, I have got my troop to look after—I started from England with 35 men, but at the moment have only 28 of them available. Some of them have been taken as orderlies for the Staff; two are sick, and one was made a sergeant and transferred to another troop. I am glad to say that I am on excellent terms with all the men, some of whom are really awfully nice fellows, and I know that my troop is in high favour. I have got — horses at my farm at the moment. These have to be looked after properly and exercised daily. I have to see that the men's rifles are kept clean, that they know how to use their swords, and that they understand the reconnaissance work, which we have practised a good deal. I am responsible for their conduct in and out of the field.

If there is no particular job for us to do, we get up at 6 a.m., water and feed the horses, breakfast at 7, exercise and groom the horses in the course of the morning—lunch at 1.0. In the afternoon rifle exercises or sometimes we play football or rounders, and sometimes do nothing at all—it depends on what happened the day or night before. Occasionally we ride out and report on roads and get a thorough knowledge of the country. Sometimes we visit neighbouring towns, such as Poperinghe, Ypres, or Bailleul. The men have their teas at 5.30, and go to bed at 9.0. I have dinner at about 7.0. I have got a very good servant, and have really made myself very comfortable in this billet. There is no lack of food. The army rations are very good, apart from the frozen beef, which is sometimes uneatable owing

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to its toughness. It is then either minced or made into a stew. I buy eggs, butter, milk, coffee, beer and such like things from the farm people round about. I always have a very English breakfast consisting of porridge and eggs and bacon (a ration!) Consequently you will see that I am suffering absolutely no hardships. We get plenty of exercise, often long hours in the saddle, and the result is that I am feeling as fit as anything.

"Personally I am very much enjoying this experience. Occasionally we do see some funny incidents, a shoeing smith trying to make himself intelligible to a Flemish peasant, or Belgian soldiers marvelling at our games of rounders, or English Tommies making themselves thoroughly at home, perhaps side by side with a horde of refugees from Ypres or Malines, in the kitchens of peasant proprietors who have long ago grown accustomed to English ways.

"Our state of inaction cannot, I feel, last very much longer. The fight at Neuve Chapelle was an indication of what is likely to happen in the near future. The weather has during the last week or two greatly improved. The country has dried up considerably, and to-day for the first time I noticed that a motor travelling along a main road made quite a lot of dust. During December, January, February, and the first week in March, we suffered a fair amount of discomfort from the cold and wet and mud. Now, perhaps, we shall regret those days, when we get too much heat and dust! But the winter is not yet quite over, and Jupiter Pluvius may still have some gifts in store for us.

"I think everybody out here will be very glad when the war comes to an end. It is very nearly eight months since we began to live in khaki. But I fail to see any indications of the war coming to a speedy end; however I live in hopes that we shall not have to go through another winter campaign; at any rate, if we do, I hope it will not be in sodden and stricken Flanders. . . ."—Letter from a Yeomanry Officer, 18th March, 1915.

"Many thanks for your last letter. I showed it to Prince —, and he thought your proposition good. But it is the damned English that may be the cause of the solution of our prisoner problem not working. Those swine, it is they that turn our stomachs; but for them we should not now be getting nearer the precipice of starvation. Between us, as old friends, I tell you we shall be face to face with starvation, and it is due to England alone, this dilemma, which is going to torture our beloved Fatherland. Yet, you say, we cannot starve the prisoners. Why not, I ask you? It is entirely England's own fault we have any of her people as prisoners. Remember that always. As solemnly sure, I tell you this, as I write this letter to you—no one in our Reichstag imagined England as an enemy. From the highest

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downwards; no, no, a thousand times. Not only now is she our worst enemy, but she is ruining us; thousands of the best sons of the Fatherland have spilled their blood through England. Through England and the English thousands have suffered. God in Heaven, I can't tell you on paper the horrors, the sufferings—all through England. And, to finish all this misery, thousands of women and children, if England can manage it, will starve to death. Oh, my friend, can you ask me to think of England and the English but in one way only? 'They are swine-dogs of swine-dogs.' We in Germany cannot feel or treat their officers, their soldiers, but as they are—as swine must be treated—for they are swine, every 'John Bull' of them. And when an English prisoner dies, we say: 'God be thanked, one "John Bull" less.' It is so, and no persuasion from you will make any difference. From the Kaiser down to the gutter-boy we all say the same—we don't want to exchange them, but let them be here, like the bloody swine they are, and if they don't survive the war, with our Fatherland racked as she is, well, remember well, that a great many of the Fatherland's best will die for their country; but they will die with honour.

"The English die like swine, polluting the Fatherland by dying here, say we. We are not going to feed them when we may want for ourselves. You think, my friend, I am cruel. I am merciless; but since my last letter, a new feeling is becoming assured, and it is that England has done us all this wrong; causing all our sorrow, all our ruin, and her sons must suffer. Now, I tell you, Americans with us say England is the laughing-stock of the world with our prisoners. And why? To salve her conscience for all she's about to aggrandize herself through Germany's downfall, she's 'slobbering over' our Germans in England. Why the prisoners themselves own it, and we say, well we will be honest, we will show the world we won't 'slobber over' the English prisoners. No, they shall first starve, slowly but surely. We hear England says to all the neutral Powers: 'See how we treat Germany's prisoners; then see how they treat ours.' Well, we take very good care to let the neutral Powers see we are fighting like Germans, full of courage, full of hope, and we look after what we want. We are not afraid like England, with her old-women-like politicians, to insist that our prisoners in England should be well treated. America tells us England must and will treat them so. But we tell America we are not ruled by old women, but by men, and we treat our hated enemies as swine-dogs, which we consider them to be, and no country will have the power to stop us. We are honest, we Germans. We hate the English, and we show it. They hate us, but because they are afraid of America and neutral nations they dare not show it, and which country has the most respect? Well, ask the Americans with us!

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"I think 200,000 Russians will be exchanged this month for ditto Germans, and I am with you, so are the rest of the Prisoners' Council, that a neutral country should be responsible—that if we return them to Russia on the parole of the Russian Government they will not fight against us again; and a neutral country will be responsible that Russia keeps her parole; for many of these 200,000 will in time recover. With France I agree, too, that the prisoners be exchanged under those conditions; always that a neutral country will be surety that the parole is kept. But with English prisoners, I say no. England is causing us starvation; in turn, well let the English prisoners join us in our starvation, let them die, like swine if needs be, when the hunger arrives. Ask the Commandants of our Internment Corps. 'Yes, so. Let the French, Belgian, Russians go, but keep the English.' Certainly, *mein freund*, your proposal has been under discussion, and is to be taken to the Kaiser for the discussion by your faithful friend, and then I will write again. It is a solution worthy of the problem worrying our country, and I thank you for such heaven-born help. So much rests on my head with these unfortunate prisoners of war I hail with joy such a proposal, which with all speed our Council and our Highest will discuss."—Letter from a highly-placed German official to a neutral correspondent. *The Morning Post*: 19th March, 1915.

"Then I was just climbing out of the trench when I felt a terrific blow just as if all the world had fallen on me. I fell back, and thought I was dead, as blood was all over me. My men were splendid. They tore off my coat, bandaged me up, and some of them stuck with me. All day we were under a terrific fire from every sort of shell, including great howitzers. They fell all around our trenches, and when you are wounded this is not pleasant, let me tell you.

"Several other wounded officers dropped back and joined me. A soldier from the ——— Regiment came limping in with a bullet in his leg; he said, in a broad West-country accent, 'I'm lucky; I was 'it before in the leg, and 'ad a short holiday, and 'ere we are, 'it in the same place. I shall see a bit of 'ome once more.' He then said, 'I'm not going to stay here, I'm off to the dressing-station.' We told him it was too dangerous, and advised him to wait in the trench until after dark, but he insisted on going on. He had only moved about ten yards when a shell got a direct hit on him, so the poor fellow did not see home after all. He was blown into small pieces, and never knew what had happened."—A wounded Officer's experiences at Neuve Chapelle. *The Daily Telegraph*: Saturday, 20th March, 1915.

"'At first I was in a rotten funk,' he said, 'and was quite surprised to find myself holding my rifle steadily and firing away at

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a great rate. Then my chum alongside me was killed, and I saw blood—and then—well all you know is that you want to get right on to the enemy.

“ ‘The Germans did not take us by surprise at Mons. It was we who surprised them, but they seemed to outnumber us by ten to one. Mind you, it was a bit thick. In my company there were only twenty-four left out of two hundred and fifty.

“ ‘In the retreat I lost my regiment. That made me feel scared. Then I ran into the Irish Guards. “Hullo, Kiddy,” one of the officers shouted, “where are you going?” “Looking for bread,” I said, foolish like, not knowing quite what I was doing. I think I was really looking for Camberwell. I felt as if they wanted me at home. “You come along with us,” they said. So instead of retreating with the remains of my regiment, I went into action again, as the Guards were helping to cover the retreat.

“ ‘My regiment is nicknamed “The Cauliflowers,” and we were in the firing line at the great fight at Ypres. We were charged by the Prussian Guards. Somehow they managed to attack us both in the front and in the rear. They were a fine lot of men. Then, in their turn, they were charged by the Black Watch. I wouldn’t like to be in the Black Watch. They run too quickly for me. They gave just a yelp, ran like mad, and simply leapt on the Guards. It was all up with those Prussians.

“ ‘Is it true that we love our rifles? Well, I didn’t at first. I used to prop it up anywhere, and I was surprised to see men patting their rifles, and even kissing them. But, after a bit, I found myself doing the same thing.

“ ‘You ought to have seen our men use their fists, too. You get into trouble if you are seen to drop your rifle, but I’ve seen lots of chaps do that when they were right on top of the Germans, giving them biff! biff! with their fists.

“ ‘I reckon we have learned a lot from the Germans as to the best way to make trenches, but we didn’t find that most of them were first-rate fighting men. They always came on in close order, as if one was holding the other up, and if they got as far as our trench they didn’t seem to know what to do with the bayonets. They would stand up against our barbed wire as if they were waiting to be shot down. Sometimes you felt as if you didn’t want to do it.

“ ‘Then we fire so fast that some of our German prisoners have asked if every Tommy was using a Maxim. Even the French can’t come near us for that. Fifteen rounds a minute, and marking our men too.

“ ‘The greatest trouble was to get our men to retreat. Now and then somebody would call out, “What we have we hold!” and several companies would stop dead, and only would start marching again at the word of command.

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“ ‘One thing we were always hankering after was a wash and a shave. When I got the bullets in my hip and leg I lay for twelve hours before I thought I would try to crawl away. It was lucky I did crawl, for I have heard since that the men beside me were taken prisoners.

“ ‘I crawled along until I was picked up by a battery, and then they had to get rid of me, as they had to go into action. I crawled on a good bit further until I was picked up by some of the R.A.M.C. The first man who spoke to me was my own brother. And what do you think was the first thing he said to me? “What the dickens have you done with my razor?” ’ ”—The experiences under fire of an eighteen-year-old private in the Loyal North Lancashires. *The Daily Express*: Tuesday, 23rd March, 1915.

“I suppose you will be beginning to think that in the dearth of great battles things out here grow monotonous. Some people maintain that winter warfare in the trenches will make the Army stale. But don't you believe it, for we are kept very busy. They gave us a position with a filthy old deserted farm, mud surrounded, as billets; the medical officer would condemn it at sight (or scent) the first day. But ‘T. Atkins’ sets about making a proper barracks of it—put soldiers into no matter what sort of a place and it would straight away become a barracks neat and complete. So now there is a nice clean kitchen, the row of dixies cooking on two iron rails brought from the ruined railway track, an unhinged barn-door scoured clean as a table for butchery, and shelves strung up with wire that was over a part of a fortification. There is a clean but sombre guard-room, and safe in the cellar each man has a little bundle of tobacco leaves for his blanket. They would have gone further and made the place a palace, but when they began to bring in couches and cheval glasses from a ruined chateau in the ‘no-man's-land,’ and spoke about a brougham they wanted to bring for the officers, they were sent back, and the major gave a lecture on the penalties for looting!”—Letter from an Officer in the Royal Field Artillery. *The Times*: Tuesday, 23rd March, 1915.

“For some time the section of the Army Service Corps of which I am in command was sent to rest at a base, and it became part of my duties to censor all the letters which the men wrote home.

“They had nothing else to do but to write letters, and the censoring became a very serious business for me, as I frequently had at night to wade carefully through 150 love-letters.

“So I decided to introduce a change, if possible, and one day I motored into Boulogne and bought a football, which I took back for my men to play with.

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"The result was quite marvellous. The money I spent for the football provided the best investment I had ever made. The men took to it so keenly that they played football all day, and had very little time left in which to write love-letters.

"After the introduction of the football I never had more than five love-letters to censor at night."—Letter from an Officer. *The Daily Chronicle*: Friday, 26th March, 1915.

"I am simply dying to read poor old ——'s diary—we know that the treatment of our prisoners has been shocking. The dirty German swine turned their machine-guns on a lot of our wounded the other day, and killed many of them. They went even further than this—paraffin oil was poured over some of our poor fellows, and then they were set fire to by these swine. I can only pray that this war will not stop or be stopped before we have wiped out the whole German Empire.

"Our men are splendid, and it requires all the efforts of officers to prevent them simply rushing up to the nearest German trench and bayoneting every one in it—we should lose too many, of course, by doing this.

"The weather is much better and although cold, is much drier; so one does not have to live in such a filthy manner as we have been doing recently."—Letter from an Officer in Northern France to his mother. *The Morning Post*: Wednesday, 31st March, 1915.

" 'Is this Captain ——'s dug-out?'

" 'Yes! What d'you want?'

" 'Rations, and mails from England, sir.'

"It is one o'clock in the morning; the rain is coming down in sheets; the wind is howling, and the night is as black as pitch. The wet is oozing through the shallow mud walls and dripping through the waterproof sheet which forms the ceiling of my shelter. This shelter has been my residence for eight days and eight long nights; my clothes are caked in mud—I have eight days' growth on my chin and my feet are icy cold. The magic words 'Rations and mails' immediately dispel all thoughts of discomfort and mud.

"I scramble out of my 'funk-hole,' and automatically look out towards the enemy's lines—some two hundred yards distant; all is quiet in front. The fact that my feet are so cold makes me decide that it is my duty to walk down the line and see that all the sentries are awake and alert. The trench is a long one—nearly a quarter of a

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mile; the depth of the mud makes progress slow, and the stench makes the slowness all the more objectionable. . . .

"Having visited my last post on the further side of this gap, and satisfied that all—no! I cannot truthfully say all, but the majority of the sentries were really awake and alert, I began to retrace my steps, and I thought of the poor men whose names I had taken who were not wide-awake and on the *qui vive*. I thought of the military critic sitting in his arm-chair in front of the club-room fire, and of what his verdict would be if I reported any sentry not being as wide-awake as he might be at two o'clock in the morning. I remembered that this was the eighth night my men had been on duty, and I remembered also there was a limit to human endurance. I realized how tired and weary I felt myself—and by the time I had arrived at my dug-out I had forgotten the names of the unfortunate men because I was satisfied that there were sufficient sentries alert enough to safeguard the trench against any sudden attack."—Letter from a London Territorial Officer. *The Morning Post*: Wednesday, 7th April, 1915.

"March 6.—We have been fighting ever since last Thursday week, ten days with only two days' rest, and have come back to-day for more ammunition. Hundreds of shots have passed ahead, astern, and over us, but we have only been hit once, and that did no damage. We had a tremendous fight all day Thursday. You see, although we have completely destroyed the three towns of Seddul Bahr, Kum Kale, and Yem Shehr, so that not one intact house stands, yet among the wreckage is any amount of cover for the Turks, and they in huge numbers—40,000 or 50,000—are utterly reckless of their lives and dodge about picking off the landing party one by one. Their own losses must have been immense. One time I was watching the fight, for the Fleet was only about three-quarters of a mile off the shore, and I saw about fifty of them break cover, start to run across an open space down the hillside toward us, when 'plunk,' and a 6in. lyddite went bang into the middle of them, and on the smoke clearing away there wasn't a sign of anybody, not even anything big enough to call a dead body.

"Yesterday we started on our next step. At 1, 2 and 3 all the forts have been completely wrecked; they are simply unrecognizable mounds. On Tuesday and Wednesday we went in and silenced 4, 5 and 6, and yesterday we started on much the hardest part at 7 and 8. This part, which is called the Narrows, is only about three-quarters of a mile across, and there are sixteen known forts on it.

"Yesterday was a very long-range affair, but the wonderful part about it was that an enormous battleship we have here—the finest

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battleship in the world—lay off at nine miles and dropped shell after shell, each weighing nearly a ton, into a fort that she could not see, twelve miles away over the land. I should have liked to have seen the 'Turks' faces when the first earthquake fell among them, looking in amazement at each other, and saying, 'Now where in the world did that come from?' We had aeroplanes up spotting for her, and signalling by wireless if the shot was a miss; but very few of them were. To-day we are taking in ammunition; to-morrow I suppose we start again."—Letter from a British Naval Officer in the Dardanelles. *The Times*: Monday, 12th April, 1915.

"We have been having a fine time here. We have been hit eight times, but most of the shots have had no effect, as they were on the armour belt. I landed the other day with a demolition party and blew up the guns at Seddul Bahr. The great difficulty is the mines, which are very numerous. A large percentage of them are floating, and, of course, they launch them at night, so as to let them drift down into the patrolling ships. You will doubtless have seen from the papers that we are eighteen miles up the Canal. This is quite wrong, as Chanak, the greatest problem of all, is only fourteen miles up.

"The forts are very powerful, as they have the modern 14in. disappearing guns. D—— has gone up mine-sweeping in our remaining steamboat to-night. I was put all last night in a pilot boat patrolling the straits. I hope to be able to go mine-sweeping to-morrow. We have a very powerful fleet here, and there will be some splash when we meet the Turkish Navy and the 'Goeben' at the other end. Our best ship is the 'Queen Lizzie,' with 15in. guns. They can fire 27m. We are going up to-morrow to have a grand bust up. So far things have gone very well with us, but things are awfully risky, as at Chanak the Turks have got torpedo tubes and every conceivable invention for the destruction of life. They have got eight very fast destroyers, which will probably show some fight.

"Germans are manning all the guns and searchlights. They are a very fine body of men and are awfully brave. Whilst our marine covering party was landed at Kum Kale a sergeant was wounded and left in a safe place under a wall. When they came back he had fourteen bullet wounds in him. They searched round until they at last found a German in a wood exactly opposite the sergeant. He was put up against a tree and shot without a word. Our aeroplane scouts are splendid, and they work awfully well."—Letter from a Midshipman in the Dardanelles. *The Times*: Monday, 12th April, 1915.

"I don't know what to think of these men [strikers in England] at all. It is impossible to frame a sentence that will sufficiently express

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our disgust at their ungrateful action, and I do sincerely hope that some punishment is meted out to them to teach them a lesson. It is painful to our feelings to think of it. Here we are out here, fighting in a muddy, waterlogged trench, suffering every hardship that it is possible to imagine—wet feet, frozen feet, chilled to the bone at night from the intense cold and frost, working hard, digging and carrying, and risking our necks all the time, living in desolation day after day, night after night, week in and week out, always the same scene, nothing cheerful, everything dull, sleeping when we can sleep on the hard, cold earth, and all the time listening to the nerve-racking shrieks and crashes of shot and shell bursting all round us, seeing our comrades falling by our sides and wondering whether it is our turn next. And for all this we get a shilling a day. We have given up our jobs, our homes, our liberties and pleasures, and are sacrificing our lives in taking our stand by the side of our Regular Army, in the name of a great cause—to save old England from the ravages of a foreign felon, to rid our Empire of the menace that threatens her freedom and liberty, and to seek redress for the bitter wrongs dealt poor little gallant Belgium. We can endure our hardships bravely, we can go into battle fearlessly, we are willing to sacrifice everything in such a noble cause as long as we are convinced the people at home are with us in thought and spirit; but when we hear of our fellow-countrymen (some of whom ought to be out here with us) acting as these men are acting, it is very discouraging and makes us think. They are hindering our progress. They have the same effect as if they were in an attack, and they are an unforeseen enemy that must be dealt with, and we won't forget them for it, either. Kitchener, I hope, will deal with them as he is dealing with the common enemy, and make both master and man sit up for their selfishness. Let them have six days and nights right off in the trenches as we are having, and they will alter their tune, I'll wager.

“One of our jobs in the trenches [continues the writer], as important as it is risky, and which I have never seen mentioned in the papers when describing the Tommies' duties out here, is ‘Listening Picket.’ None of us are fond of that job, although we do it without murmuring. A picket consists of two men, and we have to go out fifty yards (sometimes further) in front of our trenches (and where we are over our barbed wire) and lie down flat facing the German lines and listen for them to come. Should they make an attack we have to give the alarm by firing four rounds and then get back the best way we can. Of course, it is odds on us getting left, for we are between two fires. We do this for an hour each, from dusk to dawn, at intervals, along our front, and I tell you it is no joke lying there for an hour almost frozen. You can imagine what it is on the cold frosty nights

From the Fighting Line

we have been having lately. All the time bullets are whizzing over our heads from both sides, and flares continually falling round you. Sometimes these flares fall on you and chaps have been burned with them, for they dare not move or they would be spotted. If we are fired on, as is often the case, we have to move our position. I tell you we are not sorry when the hour is over. It seems an age, and we get so stiff with the cold that we can hardly get back to our trenches when the relief comes.

"While upon the subject of working in front of our trenches, I must mention one particular incident, which illustrates the British daring. The other night we were out putting up large wire entanglements in front (the curious thing was that the same morning we had been reading an account in the *Morning Post* of how the engineers risked their lives during this kind of work; it vividly described the risk they run). I might inform you that this is now done by us (the infantry). Well, we were out working hard and fast and almost finished when we found that we wanted another length of wire to complete the job. The Germans were nearer to us than our own trenches, and to solve the difficulty one of our chaps actually went across and cut enough of the Germans' barbed wire and brought it back to finish our own. What do you think of that?"—Letter from a Lance-Corporal in a London regiment. *The Morning Post*: Tuesday, 13th April, 1915.

"When we went into the Dardanelles that afternoon we had no idea we were to be in special danger of being mined. On the morning of the 18th the 'Queen Elizabeth,' 'Lord Nelson,' 'Agamemnon,' and 'Inflexible' went in and fired at long range; later the four French ships went in to closer range. At this time we were off the entrance and saw (but not for certain) the 'Bouvet' meet with disaster and sink in 2 min. 45 sec.

"I went down below at 2 p.m., when the 'Irresistible,' 'Majestic,' 'Ocean,' and 'Albion' went up to close range to relieve the French ships. You can understand that I did not think anything very dangerous was on, as I went to sleep down below from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. At four o'clock I had a nibble of biscuit and a few chocolates. At 4.30 p.m. the explosion occurred. Every one seemed to realize it was a knock-out blow, the whole ship being lifted up, and when she settled down she had a distinct list to starboard. I think I must have been dozing at the time, as the explosion did not seem so terrific to me.

"A shipmate said, 'Come along,' meaning up through the turret—a somewhat intricate way out—and after a moment's hesitation I

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followed him. When we got up the first ladder all the lights went out. Fortunately he had his electric torch on him, and he found the way up quite easily.

"We climbed out on to the quarterdeck, and found the men mustering there. There were no destroyers visible, so the prospects were rather dismal for getting away. In the hurry of getting up the turret I left my cork lifebelt at the bottom of the turret. The inner tube of my 'bike' tyre was in my cabin, so I nipped down below to get it. My first effort was a failure, as the watertight door near my cabin was closed. Meantime the ship kept floating very well, so I thought we should be all right.

"On coming on to the quarterdeck again I found some one had opened the ward-room skylight, so I climbed down there, got to my cabin in the dark, and brought up the tyre and pump, which I blew up, together with the swimming collar. All this time we had been drifting towards the beach—our engines being disabled—and about this time the Turks began to shell us with 6in. howitzers and other big guns. We were trying to take cover behind the turret, and I noticed two shells explode about ten to fifteen yards off.

"A destroyer came up alongside us. I then turned round to look for our engineer lieutenant, but he had disappeared. Afterwards we heard he took to the water and was picked up by a steamboat. I now thought it was about time to clear out myself, as the shells were exploding all round us and the combination of that and the possibility of the ship sinking was somewhat alarming.

"The destroyer's stern was some way from the stern of the 'Irresistible,' and only her bows were touching us right forward. I did not fancy going through the battery where the shells came from, so I decided to climb over the side and walk along the net-shelf and get on the destroyer. There were a number of men there and progress forward was very slow. Lots of them jumped overboard and were hauled on board the destroyer by rope-ends. I caught a line that was thrown from the destroyer, and an R.N.R. lieutenant in her beckoned me to jump, which I did and was hauled on board.

"There were 610 of our men in the destroyer—it would have been a calamity had a shell dropped in the middle of them. They shoved off soon after I got on board and shortly we were all put on board the 'Queen Elizabeth.'

"We had sixteen wounded and thirteen killed; among the latter were a lieutenant, a midshipman, a warrant-officer, and an assistant clerk missing. The last-named was killed or drowned, we fear. Poor boy, he only joined the ship about four weeks before. We spent two nights in the 'Queen Elizabeth' off Tenedos and one night in the 'Phaeton.' I hardly had a wink of sleep these three nights—however, I am now sleeping like a log and feel none the worse.

From the Fighting Line

“ The captain, commander, and several lieutenants remained on board the ‘ Irresistible ’ with the idea that she would be taken in tow, but they went to the ‘ Ocean ’ about an hour after we left, and were soon again mined, and eventually got off in a destroyer. The ‘ Ocean ’ was not shelled as we were and did not lose any killed or wounded. Of course I lost all my belongings.”—Letter from an Officer in the “ Irresistible.” *The Daily Mail*: Tuesday, 13th April, 1915.

SOLOMON ON DRINK

“**G**IVE strong drink unto him that is ready to perish,
“and wine unto those that be of heavy hearts.”

(Proverbs xxxi, 6.)

FINANCE AND THE WAR

I. THE BANKING SITUATION AT HOME

THE City of London in these middle days of the War resembles a giant Atlantic liner feeling her way through storm and fog to a break which may reveal either an open channel and a clear course ahead, or a line of beetling cliffs so close at hand that neither skill nor good fortune can save her from destruction. The passengers try to make the best of it. They feel that nothing they can do at such a time can alter the fate of the great ship to which they have entrusted their lives and their fortunes. The crew know little more than the passengers and carry on in a spirit of loyalty and devotion to the owners, looking to the captain to do his best to pull them through, whilst the captain has recourse to every expedient that his long experience can suggest. But the captain of that good ship, the City, died in the midst of the storm standing on the bridge to the last and working with whole soul and energy to steady the course and meet each new trouble with the same cool courage that overcame its predecessor; and the new man has not yet come aboard.

The death of Lord Rothschild at a time when the problems raised by the emergency measures of last August and the continuance of the War had created an entirely novel set of conditions in finance, was a grievous loss to the City and to the nation. Naturally, when in the City, he desired to make profit, and the making of profit was a satisfaction to him as to all other merchants and bankers. But Lord

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Rothschild never allowed profit, or the possibility of profit, to divert his mind from the broader national issues in which the City looked to him as its leader. It will always remain his great claim to distinction that, over and over again, when his advice was asked by the Treasury on public affairs, he subordinated all questions of self interest to what he believed to be the public interest. It was a pity that, in the critical years from 1910 onwards, when Mr Lloyd George decided to multiply public levies of taxation and to apply the product to various ill-considered schemes of benefiting a certain section in this country at the expense of every one else, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not trouble to maintain those friendly relations between the Treasury and the City which his predecessors had always taken pains to preserve. Notwithstanding the bitterness of those days, which must have affected the great financier with a sense of the follies which King Demos is ever ready to adopt, he was the first when war broke out to offer his whole service to that very Chancellor who had maligned him in one public place after another, and no doubt the heavy labours he undertook hastened his death. It will not be easy to fill his place. No one will regret his loss more than Mr Lloyd George himself. For time brings its own revenges.

The appointment of Mr Hartley Withers as Financial Adviser to the Treasury is an indication of the new view which the Treasury takes of what should be its true relation to the bankers and financiers, on whom it must now depend for those silver bullets which are absolutely necessary to carry on the war. Mr Hartley Withers' record speaks for itself. Since the days of Walter Bagehot no authority on City matters has commanded wider respect. His appointment is a very notable abandonment and supersession of the Treasury mind. But certainly no authority has ever had to face so grave a problem as that which confronts the City at the present time. It is novel, its possibility had never been taken into account, and on its correct solution hinges the continuance of the war with-

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out inflicting acute suffering on our civilian population at home. It may be stated briefly.

How is London to remain a free market for gold? That is its distinction amongst all the capital cities of the world. In ordinary times the exchanges of trade and commerce and of the Bills, which represent those exchanges converted into nominal value, can be so adjusted by variations in the Bank Rate that the conservation of our gold reserves presents no special difficulty. If there be any sign that the balance of trade is against us, and that gold will have to be exported to adjust the difference, a very slight manipulation of the discount market makes it necessary to discontinue the operations which are causing the trouble. But these are not ordinary times, and we are confronted with the difficulty that our imports this year so far exceed our exports that there is no other direct means of paying for the balance than by exporting gold. Nor can we do without these imports, for they consist very largely of food and munitions of war. It is true that we might commence to sell back to foreign countries the securities they have given us in exchange for the money we have lent them in past years. But, with prices at their present level, such transactions would represent considerable loss to those of us who lent the money. Or we might call in all those sums due to us in foreign countries which we have lent on short term notes and other securities of that class. But, if borrowers are pressed too hard, they may not be able to pay, and instead of getting back our money—that is to say instead of having credits opened for us with our money in the Banks of other countries who owe us the money, by which we in turn could pay the money we owe in those countries—we might have to be content with putting in Receivers and risking the bankruptcy or liquidation of our debtors. Indeed, something of that sort happened soon after the beginning of the War, when a call was made on various heavy debtors in the United States to pay us back what they owed. A compromise had to be effected, and \$100,000,000 in gold on account was

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lodged in Ottawa, by American bankers, to the credit of the Bank of England. It was the best that could be done at the time, when panic was worse there than here; but no one who was interested in the negotiations which brought about this poor result could pretend that the payment of an amount which was only a small proportion of what ought to have been paid was a satisfactory ending to the transaction. Clearly, if the Balance of Trade keeps against us, it may be necessary to press in New York for further payments of the same kind, especially as the United States is our principal creditor for recent imports here. The alternate course is to borrow money in America and set up credits there with the borrowed money. But it is never quite satisfactory to be compelled by circumstances to borrow your own money from your own debtor and pay him a high rate of interest for the accommodation. In the meantime the gold deposited at Ottawa is finding its way back to the States, and before long the stock will have to be replenished, from some source on that side which can either be influenced by pressure to repay its debts or which will yield up its gold to the blandishment of a substantial rate of interest and the credit of Great Britain in the Money Markets of the world. The essential thing is that if people want to export gold from England and are in a position to buy it, no legislative hindrance should be put in the way of their doing so. But when an American with \$4.80 in his pocket can buy a pound sterling which ordinarily costs him \$4.89 the temptation to lay in sovereigns is considerable, and would be greater were it not that when he has bought his pound sterling the cost of carrying it across the sea, in view of present maritime risks, absorbs much of the profit. Nevertheless it is easy to see how great is the risk that natural causes may unduly deplete our gold reserves and jeopardize our power of importing what is necessary for our welfare. It is to avoid that risk—far greater there than here—that Germany is hoarding every gold coin she can beg, borrow, or steal, and has forbidden

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any person to leave Germany with gold coin in his possession.

The condition of the gold reserve is not the only abnormal feature of the state of affairs in the City. The Bank Rate has been fixed at 5 per cent. But it has been quite ineffective as regards the rate of discount. Indeed the Bank itself has advanced money on War Loan Stock not at one per cent below Bank Rate, as promised in the prospectus, but at two per cent below. In other words, given "fine" security, it has been content to earn three per cent—not five—on its money. Nor is the Bank obliged to compete for new business; because the bills in "cold storage"—those discounted with the Government guarantee of repayment one year after the conclusion of peace—and its various other advances under Government guarantee have absorbed the bulk of its own resources, and its Reserve, though larger than usual, does not represent more than twenty per cent of its liabilities. At the same time the discounting of these "cold storage," or pre-moratorium bills—which would never have been necessary had bankers kept their heads last August—has so augmented the resources of the institutions which took advantage of the Government offer, that it is now difficult to find employment for money at remunerative rates. In October it cost $3\frac{1}{8}$ per cent to discount three months "fine" bills, and 5 per cent for ordinary "trade" bills. In February the Banks were glad to get 1 per cent for the "fine" bills, and yet "trade" bills were maintained at 4 to $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

In this REVIEW we have commented severely upon the wretched inadequacy of the facilities which the London Joint Stock Banks, who have control of the Banking of practically the whole kingdom, are willing to afford to internal trade. The rates we have quoted prove the case so conclusively that nothing need be said in reply to those who accused us of harsh and unfounded comment upon so unnatural and unpatriotic a policy.

The present trouble is that, although it would be

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better for legitimate trade if the Bank Rate were reduced to 4 per cent, it is impossible to reduce it on account of the "cold storage" Bills and the existing undertaking that War Loan Stock may be pledged at one per cent below current Bank Rate. In other words, the ordinary method of manipulating the Bank Rate to steady adverse Foreign Exchanges is in suspense for the time being.

It is worth recording that up to 7th April, 1915, the figures of the Clearing House showed a decrease of no less than £1,655,266,000 in cheques cleared as compared with the corresponding period of 1914. Practically all this decrease was in the Town Clearing, which is down by 36·10 per cent, whereas the Country Clearing is only down 0·98 per cent. No better confirmation could be given of the conclusion that London—and particularly the City—has been the real victim of the extraordinary measures of last August and September, whilst the country, which is essentially industrial, is as busy as ever. The returns of some of the Provincial Clearing Houses show indeed a considerable decrease, but the clearances in these local institutions are relatively small and do not afford so sound a basis of comparison.

There is one other point. Never in the history of Banking were the amounts left on deposit by customers so large as they are to-day. So long as the Minimum Price rules are retained in the Treasury Regulations controlling the unhappy Stock Exchange, and thereby destroying it as a free and open market, so long will most of this money lie idle in the Banks. In bygone days the Bankers themselves were the first to urge on their customers the desirability of finding on their own account permanent investments for large balances. To-day the Bank Manager is most considered by his Directors who induces most customers to leave their money on deposit so that the Banker can invest it for his own profit. It is curious that Bankers are willing to run the risk of the possible depreciation which may follow their investments of vast sums of customers' money in various securities; for this was the real rock

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on which their ship nearly foundered last August. It is doubtful if they can possibly make enough profit in handling deposits to compensate them for the ever-present risk of depreciation—and even large profits may be easily swept away, as they know to their cost by now. For the present Bankers themselves are not transferring these deposits to any large extent to investments of a permanent nature; and so long as they exist in such superabundance, the true, as opposed to the artificial, rates of discount must remain low and our American and Argentine exchanges must suffer accordingly. Our food must cost us more.

In these circumstances the Government have adopted a new method of issuing Treasury Bills which, if loyally supported by the Banks, may easily obviate the necessity of any further War Loan. The old system of issuing these Bills by tender as and when the money was required, which was meant to induce competition in rates of discount, has been beaten by the limitation of the number of Banking Institutions, and by a kind of agreement—informal, of course, but effective—which settled the price that should be offered in the tenders. The new system offers the Bills in denominations of £1,000, £5,000 or £10,000 at a price fixed from time to time by the Treasury, having regard of course to monetary conditions at the date of issue, and it is now open to anyone to go to the Bank of England and buy these Bills at the price current in exchange for cash or a Banker's draft. No limit whatever is to be placed on the total number of Bills issued. This measure should have a twofold effect. First it should provide the Government with all the money it wants from day to day, and secondly it should help to find employment for these undigested masses of Bank deposits which, beyond all question, are creating that artificial and dangerous position which has jeopardized our stock of gold at home. We are assured that the normal method of checking gold exports by raising discount rates is impossible owing to the colossal amount of cheap money lying idle in the Banks. It has been disappointing to see that once

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again the Banks have had regard to other considerations than the national good in not agreeing to stiffen discount rates themselves. As in August with guarantees and moratoria, so now with Treasury Bills at a substantial rate of interest, the State has come to the rescue of a position which might have denuded us of gold. Most surely the day is not far off when certain elements in politics will demand the profit for the State in commercial matters where the State takes the risk of loss. The position, however, is better than seemed possible a month ago, and if the new step is the first result of Mr Hartley Withers' appointment we can only congratulate him and hope he will continue to do as well.

Reference has been made to the position in the United States in considering rates of exchange. But we have become equally weak in the Argentine where the vast payments we are making for the supply of grain and meat for ourselves and our allies have completely turned the exchanges against us. An important factor, both in the United States and the Argentine, is the enormous increase in the price of meat and cereals. These are valued at fifty per cent above their price last July, and therefore finance has to be provided to the extent of at least fifty per cent more money for no greater dead weight of goods than before. On the other hand there is not a very great increase in values in the materials we export, and of course the diminution of the quantity of labour in the country, and the application of most of what is left to Government work, is seriously affecting all normal export commerce, both in quantity and value, and through it the rates of exchange and the conservation of our gold reserve.

In the meantime there are two points of hope. All the European exchanges are in our favour, which probably means that most of our allies' imports, and very likely of our enemies' imports, are paid for through London; so that notwithstanding the hope of our American cousins to substitute the dollar for the sovereign as the basis of sterling

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exchange, our position as financiers of the world has not been materially injured. Secondly, the German exchanges with all neutral countries show a severe depreciation, which at present rates means that our foes have to pay in marks for all their imports at least eight per cent additional through loss on exchange. Moreover, the refusal of the Reichsbank to exchange its notes for gold on presentation has resulted in a considerable demand for the export of German gold to countries whose merchants will not take German paper. When our Navy is allowed to do its work and stop every German export the position will become still more intolerable for them.

II. THE NATIONAL REVENUE

THE publication of the Total Revenue of the United Kingdom in the year ending 31st March, 1915, and of the Receipts into and Issues out of the Exchequer during the same period, provides in short form a review of war conditions which sum up the magnitude of our task and the wastefulness of war, in a concise and effective manner. The comprehension of masses of figures is not unfortunately a common quality amongst those who rule us. It is the practice of most of them to sanction without discussion the vast expenditures which we incur in time of peace. It is too much to hope that the Estimates for War will receive any more particular attention until the War is over and the era of recrimination begins. Yet there is at this moment no greater national need than a vigilant and accurate critic of public expenditure, who, without delaying business, could put his finger on the spots where waste seems evitable and show how that waste could be avoided or where savings could be effected.

It is a curious sequel to the agitation for diminished armaments and increased offerings on the shrine of Demos,

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to keep him fat and quiet, that those very Ministers who sincerely desired to reduce expenditure for war should now be caught in the web of the greatest and most expensive war ever waged. They are fortunate for the moment because the fictitious prosperity brought about by the expenditure on munitions of war on such a colossal scale is acting as a stimulant to various sources of taxation, and notably to liquor and Customs duties. The same expenditure is keeping the working classes in good employment. The withdrawal of so many men from work to soldiering has caused a shortage of labour in most trades and for the time being unemployment is unknown; yet strikes are of daily occurrence and are usually followed by large increases of wages which impose an additional burden on the public purse, and tend to prevent any kind of definite contract prices being possible. All these conditions have helped to give a result to the total Revenue which no one could have expected last November. Mr Lloyd George, in his fourth Budget Estimate, hoped for a Revenue in the year of £209,206,000. He has collected £226,694,080, or nearly £17,500,000 more than was thought possible in November. No doubt he was helped by the readiness with which people paid their taxes. In one large collection in the City of London practically the whole amount of tax was in hand by 17th March, whereas in previous years the collector had scarcely finished his work by the middle of June. Singularly enough the same phenomenon has been noted in the collection of local rates. All but those who, from financial misfortune, were unable to pay at all have hurried with their money to the Rate Offices hoping perhaps to "do their bit" in that way.

But if the surplus for the current year has been augmented by a collection which has left little or no arrears as compared with the position on 31st March in previous years, it will be necessary when estimating Revenue for the current year to provide for an additional sum to make up for this source of Revenue which has practically ceased to exist. The Chancellor cannot count regularly on his estimates

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being £17,500,000 too low, although they were being tested by only four months of experience. We hope he will not again so far underestimate his deficit, for we find that the excess of expenditure over revenue has amounted to £337,000,000 instead of £323,000,000 as anticipated. This no doubt is due to the defaults of the contract system. The Public Accounts Committee were at some pains after the South African War to set forth abundant and preventible causes for the waste at that time, and steps should have been taken on their Report to see that buying for the Army and Navy was organized in future on a business footing. What actually happens is that the War Office pass over responsible firms of manufacturers, and award contracts to speculative middlemen of doubtful character, of whom many could not make delivery when the time came. In one case a firm of manufacturers of certain much-needed articles offered 50,000 of them to the War Office at 12s. 6d. each and were ignored. A short time afterwards a speculative Jew called upon them and bought the whole output at 23s. each, and the manufacturers, quite content with the added profit, ascertained that the War Office had given the Jew a contract at a much higher price than 23s. for all the articles of that class required for service in order to save themselves the trouble of buying direct from the makers. The objection of the War Office buyers at the beginning of the War to deal direct with the manufacturers amounted to a form of dementia. Manufacturers complain that the insolence with which responsible people were received in the Army Contracts Department made it impossible for them to do business direct; and they soon stopped trying. As it happened, they were able to make more money by waiting for the advent of the War Office Jew, of Polish or German extraction, to whom insults are the salt of life, and who was certain to visit them in due course and buy at almost any price for immediate delivery. A good deal of the £14,000,000 excess in the estimated deficit is in the pockets of these gentry; all the warnings of the Public Accounts Com-

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mittee, and the fruits of all their investigations, are in the pigeon holes.

There is little of special note in the figures presented. The diminution in Suez Canal share receipts amounts to £303,340, a fall of approximately 20 per cent on last year's figures, which indicates the serious effect of the war on legitimate trade with India, the Far East, Australia, and East Africa. There is a decrease of £790,000 in Post Office Receipts which must be entirely due to a falling off in ordinary everyday affairs, and of £2,398,000 in stamps, which is the price the Inland Revenue has to pay for the Treasury method of handling the Stock Exchange in the interest of the Banks, who might well be asked to make good this particular loss. A fall of £280,000 in telephone receipts is largely due to the same cause. The use of the telephone by Stock Exchange members—especially of the trunk telephones—is almost continuous in normal times.

The issue of War Stock and War Bonds enabled us to raise £296,000,000 during the financial year and Exchequer Bonds produced a further sum of £47,700,000. No less than £87,750,000 was raised by Treasury Bills and £38,500,000 of such Bills were paid off in the year. But we do not know the amount of Treasury Bills outstanding on 31st March last, although without this figure we cannot compute our true liabilities. We know that £70,000,000 of such Bills fall due in April and £15,000,000 in May, and that the first batch falling due in April has been renewed. But the real difficulty of the Treasury accounts is that they never do reveal the true position, and are probably never intended to. The Treasury Balances on 31st March amounted to £83,450,952 and a further sum of about £50,000,000 on account of the War Loan was payable on that day, so that the Government started the new year with about £130,000,000 in hand—and it may be said with truth that, so far, the financial difficulties of the war are well under control.

The new method of selling Treasury Bills should provide

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the country with all the funds it needs from day to day. These needs may be put in round figures at £2,000,000 a day. After taking into account the increased taxation already arranged, this means that next year the deficit of tax revenue to meet expenditure will be about £500,000,000, assuming of course that the war continues all the year. The estimates which have been laid before the House of Commons show no attempt whatever to cut down expenditure on the Civil Service votes, and apparently the squandering of the public funds on vicarious philanthropy is to continue unchecked. New taxation may be devised—probably will be devised. But the yield of new forms of taxation is always problematical, and in any case its full result cannot be obtained in the early days of its imposition. Borrowing must be our sheet anchor for a time.

The rise in prices which is so well illustrated by the *Economist* index number begins to take serious shape. Since last July Cereals and Meat have risen in value 50 per cent, and other foods 20 per cent. Textiles are cheaper, but minerals, including coal, are 40 per cent dearer than in July and were 30 per cent dearer in March than in the corresponding month of last year. These rises are due to natural causes, but have a serious effect on the daily life of the country and its taxable capacity, which ought to prompt a wise Chancellor of the Exchequer to seek immense reductions in non-war expenditure. Of that there is no sign. All the taps are full open and left running, as well for the foolish and needless new expenditures of Peace as for the unavoidable expenditure of War. And there is no control of either.

It distresses us to see the lack of vigilance over public expenditure which is the worst side of the present regime. To bring this war to a successful issue the country is prepared to undertake any burden and face any discomfort. But it is not fair that want of supervision and business capacity should impose upon it the extra burden of waste. Least of all is it fair that philanthropic services rendered

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reluctantly in time of prosperity should continue to be called for when adversity is upon us.

III. THE SECOND GERMAN WAR LOAN

THE internal state of affairs in our enemy's country has an interest for us second only to that of our own. We know that in the long run Credit will play a part, possibly a determining part, in the issue of the war. We are ready to concede that the outbreak of war found the German Banks, who had been warned for a long time past of its probable date, in a much greater state of preparedness than our own. They had strengthened their position and weakened ours by manœuvres on our Stock Exchange and in our Discount Market, which have already been described in this REVIEW, and they were able to avoid a moratorium and to keep their Bourses open when practically every other nation, neutral or belligerent, had to proclaim the one and close the other.

The guiding principles of German finance were set out at some length in a speech in the Reichstag made by the Finance Minister, Dr Helfferich, in introducing this year's Budget. He comforted his hearers by assuring them that, at the end of the war, Germany's adversaries will pay in full the outlay which Germany has incurred. This statement is more important than it looks. Nothing but Germanic faith in an ultimate victory has kept German paper finance floating; and it is quite likely that if this confidence were once shaken a complete financial panic and collapse might bring down by the run the whole house of cards which the financiers have built up. No provision is being made for the redemption of German War Loans because, we are told, Germany's enemies will be responsible for interest and sinking funds when Germany's peace is imposed. Still more remarkable is the demand that "not only should all Germans fight, but that all should save and all should

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“pay.” We shall see in a moment how this latter demand has been met. Knowing his difficulty in accumulating specie, Dr Helfferich laid down a proposition which is quite characteristic of his race. He said:

“We regard war as the most grievous, but also the most noble trial, which summons, and strains to the utmost, all the moral, intellectual and material forces of the German people. This view is a better foundation for our confidence than all the gold and silver in the world.”

Well, we shall see. We may wait the result with some confidence, since the Finance Minister went on to say that the increase of taxation in England was a useless adherence to tradition and that Germany would not increase taxation because the revenue from the largest possible tax would be of little use; and because Germany held firm to the hope of presenting the bill to her enemies at the conclusion of peace.

There is a mixture of sentiment and hope about all this which does not seem to commend itself to neutrals. For the rates of exchange on Berlin have fallen in neutral markets since the beginning of January as follows:

	<i>Per cent</i>
Denmark	4·57
Sweden	4·28
Norway	4·01
Holland	5·54
New York	7·88

It is impossible for any country to stand such a continuous loss on its exchanges for an indefinite period of time, nor can we believe that Germany will prove an exception. This fall has had many grave consequences in neutral countries, notably an increase in the price of such of their commodities as are in demand in Germany. These increases have compelled the neutral countries

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concerned to prohibit the export of foodstuffs into Germany, Austria and Turkey, a course of action which may prove important later on, and which perhaps accounts in part for the attacks on Dutch shipping which have been so frequent during the last few weeks.

However this may be, the fact remains that until Dr Helfferich can present the bill to the beaten allies he must arrange for his own country to meet it. Therefore, he has raised a new loan of £450,000,000 for the German Government and has boasted so loudly that all the money has been subscribed that no one outside Germany is inclined to believe him. We know very well that it is an easy matter to subscribe for a loan, yet sometimes a difficult matter to take up the subscription. Nor is our confidence in the genuineness of the subscriptions increased by a statement published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* as to their origin. We are told of the following distribution:

	<i>Marks in Millions</i>
Reichsbank	565
Banks and Bankers	5,592
Public Savings Banks	1,977
Life Assurance Companies	384
Co-operative Credit Companies	430
Post Service	142
Total	9,090 million marks

But the *Morning Post* has pointed out that, notwithstanding all this subscribing, there is no indication that the Government has repaid the Reichsbank the large sums it has borrowed in the last few months. It is true that the Reichsbank has been relieved of its obligation to convert its notes into gold. But on 31st March, 1915, its liabilities on notes in circulation exceeded the amount outstanding

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on 31st March, 1914, by £159,818,000, and its liabilities on current accounts exceeded the corresponding amount by £157,325,000, while the actual increase in gold in hand to meet these additional liabilities only amounted to £53,877,000. Moreover the discounts and advances rose in one week, 24th-31st March, by no less a sum than £98,272,000 and amounted on 31st March, 1915, to £343,832,000 as compared with £72,299,000 on 31st March, 1914. This enormous increase in advances—over £271,000,000 in one year—means that the War Loan is being financed with paper money issued by the central institution, and the value of this paper money is now entirely dependent on the possibility of making the Allies pay the war bill—an event which does not appear to be in sight.

We read in *L'Economiste Européenne*, which quotes from an Italian journal of repute, that the whole basis of the subscription to the new Loan is the intervention of the Loan Banks—the Darlehnskassen—which works in this way. For the first war loan holders of State or Industrial stocks were authorized to deposit these stocks in special offices of the Loan Bank in exchange for a fiduciary paper issue, the Darlehnskassenscheine, and to subscribe to the War Loan with this fiduciary paper. The operation was carried so far that even commercial credits, and credits not solvent for the time being, could be transferred in exchange for similar paper. In this way 4,460 millions of marks were gathered together for the first Loan.

For the second War Loan the same method has been adopted. But now in addition to other securities available for the paper operations of the Loan Banks there are the bonds of the first War Loan itself, on which 70 per cent of fiduciary paper can be obtained. This new element rendered the second Loan possible, of course with the assistance of other Darlehnskassenscheine, based on other securities of the same class as those pawned during the first operation.

So we have mortgage piled on mortgage by State inter-

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vention, and the immobile assets of the nation turned into paper money. Meantime the search for gold from house to house is pursued with the utmost tenacity and, as the gold reserve in the Reichsbank has fallen from 70 per cent to 28 per cent of the liabilities or less, such a search is vitally essential for the success of the policy.

How far it may go is well instanced by a correspondent of the *Economist*, who points out that the Société Générale de Belgique has power to issue notes on foreign credits. By enforcing these notes as legal tender in Belgium the Germans still further denude Belgium of gold, for which indeed they have been offering in that country a premium of 20 per cent, which we are told the Reichsbank can well afford to pay under present conditions.

The fact is the position is entirely artificial. If Germany wins the war she will get clear, although perhaps with difficulty. If she is beaten, all this house of paper will fall in fluttering pieces and more complete financial ruin will come upon her than ever upon any country in history. The Darlehnskassen will not be able to realize the assets on which the Darlehnskassenscheine have been uttered, the Reichsbank and other holders will not be able to realize the Darlehnskassenscheine, and holders of Reichsbank notes and other liabilities—which have only 30 per cent of gold behind them—will have to be content with that 30 per cent. For the balance will be lost. Such a crisis would realize Mr Norman Angell's worst forebodings and have its collateral effect in every banking centre of the world. We in the City of London ought to consider very seriously what our position will be when the trouble comes.

Had the war been a short war, had the Emperor returned to Berlin at the end of September with the plunder of the Paris banks in his pocket, the novel methods of the German finance mobilization for war might have been justified by results. But the plot broke down through our intervention. Paris is safe, and although both France and England have been gravely injured by the cost to which

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they have been put—a cost which will probably be doubled before peace comes—they are both able to finance the war out of the savings of their people without creating artificial paper currencies built one on top of another to make up for an absence of liquid assets within their boundaries. During the war the depreciation of the German paper currency may not of itself bring about panic. But when the war is over, we believe that nothing can save Germany from the most complete financial disaster the world has ever seen. No nation will lend her money. Her own power to finance her trade has vanished into Darlehnskassenscheine and War Loan Stock, and she may quite conceivably be crushed under a great war indemnity to be paid to Belgium and the Allies. At the same time we must not forget that all these facts are well known to the German rulers and supply the strongest incentive to their determination to fight on and win. We have not observed as yet any weakening of that determination, nor have we as yet any right to expect it.

London, 15th April, 1915.

FISCALITY

“ C’EST la fiscalité qui a ruiné l’Empire Romain, la
“ fiscalité pesant sur le possesseur alors que le nombre
“ des possesseurs est diminué par le privilège.”

(Lavisse and Rambaud, *Hist. Gen.*, Vol. I.)

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THE SETTLEMENT IN GERMANY

THE remote mirage of a still distant peace has produced a singular contrast of interpretation on the part of those belligerents who observe the mocking vision from afar. With arrogant assurance the confident German defines the conditions of a victory unaccountably delayed—new provinces, more trade, huge indemnities, the domination of Europe, perhaps even of the world, a success sufficient to reward the colossal sacrifices which his rulers taught him would not be made in vain. The Briton talks, when he does talk, of peace in a different strain; he seems to look on peace almost as an end in itself, and some of those who have founded political leagues and associations to discuss the coming and the conditions of peace appear to think that the combination of a referendum for ravaged provinces and a formal renewal of the foolish Hague Conventions will speedily produce the millennium. The contrast provides a curious paradox in national mentality; for the aggressive German who is assured of the rewards of victory is slowly losing even the poor prospect of a stalemate; the British pacifist scarcely realizes that a victory which he has done much to delay is still far from being assured.

Neither of these views probably represents the real opinion of the rival nations, each of which is still too closely occupied in the conflict to consider precise details

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of the final settlement. The British talk of peace comes not from the many who are bearing the burden and heat of the day—these have indeed quite other notions in their head and work to their hand—but from the few who have stood idle in the market-place at the crisis of our lives. The confident German definition of the rewards of victory, on the other hand, has obviously a purely official inspiration; the real thoughts of Germany are hidden even from the few friendly ears that have not stopped themselves against her cannon, and no more can be said than that the tone of exaltation in her Press is less strident than before. Suffering and loss have already a little moderated the temper of this arrogant-to-order people; the fever of ambition is somewhat abated by the terrible blood-letting Germany has undergone. The Prussian professor prates of victory and spoil, but his words are fast becoming a mockery, for his too willing pupils are gone and their parents are in mourning. What are indemnities and provinces, what is the conquest of the world, to the man that has lost his son? A million men are losing their sons in Germany to-day.

But Germany has in these last months at least taught a world which was in some danger of forgetting the fact that there are times when action is more decisive than talk. She may yet regret the lesson she has forced us to learn; for it is well to remember that the terms of the peace which will conclude the war will depend on the results of action and not of talk. The loser will pay, the victors will reap the fruit of their victories, and those who have stood aside and contented themselves with applause or criticism, or maybe have profited by trading with the belligerents, will receive the polite thanks that are due from active player to passive spectator—and little more. The victor will have no lack of friends at the close; he will not need their tardy services.

At the moment these elementary considerations seem to be ignored in some foreign countries, and by such bodies

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as the Union of Democratic Control in England, whose importance may be judged from the fact that, while proposing democratic control over foreign policy, it can only muster two members of Parliament to its support, one of whom strengthened the Government by resigning the minor post he held at the outbreak of war, while the other promptly followed the example by resigning the leadership of the Labour Party a few days later. The contributions of this and other kindred associations to the discussion may therefore be dismissed in a few sentences. They advocate, for example, the holding of a *plébiscite* before territory is transferred from the vanquished to the victor at the end of the war. Conceivably this method might be satisfactory in Alsace and Lorraine, two provinces where the result is almost a foregone conclusion and where it is therefore superfluous; but in the extraordinary welter of racial, religious, and divergent nationalist feeling in Eastern Europe it would merely turn confusion into chaos, and leave dissonant but powerful minorities permanently intent on wrecking the results of such amateur statecraft. It is not on such facile lines that the future settlement of Europe will be secured; those who advocate this solution have already forgotten the difficulties which arose out of the mere proposal of an Ulster referendum a year ago.

It is likewise common ground with the pacifists to make generous terms with the enemy, lest Germany be irritated against us; forgetting that Germany is irritated already to the pitch of "Hymns of Hate" and salutations of "God punish England" even before there is any question of peace. Neither would they "insult" Germany by making the limitation of her fleet a question of the peace negotiations, although they were continually "insulting" Germany before the war by proposing a precisely similar limitation of her naval expenditure; but while they would apparently allow Germany to retain her fleet intact, they still hope for a general reduction of armaments after the war. Such hopes are idle. What was it but the continued

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expansion of the German fleet that forced up armament expenditure before the war? On this question of a limitation of armaments, indeed, the pacifists have bettered the Bourbon example, for if they have learnt nothing they have forgotten everything. The melancholy manœuvres of the Reduction of Armaments Committee between 1908 and 1914 were as futile as the similar French proposals to Germany for disarmament before 1870.* In both cases they were followed by a great war.

Beyond these indefinite proposals the pacifists envisage a vague prospect of future progress, a United States of Europe in which brotherhood shall take the place of battleships, but in which things other than armaments shall be much as they were. Peace is to be perpetually preserved and small nationalities protected, although small nations are not normally less ambitious of expansion nor less aggressive when occasion permits, than their greater neighbours; the sense of nationality is to be fostered as one method of advance, an international police to be instituted as another; the States are to meet in a European Parliament—presumably with the aid of interpreters, since nationalist sentiment commonly insists on national language—and the functions of that assembly are left judiciously undefined. There is no need to pursue that avenue of thought further into the impenetrable thickets. Human nature was not permanently changed by the Napoleonic wars, nor will it be permanently changed by our present quarrels. Human nature will not fling away ambition because by that sin fell the angels and the Germans; Europe will forget the catastrophe of 1914 in time; and Europe will yet arm itself again.

But if the things eternal remain unchanged, other things will be changed for a very long while. The German people have made their bid for the domination of Europe, like the French a century ago; when this conflict, still so far from its decision, closes in their defeat, and when that defeat is

* *The Life of Lord Lyons.*

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thorough and complete, as it must be to secure any reasonable prospect of lasting peace, they will hardly bid again. History does not repeat itself among the same people and in the same place—an impoverished and disillusioned Germany may yet thank heaven it does not—nor can spent energy be gathered up again and used a second time. Like electricity, it goes into the earth; unlike electricity, the spent energies of a nation, which are its dead, remain there. The money spent on preparing and waging war is gone; the interest on the capital cost of the war cripples for generations. And in that more precious form of national capital, human life, which multiplies less rapidly than money and may be even more quickly squandered, Germany has lost no less heavily.

It is worth while to look rather closely at the German casualty lists, and to compare them with the vital statistics of the Empire, before we speculate as to the terms of peace or German policy in the future. In the first eight months of the war the total German casualties on land and sea were approximately three million, of whom nearly one million were killed or died of wounds, or so severely wounded as to be a burden on their country for the remainder of their maimed and broken lives. The losses have not apparently diminished their proportion since that date. Now Germany produces yearly nearly two million children; but her birth-rate is falling, and falling even more rapidly than her death-rate; the normal increase of population in Germany every year, by excess of births over deaths, is 880,000, and that annual increase—which includes of course Poles and Alsatians—tends to fall. But taking it as the standard, the fact remains that in this war Germany is losing her population more quickly than she has produced it; and, since all her losses are males, she has lost men three times as fast as she has produced them; while owing to the domestic dislocation caused by the withdrawal from domestic life of six million men, married or of marrying age, the German birth-rate for 1915 will necessarily be far below the recent

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diminishing normal birth-rate. Nor will it easily recover after the war; for the most virile will have been killed, the less virile remainder will have to bear the burden of far heavier taxation even than before, and the more virile portion of that remainder will seek an escape from the crushing weight by the old German remedy—only unfashionable during the late brief years of German prosperity—of emigration to other countries.*

The war is not yet over, its decisive phase is not yet even reached, and the German losses may be more than doubled before the curtain is down on the tragedy; for the German officers, who have learnt to economize their ammunition, seem incapable of economizing the lives of their men. But whenever the war ends, it will end with a smaller population in the German Empire, and a smaller population showing an increased excess of women over men, a large excess of old men and children over adult males, and a considerable proportion of adult males whose energies have been sapped by wounds received in battle. Where is the money to come from for the German expansion that was so carefully planned? Where are the men?

It is sometimes suggested that Germany will quickly recover her losses, after the example of France after 1870. The analogy is doubly false: France did not recover quickly, and the German losses are already far heavier than were those of France in the whole course of that war. The bulk of the French armies were taken prisoners, and after the war they returned to their homes; they were not permanently lost to France, as the German dead are lost to Germany. The French losses in men killed were severe, but they were light in comparison with those of Germany during the last few months; had France lost as many men as Germany relatively to her population, she could not have paid the indemnity so quickly. As it was, France rallied

* It may be remembered as a parallel that the French birth-rate dropped considerably after the war of 1870, under the double pressure of heavy taxation and national depression. It has never recovered.

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herself with splendid courage after 1870, but even in forty years she had not recovered from the blow. The two lost provinces remained under alien rule; her inferiority of population relative to that of Germany, first noticeable after 1870, became absolute and permanent. The proud country which had not fully recovered from the ultimate price paid for the victories of Napoleon I when it suffered the defeats of Napoleon III, finally abandoned the attempt, and even the desire, to give the law to Europe. Since her defeat France has done great things in the world, in art, in science, in medicine, in engineering, in colonization; but the ancient political ambitions which she shared, and for which she suffered, with her rulers from Louis XIII to the last Napoleon, were exorcized by an unparalleled series of costly victories under the first Empire and a disastrous sequence of defeats under the second. The psychological effects of war upon a nation deserve perhaps more attention than they usually receive from the modern school of history.

As it was with France, so it will be and even more so with Germany. The modern Empire was founded on the victories of William I, costly but profitable; it is being sapped by the exploits of William II. After this war—if, as we all expect and believe, Germany is defeated—there will be no indemnity for her to receive, no provinces to add to her domain; there will be an indemnity to pay, and there will certainly be territory to cede. The relatively small loss of men in 1870 was of no moment to the new German Empire enlarged by two fruitful and populous provinces; the heavy loss of men in 1914-15 may mean everything to an Empire which is to lose more than those two provinces. To put the thing at its lowest, every man lost to Germany represents an actual or potential head of a family, and a capital potentiality of £2,000 at least*; the loss of a million men means two

* On the moderate assumption of an earning capacity of £50 a year, and a wage-earning life of forty years.

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thousand millions sterling lost in the earning power of Germany after the war, and at least two million fewer German children in the next generation. And in addition to the losses in the rank and file, the officer class, on which the German military system is founded, is being wiped out almost as completely as was the old baronial order of England by the Wars of the Roses. These losses, heavy, continuous, and cumulative, inevitably mean profound and complex social changes whose extent no prophet can foretell and only the experience of years can measure.

Apart from the actual diminution in human and monetary capital, losses and defeat must also have a psychological effect, of far-reaching importance, on the national character. One cannot annihilate a nation, but triumph or disaster can alter its perspective. The present intoxication of the German people with the lust of conquest is directly due to the relative ease of their triumphs over Denmark, Austria and France a half-century ago; to those victories is due the tradition of German superiority which led Treitschke to prophesy the successful reckoning with the England that he despised; and the effect of those victories on the German mind was foretold in 1875 by Sir Robert Morier in one of the most accurate descriptions ever penned. "The malady "under which Europe is at present suffering," he wrote, "is German Chauvinism, a new and far more formidable "type of the disease than the French, because instead of "being spasmodic and undisciplined, it is methodical, "calculating, cold-blooded, and self-contained. [In the "event of war] the action of Germany would be stamped "with a pedantic ferocity, a scientific cynicism, an academic cruelty, which history would never forget and "mankind would take a long time to forgive."*

That devilish ferocity, for which Germany will have to pay heavily at the peace, and in reputation for all time, is at least being exorcized by the potent spells of war. It is being discovered, somewhat late in the day, that

* *Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier.*

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the gospel of frightfulness does not necessarily convert its opponents. It is recognized that the inferior peoples of the earth are killing Germans more rapidly than they are being killed themselves; which incontestable proof that the enemies of Germany are as highly civilized as Germany itself has caused belated but not unprofitable reflections and revisions of estimates in Berlin. It is admitted that the war of expansion has been transformed into a kind of siege, and that the plan of the Great General Staff has not succeeded. It is not yet admitted, however, that the plan has failed, or that its only chance of success lay in speedy victory. There are limits to the present understanding of the people; the German is proverbially a slow learner, but while the bulk of the German Press still personates the rampant eagle, there are occasionally signs that a more chastened spirit may emerge in time. The *Halle Börsen*, for instance, remarked in March that

“After the war, Germany will need £100,000,000 as
“interest on the war loan and to assist widows and invalids.
“One cannot for the present calculate the losses sustained
“by the nation, but we are far from finishing the war.
“German markets in the East will be greatly diminished by
“Japan’s advent, and in South America we shall find
“merchants from the United States. It is doubtful whether
“a victorious Germany, with weakened power, would be
“able in the long run to bear its enormous burdens. It must
“not be forgotten that the German working-man who was
“enthusiastic at the outbreak of the war will find it difficult
“to maintain his enthusiasm when, after honourable
“victory, he starts work again; for on the one hand he must
“accept a reduction in wages, and on the other pay higher
“taxes.”

If even victory has so few attractions now, how frowning and repellent must be the countenance of defeat! But Germany as a whole has not yet realized the bare possibility of defeat. Although her generals have failed to give her either Paris or Warsaw, although her own soil has been invaded in East Prussia and the Reichsland, her ocean

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trade is gone, her colonies are going, and her wretched allies are slowly bleeding to death, even yet she does not realize that the god of force she worshipped is turning against her, and that in clutching at world power she has risked her own downfall. The masculine vigour of her determination does her credit, but her losses will be the heavier therefor, and the exhaustion that follows will be the greater. At present the effect of those losses are not understood, nor will they be until the Allies begin to impose their united will on Germany; the people are still assured of victory, they still believe the assurances of their Government and the Press that success is delayed but ultimately inevitable. For that deception there will be a price to pay when it is proved beyond doubt that it is a deception: the reaction may then be as great as the original fever of desire. But not until the defeat of Germany is an accomplished fact will the reaction begin to show; to risk a weak peace with an arrested but undefeated Germany would merely assure a repetition of the "shining armour" policy in a few years' time. It is our object not only to prevent Germany from being a danger to her neighbours now, but to make certain that she is not a danger in the future. People who run amuck cannot be released on their own personal assurance of returned sanity: the world needs some stronger guarantee, and that guarantee can only be the thorough defeat of Germany.

What and how great the effect of defeat and disillusion will be on the German Empire at home can in no wise be predicted. The Hohenzollern dynasty is founded on success, but it survived disaster and revolution in the nineteenth century, and may survive both in the twentieth. There is no rival dynasty; republicanism has no real following, and the German people, like all nations of docile temper who look to their rulers for guidance and policy, is not politically volatile. Their head was turned by the prospect of an easy victory, and they sang their song of triumph oversoon last September; but they have settled

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down to siege, battle and heavy losses with admirable stoicism. German Imperialism, it is true, is still barely fifty years old, it still suffers the disadvantages of a new thing in a very old country, and German particularism is still a force that has to be reckoned with; but it would be very unwise to assume that the German Empire will necessarily split into the ancient Kingdoms and duchies and principalities out of which it was formed. Whatever disasters the German Empire has brought upon Europe by war, it has more than justified its existence to its own people during a generation of peace; and it will be the German people, not the Allied Powers, who will decide the political future of Germany. The idea is a delusion that we can dictate the form of government under which even an utterly beaten and temporarily demoralized Germany must live. The Allies propose to defeat Germany, not to dissect her; they will not follow the German example in Poland; Germany herself when she had her foot upon the fair throat of France did not attempt to dictate whether Paris should house an Empire or a Republic.

The internal settlement of Germany after the war will be the work of the German people. But grave changes, possibly even fundamental changes, will inevitably be found necessary by the German people themselves.

They may continue to despise the Russians, to deride the French, and to hate the English; but these sentiments are mere luxuries, and the German people will be faced by the more urgent necessity of reforming themselves. Reform is indeed long overdue. A century ago, when the defeated Germany of Blücher and Fichte decided on a policy of national reconstruction, two things were declared to be necessary—military power to defend the Fatherland against any further attack from without, and a liberal constitution to secure it against despotism within. The former was achieved at the expense of the latter, thanks to the superior strength of native Prussian tradition over imported liberalism, and to the fact that the Prussian militarist was in any case a

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better man than the Prussian Liberal, who had some of the verbiage of a Gladstone with none of his driving-power, and who thought to conquer a Bismarck with an effective phrase.

The failure of German Liberalism created German Socialism, whose leaders were at least of stronger calibre than the invertebrate National Liberals; Bebel was to Bassermann what Mr Lloyd George is to Sir Albert Spicer. There is no longer a Bismarck to contend with, only a Bethmann-Hollweg, who compares with Bismarck very much as Sir Ryland Adkins compares with Kitchener; but whereas even Bethmann-Hollweg with the Bismarck tradition of victory behind him could cope with the Socialists before 1914, any conceivable German Chancellor may fail after 1915, when that tradition has vanished.

The triumph of the Socialists would not mean the triumph of Socialism but of constitutionalism. The bulk of the German Socialists are plain Radicals, who follow Liebknecht for the same reason that Lord Hugh Cecil follows Mr Bonar Law—not because a Free Trader prefers a Tariff Reformer but because the Presbyterian is at the moment the Anglican leader. In the same way the German Radical who wants a constitutional monarchy follows a Socialist who wants a number of other things that the Radical cordially dislikes; when the Radical has his desire he will shed the Socialist with the proverbial speed and ingratitude of the party politician.

The defeat of Germany by the Allies may not mean internal revolution or a Commune in Berlin followed by a Prussian Republic; but it may probably discover a demand for a constitution that will be found irresistible. The failure of the military party would inevitably give the preponderance of weight to that commercial party of peaceful development which was rushed off its feet by national resentment at the diplomatic defeat at Agadir in 1911; this party, which had a very real existence but no organic unity before the war, held that with thirty years of peace assured the German colonies would become self-supporting, Ger-

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man commerce dominate the world, German finance secure a bloodless but complete triumph in Asia Minor and the Near East, and the German Empire at home, strengthened by these successes and its own steady industrial advance, become in fact the dominant power of all, with Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia and Switzerland held fast within its commercial orbit, Austria-Hungary definitely a vassal gratified by the appearance of an equal alliance, France an uneasy but nevertheless scarcely dangerous neighbour, and Britain an admitted but conceivably not unfriendly rival with whom accommodation might be arranged.* Those dreams have vanished, but the German peace party remains. It should after the war be able to draw within its influence the bulk, and not merely a portion, of the German commercial interests—not all of which before the war believed that peace was profitable. It should receive a popular backing which was entirely absent before last August, and which was probably the real reason for its failure to influence events. It may have to fight a hard battle with University professors who preached the war of conquest in the past, and may yet attempt to preach a war of revenge in the future; but even a Prussian professor, the most stupid intellectual in Europe, may be overwhelmed by the logic of events and the revolt of his audience against doctrines palpably false and outworn.

The German Empire may remain, purged, impoverished, lean, its vital forces flowing less easily, its spiritual forces, which had somewhat shrunk of recent years, clarified and ennobled by suffering. Once defeated it will hardly recover from this war in our time, although it may yet play a considerable part in Europe; but the territory of the Empire will be diminished East and West and overseas, and it will pay tribute to the victors. Such is the fate of those who provoke aggressive wars without success.

* See, for example, the able pamphlet, *Deutsche Weltpolitik und Kein Krieg* (Berlin, 1913). The author of this pamphlet is now attached to the German Diplomatic Corps at The Hague.

WAR FOR A WINDOW

“THE King, who loved to build, had thrown down the
“Petit Trianon of porcelain which he had for Madame
“de Montespan, and was rebuilding it as we see it to-day.
“Louvois was superintendent of building. The King, who
“had an accurate eye, perceived a window somewhat
“more narrow than the rest. He showed it to Louvois to
“correct it, which was then very easy. Louvois main-
“tained that the window was right. The King insisted on
“the contrary, but Louvois would not give way. Two days
“after the question was revived. The King desired Le
“Notre to measure the window, who found that the King
“was right by some inches. Louvois tried to carry his
“point, but the King bade him hold his tongue, com-
“manded him to have the window instantly rebuilt, and
“treated him very hardly.

“Louvois, not accustomed to be treated thus, returned
“home in fury, and like a man in despair. Saint-Pouange,
“the Tilladets, and his familiar friends were frightened,
“and sought to know what had happened. In the end he
“related it to them, said that he was lost, that for a few
“inches the King forgot all his services which had brought
“so many conquests, but that he would raise for him a war
“such as would make it necessary for the King to employ
“him, and would leave the trowel for war.

“He accordingly prepared the war by the affair of the
“double election of Cologne, of the Prince of Bavaria and
“the Cardinal of Furstenberg. He affirmed it by carrying
“flame and fire into the Palatinate, and by leaving England
“every liberty. He put the last touch to it to render it
“general and if possible, eternal, by driving to despair the
“Duke of Savoy, who only desired peace, and whom, un-
“known to the King, he treated so unworthily that he
“forced him to throw himself into the arms of our enemies,
“and to become always, through the position of his
“country, our most difficult and most ruinous adversary.

“That was the strange cause of the war of 1688.”

(*Memoirs du Duc de St Simon*, Vol. VI,
pp. 263-265. Hachette, Paris, 1873.)

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AT SEA

COURTS MARTIAL—PRIZE MONEY—THE DARDANELLES

DURING the last three months the German Fleet has attempted no single operation of open warfare except another rapid hit-and-run raid after the Scarborough pattern, on the 24th January. At the first news of British men-of-war it abandoned the raid and turned and ran for home, but was caught by Sir David Beatty of the Grand Fleet, who happily sank the "Blücher" but as unhappily failed—through no fault of his own—to sink the three other German men-of-war which would have made it a victory influential on the War.

Except this and the hunting down, surrender and sinking of the "Dresden" at Juan Fernandez by the light cruiser "Glasgow" and the privateer "Orama" on 14th March, there has been nothing that could be called an action at sea. During the whole three months Germany has renounced all attempt at open war on the seas. Since the 24th January her war flag has not been seen in battle either fighting or even flying. All her men-of-war that have not been sunk have lain close up in her ports, not daring so much as to show themselves outside. This affords a striking contrast to her bold and open campaign on land.

She has, however, betaken herself to another kind of offensive proceedings never before known in European warfare. Having discovered that open warfare at sea

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brought loss, disaster and risks her seamen could not face, she has, in desperation, resorted to secret war under the sea. In this there is no flag flown, no number shown that is not painted over, no means even left, much less offered, of identifying the submarine which, like a sneaking assassin, lies in wait masked and cloaked and, having delivered her blow, like the assassin fearfully flies. The mine and the submarine are alike in this, that neither shows its colours nor asks any questions; both destroy anything that comes along—neutral and belligerent alike—and leave no trace of the destroyer. Both also are alike in this, that for one man-of-war that can defend herself they destroy at least six merchantmen or fishermen that have no defence. It is very German. The same abandonment of all the frank, open, vaunting, glorious, risky traditions of battle for the sneaking and cowardly methods that can only be used without risk, and only against those who cannot defend themselves, are but removed from Belgium and Scarborough to the high seas, hitherto the scene only of open and gallant fight in the light of day.

The unrestricted use of mines was authorized by a Hague Convention for which Sir Ernest Satow—then and still a Privy Councillor—had actually voted at The Hague in 1907, and we well knew, from the Russo-Japanese War in the East, their terrible effects. The submarine we had ourselves adopted and sought to improve. Nevertheless we were not thoroughly aware—for our leaders as usual lacked imagination—of the full importance either of the mine or the submarine. Admiral Sir William May, a Sea Lord of the Admiralty from 1901 to 1905, and again from 1907 to 1909, is believed to have repeatedly pressed the urgent need for steps to be taken against the Mine; Admiral Sir Percy Scott was so well aware of the Submarine and so impressed by its dangers that on 15th December, 1913, he had declared that in his opinion it had “entirely done away” with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of the “water” as to the major part of their functions, and had

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avowed that in these circumstances he could "see no use" for battleships" and very little for fast cruisers. These conclusions he must assuredly have previously commended to the Admiralty.

But the great man and the only effectual force at the Admiralty from 1902 till 1910 was Lord Fisher, and he was not inclined to attach so much importance to the new dangers. Nor was the Defence Committee any more alive to them. We were, in any case, found at the beginning of the War quite insufficiently ready with any means for tackling either the Mine or the Submarine—especially the Submarine—although it was soon demonstrated that these were the only elements of the German sea-forces that we had in fact to meet. There was in short a want of foresight and a lack of due provision for fighting the Mine and the Submarine of which we are to-day feeling the first effects. The later effects bid fair to be even more serious, for it seems probable that, instead of the thirty submarines with which Germany is believed to have begun the War—whereof we may perhaps have already accounted for more than half—she will very soon have at work sixty or seventy—of far higher surface speed and more torpedo tubes than any of their predecessors. It now remains to make up for our previous neglect, and to seek and adopt effectual methods of fighting the Submarine. Methods there are. Some of them are now in hot preparation. Others have already been got to work, with success. In the end, if the best naval minds and capacities are let loose upon it, we shall certainly find means to meet and defeat both the Mine and the Submarine. Those means are not yet complete. And it is a great pity they did not in 1906 receive the attention then given to naval and military conversations with France. Meantime we must take more patience and suffer more losses than we need have done but for a most serious mistake in the policy of the Admiralty too long persisted in.

The German Fleet, most prudently and properly, refuses

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to fight an action. The German cruisers and privateers, together with their piratical robbing and sinking of our merchant ships, have for the moment been brought to an end and are most unlikely to be revived. The two remaining manifestations of German activity at sea are, then, the Mine—recently used with deadly effect in the Dardanelles—and the Submarine now prowling in the waters of our coasts. That is all we have left to deal with on the high seas. And it will remain all until, if ever, the day comes for that decision, so far avoided, in which our Grand Fleet will play its part. With the Mine and the Submarine alone we have now and meantime to deal. To tackle them must be our greatest and most immediate effort. And it will be done; later indeed than should or might have been, but done it must and will be.

Our losses, as disclosed during the 259 days of War up to 19th April, though in absolute numbers considerable, are proportionately small. Yet they are eloquent. Of the 17 ships lost to the Navy, 14 were lost to the Mine or Submarine. Of the 161 lost Merchant-ships and Fishermen, 85 were lost to the Mine or Submarine.

Our losses, however, cannot confidently be said to be no more than these. For an impression has been created, and still exists, that we are not told the whole truth about them. This is mainly due to, and is justified by, one incident which still remains unexplained.

Early in November it became known to all men who have friends and ears that one of our best Dreadnoughts, of ten 13·5 guns and 22 knots speed and built at a cost of two millions, had been mined (or torpedoed) off the western coast of Ireland, in sight of thousands. Full accounts and photographs of the event appeared in American newspapers and were passed from hand to hand in private. The loss was tremendous, only alleviated by the fact that no life was lost with the ship. Yet neither the Secretary to the Admiralty nor the Press Bureau made known the loss, either then or after, nor has done so to this day. Nay even so long after the event as the month of January the

Courts Martial

Admiralty Navy List, published "by authority" as itself asserts, in effect denied that any such loss had been sustained, for it included among the "ships of the Royal Navy with their officers and present stations," the "Audacious," Battleship," which all the world knew was at the bottom of the sea. This official long withholding of information of the highest importance long since known to the enemy and to all the world except ourselves, and a childish persistence in the pretence that it was false, have left the impression they were certain to leave—that we cannot rely on the Government to tell us what has happened, even within six months of the event, if what has happened is a disaster. That results again in the spreading, and the crediting, of terrifying rumours of all sorts, to which the reply can no longer confidently be made that if the rumoured disaster were true we should have been informed of it by the Government. And now the recurrent cry is raised of "Tell us the Truth," which is equally shameful to ourselves and to the Government; to ourselves for submitting to be treated like children and cowards; to the Government for so treating us.

COURTS MARTIAL

THE Admiralty unfortunately is not only suspected of concealing disasters when they have happened. It boldly avows that it will no longer adhere to the sound Naval tradition of ascertaining by Court Martial how they have happened; and, if because of faults, by whose fault. And this does but too forcibly corroborate what known facts too powerfully suggest, that the Admiralty is well aware that the fault in almost every case where there has been an avoidable and faulty loss of H.M. ships lies not with any Naval commander or officer, but with the Admiralty itself.

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The subject has already been raised in these pages.* The duty of the Admiralty to itself, to naval commanders and to the country, of recurring to this most necessary of all naval traditions, has been urged in private and in public, only to be contemptuously denied and refused. It was urged in the House of Commons in February† and then loftily repudiated by H.M. Government. In the same month it was ably asserted by Lord Selborne in the House of Lords, and there dismissed as curtly by what was practically an announcement of the determination of the Admiralty to do exactly as it pleased, whatever King's regulations, Acts of Parliament, Naval practice or the honour of Naval officers might demand. Yet the fight for thus ascertaining and establishing the truth must be continued, or we shall never know, or be able to profit by the knowledge, either how apparently avoidable losses were incurred or how to avoid them in future. The Admiralty is not such a body as can be suffered to do exclusively just as it chooses and no questions asked. There are already too many cases—including those in the Dardanelles—which need full inquiry; some of them cases in which the commander concerned has certainly himself asked for a Court Martial.

PRIZE MONEY

THE abolition of Prize-Money for the seaman, and the most improper uses to which the Prize-Money is proposed to be put, were set forth in these pages in February last.‡ The position taken up by H.M. Government as then described is, in the main, still maintained, though there seems

* CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW, November, 1914, pp. 930, 931, 934; and February, 1915, pp. 210-215.

† Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Official Report, 11th February, 1915, p. 704; 16th February, 1915, and House of Lords Official Report, 24th February, 1915.

‡ CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW, February, 1915, p. 59.

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now some intention of superseding the monstrous Foreign Office Prize Claims Committee. Yet it now appears* that on the 9th November last—notwithstanding the withdrawal of Prize-Money from the Seamen of the British Fleet, to which H.M. the King had been induced to consent on 28th August, 1914—a Prize Convention with France was signed by Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon stipulating, by Art. V thereof, that in the case of all captures

“made by vessels of the allied nations whilst acting in conjunction, *the net proceeds of the prize*, after deducting the necessary expenses, *shall be divided into as many shares as there were men on board the capturing vessels*, without reference to rank, and *the shares* of each ally as so ascertained *shall be paid and delivered to such person as may be duly authorized* on behalf of the allied Government to receive the same.”

What this means apparently is that the “shares” of the “men on board the capturing vessels” are to be ascertained as though they were to get those shares; that in the case of the French seamen they will get them; but that in the case of the English seamen they will not get them or any part of them, though Baron Schröder may. What the precise purpose and exact effect of this Convention is intended to be is a question needing elucidation. It seems to suggest that Prize-Money is only abolished for English but not for French seamen.

THE DARDANELLES

THE tragic and painful story of how the unhappy Turks were forced, three months after the first outbreak of the War, to take part in it against us, sorely against their will, is told in two Foreign Office papers† to which less attention has been given than they deserve. During many years Turkey, unaccustomed to any European kindness,

* Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7739 of 1915.

† Parl. Papers, Cd. 7628 of 1914, and Cd. 7716 of 1914.

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had been flattered and pleased by the clumsy yet effectual caresses of the German Kaiser, who had taken infinite pains to gain over the mystery men of Turkey, led by Enver Pasha, and had so well succeeded that English diplomacy was beaten before the struggle began for preventing the entry of Turkey into the war. It was still further weakened and discredited by Sir Edward Grey's announcement on the 3rd August, 1914, that the English Government meant to deprive Turkey—then and for three months later a neutral power—of the “Sultan Osman” and the “Reshadie,” two battleships then nearing completion at Armstrong and Whitworth's for the Turkish Government, for which ships that Government had already paid, “with money”—as the Grand Vizier sadly said—“borrowed at a rate amounting to interest at 20 per cent.” The English Government seized the ships, would not even promise to pay for them, and only said that it would “restore them to the Ottoman Government at the end of the war,” but only in case the Ottoman Government behaved better than was expected. It was not a friendly act. What would have been said had such treatment been extended to Italy or to the United States we need not ask, for Turkey has always been the sufferer from outrages never attempted with stronger nations. The filching of her battleships certainly made the task of the English ambassador harder and that of the German easier.

Almost immediately after—on 10th August, 1914—the German men-of-war “Goeben” and “Breslau” reached and entered the Dardanelles. Their escape from capture by an English force adequate to the task was due either to the Admiralty, or to Sir A. Milne, or to Admiral Troubridge, or to all three. It was the first serious blunder at sea and, although there was a Court Martial, nobody knows to which of the three the greatest share of blame should fall. It led to the worst results. For it gave to Enver and his German consort, Liman von Sanders, the very element of force they needed to drive the unwilling Turks

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out of the neutrality they desired and had long maintained into the belligerency they dreaded. All the highest and best of the country was pathetically anxious to avoid quarrel with their old friend England. The Sultan, the Grand Vizier, a majority of the ministers and the people at large were against it from the first to the very last. But Enver and Liman, powerfully reinforced by the "Goeben" and the "Breslau," dominated all. On 27th October "Enver" Pasha said that he was determined to have war whatever "his colleagues might desire." And he prevailed. He prevailed finally by virtue of those two very battleships which the English Admiralty and its admirals had allowed to escape into his hands. But for them the Turkish attack upon Odessa on the 29th October neither could nor would have been made.

Even then, even on the very day—the 1st November—when Sir Louis Mallet left Constantinople, the Grand Vizier made a last despairing appeal through the Turkish Ambassador in London for a resumption of the diplomatic relations thus broken off. And this is but the last of the many saddening proofs afforded throughout the dispatches of the pathetic, constant, unvarying desire of the Turks to be saved from the conflict into which the Germans were determined to force them.

Germany backed her diplomatists powerfully throughout with arms, men and—what cannot but appeal strongly to a Turk without a piastre—with money. On 23rd August "a further contingent of German officers has arrived"; on the 26th "ninety German sailors"; on the 27th more "German sailors with officers passed Sophia for Constantinople, making total passed about 600"

Money from Germany came in a generous stream. On 16th October "ninety-seven cases of bullion passed through Rustchuk yesterday for Constantinople. This consignment was preceded by 200 other cases." On 22nd October "it is currently reported about £1,000,000 has already arrived." On 23rd October "it is probable that

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“between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000 have arrived altogether.”

The Dardanelles—that marvellously defensible 40-mile strait with 40 fathom of water, a 3-knot current throughout, and an S in the middle—had from the Germans early and constant attentions which may here be recalled to those who think the forcing of a passage should be an easy business. On 16th August “a new field of mines has been laid—new contact mines to the number of forty-one.” On the 20th August “seventeen more mines were laid. “Several Hotchkiss guns have arrived and have been mounted.” On 24th August “former channel on the European side was further mined.” On 28th August “the whole area of the Dardanelles, Constantinople and the Bosphorus will become nothing more nor less than a sort of German enclave. Sailors recently arrived from Sophia will be sent to Straits forts and more will follow. “This is over and above German military reservists already allotted to garrison those forts. . . . A large consignment of guns and artillery material has passed through Rumania to Giurjevo. . . . I hear that although the Turks have not yet any ordnance of the more modern type for mounting in the Straits defences it is very probable that consignments of guns will arrive in the near future from Germany and Austria through Costanza.” On 10th September “warlike material from Germany traced up to date amounts to 3,000 rounds of projectiles for ‘Goben,’ battery of field guns with ammunition, several batteries of heavy howitzers. More consignments are on the way.” On 19th September “156 more mines have been sent to Roumeli Kanak on the Bosphorus. Two hundred Germans arrived at the Dardanelles on 17th September.” On 20th September “there must now be between 4,000 and 5,000 German soldiers and sailors here.” On 3rd October “the Dardanelles are closed effectively by mines . . . these mines have been laid by the Germans, and the Turks are unaware of their position.”

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So early therefore as October the Dardanelles had been made far stronger in its defences than ever they had been before. German gold, guns, men and mines (and probably also concealed torpedo tubes at the edge of the water in the Narrows whence, at a distance of half a mile, it is impossible to miss a passing ship) had rendered them, what they had never yet been, nearly impregnable.

Nevertheless sooner or later—unless an unexpected and improbable decision were reached in Flanders—it seemed probable that an attempt to force these terrible Dardanelles might be made. To do that, and therewith, as a quite inevitable consequence, to capture Constantinople, would be to turn the whole flank of our enemies; it would open up easy sea-communication with Russia; it would release a whole Russian year's crop of corn held up at Odessa and other Black Sea ports. And, although difficult, it was by no means impossible. For we now had, in such as the "Queen Elizabeth," ships which, with spotters inside the Straits, could accurately hammer the great forts of the Narrows and destroy their guns from the other, or North-Western, side of the Thracian Chersonese, now known as the Gallipoli Peninsula, and to a certainty destroy them by indirect fire over the 700 feet hills from a distance of seven to ten sea miles. The natural sequence of proceedings seemed to be, first to destroy the forts on both sides of the entrance, on Cape Greco and Kum Kale, so as to let in our ships and their spotters and correctors of range and position; next to clear away any mines between the entrance and the beginning of the Narrows at Kephez Point, ten miles up; next to hammer the formidable forts on both sides at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, three miles further up, by the indirect fire corrected from or near Kephez; and finally—but only when these forts were silenced—to search the waters for mines and the shore for torpedo-tubes. If all that was to be successfully done it could only be done on condition of simultaneously occupying, with at the very least 50,000 men, the Thracian Chersonese itself, forming the whole of the forty-mile long

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north-western shore of the Straits, but itself narrowing to less than three miles at Bulair, its extreme north-eastern end. This occupation is quite indispensable not only to secure the European side of the Straits but also to keep secure the passage of the Straits when once the Fleet has passed them, for supplies, passage and egress. All this was old enough and elementary and trite enough to those acquainted with the place and familiar with its features. And no doubt it was all thoroughly well known to and pondered by the Directors of Operations at the Admiralty. What was new was the vastly greater strength of the position so powerfully reinforced by German arts, guns and men. That was very new and most serious. But that too was (thanks to Sir Louis Mallet) well known and had been ever since October, 1914, at latest.

An attempt on the Dardanelles must however involve—as must be well known to H.M. Government—the most tremendous and far-reaching political considerations. As things stood it must mean, and indeed could only mean, that Constantinople was to be conquered by England and France with combined naval and military forces in order to be handed over to Russia. No other destiny for that marvellous and most commanding city was possible should its conquest be thus effected. With Constantinople must necessarily go the complete control of the Black Sea. And with that control in Russian hands the independence of Rumania, unable to live except by the Black Sea, must necessarily sooner or later disappear and Rumania itself become, through whatever phases and under whatever final forms, a vassal and finally a part of Russia. Rumania therefore must assuredly be wholly alienated by the mere attempt at such a conquest with such a necessary destination, from the cause of the Allies attempting it; and accordingly Rumania has long, because of the anticipation of such an attempt, held aloof from them. Moreover, so tremendous a change, once completed, must necessarily render Russia a more vastly preponderating and un-

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controllable a military power in Europe than even Germany could ever have hoped to be; whereof the whole results, not merely in Europe, but also in Asia Minor, in Persia, in Afghanistan, up to and even beyond the frontiers of India, would be of consequences so immense as must make prudent and far-seeing men hesitate long before taking an active part in bringing them about, and rather resolve to avoid as long as was possible a venture certain to lead to so tremendous an upheaval. Yet it has been begun—and begun as is now usual, and is now tamely endured—without any previous opportunity being given either to Parliament or to People of knowing what was in contemplation or of pronouncing for or against it until the forces and the credit of the country were, with incredible levity, committed to it. And it has been begun with a rejection of the indispensable condition of success for the initial step of forcing the Dardanelles—the condition of the simultaneous co-operation of an adequate army with an adequate naval force.

When, on Friday, 19th February, 1915, the attack on the Dardanelles was begun, the naval proceedings started in the order that seemed judicious. The forts at the entrance were duly destroyed, though it was observed that, after this had been done by the ships from a safe distance, as was most proper, the “demolition party” landed near Cape Greco on the European side seemed to get “the worst of it” and only got back to its boats with loss—which showed that the defence was by no means extinguished. But no army was landed in the Gallipoli Peninsula. That which should have been done with a fleet and an army was attempted with a fleet alone. After interruption by a N.E. gale blowing clear through the Straits, several of our vessels on 1st March entered the Straits with mine-sweepers and worked nearly up to Cape Kephez, while on the 5th the “Queen Elizabeth” with her big 15-inch guns began the attack on the Narrows forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr by indirect fire across the Gallipoli Peninsula at a range of 21,000 yards. Soon there seemed to be hitches. A Milan newspaper published

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a report reproduced in the German wireless news of *The Times* on Friday, 19th March, that eleven ships of the Anglo-French fleet engaged in the operations had been disabled and towed to Lemnos—now apparently made the base of operations; and the next day came a notice from the Secretary to the Admiralty—published on the 20th—with two serious statements; one that on the 16th Admiral Carden, “incapacitated by sickness,” had been replaced by Admiral de Robeck; and the other that on the 18th a general attack on the Narrows forts had resulted in (1) the sinking of the French battleship “Bouvet” by a drifting mine, (2) the sinking of H.M.S. “Irresistible,” also by a drifting mine, (3) the sinking of H.M.S. “Ocean” by “a mine,” and (4) such damage by a heavy shell to H.M.S. “Inflexible” as caused her to “require repair” and forced her to leave the Straits under escort. The British casualties were nevertheless reported as only 61 all told; yet the damage to the ships was serious. “Unfavourable weather” now again supervened; and since these mishaps occurred no other news of importance—indeed, scarcely any news at all—from the Dardanelles has been made public, though the distrust in the frankness of the Government has bred rumours of more damage than is avowed to more ships than are named—all which rumours it is a duty to dismiss without credence.

But the indispensable army was not there.

How Lord Fisher could have been either persuaded or forced, by Mr Churchill or by the Cabinet, to agree to the Fleet making its effort without an army is a serious and alarming question. The Sea-Lords, with Lord Fisher at their head, might have been confidently expected to resist and oppose, and in the last resort, strongly to protest against so dangerous an adventure. Perhaps they did. But it was done. If they did protest the fact remains concealed. And no one of them has resigned.

Why, above all, Lord Kitchener should have submitted or consented to and acquiesced in an adventure so opposed

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to all our traditions, so doubtful in itself, and involving such vast consequences to Asia as well as to Europe—this is a question the most disturbing of all. Lord Kitchener knows what it all means and what it must lead to. In a matter of such terrible import to England, to Europe, to the world, to our Army and to our Navy, we should have expected him to resist with all his power and without quarter so mad a project. He had power to do it. The country has chosen him and imposed him upon an otherwise doubted Ministry, to control it in this crisis of our fate. The whole country is behind him, ready to support him not only against Mr Churchill but against Mr Asquith and the whole Ministry if need be. He can turn any one of them out, or all of them together. He has but to declare himself. Surely he cannot have allowed himself to be overborne and put aside in this supreme question. It is on him and on no other that we all rely. If he should disappoint us, then we can have no hope left for a prudent and successful prosecution of the War. We have given him our full trust and confidence—and to him alone. We look to him alone. Surely he will not fail us at this crisis. Surely not.

But there is more. The Dardanelles require operations by land, in the occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Once occupied by an adequate land force, the peninsula is safe—safe in its own communications by sea because of the presence of dominant sea-forces, and safe also by land because the sole access to the peninsula that way is through the narrow three-mile long lines of Bulair, themselves dominated from either end by the guns of the fleet. And here comes in the very serious question whether this land work is likely to be properly and adequately done. It has not been done in due time—simultaneously with the sea work. Will it be done at all, as it should and must be done if failure is not to ensue? If it is to be done—as it should be—by Lord Kitchener and his War Office, we may all feel confident that it will be as well and efficiently done as circumstances now permit—as

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well as his land work has been done in France and in Flanders. It is the same work, of the same character and having the same needs of transport—with only this difference, that, for operations in Gallipoli the transport, while, on the one hand longer, is on the other hand much safer and more certain than that which has been so well and ably conducted between England and France. It is believed by the well-informed, that the Turks have on foot about Constantinople some 400,000 troops; if so the occupation of Gallipoli, in face of such good fighting-men as the Turks, will be no holiday jaunt but a severe task that will tax all our military capacity. The whole of the operations, including those in the Gallipoli Peninsula, may quite conceivably need 250,000 men or even more. It is an immense task. It is at any rate essentially a military business, and ought manifestly to be conducted by our great military expert Lord Kitchener. If it be left to him, then we may feel confidence that it will be done as well as may be. But if it is to be done by Mr Churchill, with Admiralty resources alone, under Admiralty management alone, and with Lord Kitchener and the War Office together excluded from it—then we cannot but recall the Worse-than-Walcheren expedition to Antwerp, and pray that no such end may overtake Gallipoli.

But far more serious and more alarming than the prospect of the military and naval operations is the political horizon thus suddenly opened up. Should these operations prove most completely successful there will still remain to be justified the tremendous political effects already indicated, which cannot be absent from the mind of all those who look as well to the consequences of acts as to the acts themselves. They are such as should have given pause to the most daring. They are such as seem to make this undertaking more full of danger for the future than can be compensated by any immediate military advantage. It needs military forces which we can ill spare. It needs the detachment of naval forces which we can ill spare. To commit

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the Fleet at such a time to operations certain to demand constant reinforcement from home, certain to take long, of an issue by no means assured, and of consequences so doubtful and so tremendous, is an act only to be excused, and even then hardly to be justified, by the most urgent and unavoidable necessity. None such is apparent. Yet unless such exists, this is the most reckless adventure yet undertaken.

The Fleet has shaken itself free from the Diplomat and is now free to use its powers. But it is still in thrall to the Politician, left to dictate to the Seaman the uses of those powers, and their employment on adventures ill conceived and worse executed. This is our greatest present danger. The remedy for it is still as apparent as the danger itself. It is to apply to the Navy the method that has succeeded with the Army—to take it out of the hands of the many-minded Politician and to commit it to those of the single-minded professional Seaman. Let us not postpone that till too late. That we must, as a People, now require. Failing that this kingdom may be lightly gambled away as the stake of personal ambitions, party interests and Caucus corruption.

London: Wednesday, 21st April, 1915.

WALCHEREN & WELLINGTON, 1809

“ **W**HILE Sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on
“ the Tagus for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two
“ other armies were simultaneously preparing to act against the
“ extremities of the French empire. The one of twelve thousand men
“ drawn from Sicily, was to invade Italy, the southern part of which
“ had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the
“ Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England,
“ where forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could boast of,
“ and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of the world
“ combined, composed an armament designed to destroy the great
“ marine establishment which the French emperor had so suddenly
“ and portentously created at Antwerp.

“ So vast an expedition had never before left the British shores,
“ neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged,
“ so calamitously conducted. The marine and land forces combined,
“ numbered more than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of
“ the bravest; the object in view was comparatively insignificant;
“ yet it was not obtained; and this ill-fated army with spirit, and
“ strength, and zeal, to have spread the fame of England to the
“ extremities of the earth perished in the pestilent marshes of
“ Walcheren. And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of
“ national honour that men were found in Parliament base enough
“ to reprobate the convention of Cintra, to sneer at Sir John Moore,
“ and to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even
“ glorious!”

(Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula*, Vol. II, Book VII, Chap. 4, p. 145. Warne & Co. 1886.)

THE WAR BY LAND

THE phase through which the war has passed since the last of these articles appeared in the **CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW** may be thus summarized:

Upon the West it has resolved itself into trench fighting of the character with which many months have already rendered us familiar. In the East it has passed through two successive developments, the first of which was the final attempt of the enemy to seize Warsaw, and the second of which (when that attempt to seize Warsaw had failed) was the struggle upon the crest of the Carpathians which still continues.

We will deal with the Eastern field first and, later, turn very briefly to the well-known problem of the Western trenches.

When the enemy had failed to take Warsaw by those strong counter-attacks upon the West which marked his action all during December and January he proposed with the beginning of February another plan.

From 2nd February to 8th February he made a peculiarly violent attack upon the Western front from the same direction, over the Rawka river, whence had come so many of these huge "battering ram" actions for six or seven weeks past. Yet this was but a feint. What he was really doing was to muster as many men as possible in the province of East Prussia, including numerous new formations composed of those hitherto untrained bodies of men whom he successively trains and puts into the field in batches of about 800,000 at a time.

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Counting these new formations and the old ones with their new drafts, he thus amassed in the first days of February something more than 400,000 and less than



600,000 men in East Prussia, and was successful in achieving what he had always successfully achieved throughout all this Eastern campaign, to wit, a concentration unperceived by the Russians. His power to do this consists in the excellence

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of his considerable network of railways, and the difficulty of air reconnaissance in that wooded country.

He had against him, nibbling at the frontier of East Prussia, a Russian force perhaps a third as large as his own. He fell upon this force and drove it out of East Prussia immediately with his superior numbers, not without obtaining at the same time a considerable local success. For while his troops were advancing in a great crescent parallel with the frontier from A to B and driving the Russians out before them, one Russian corps was caught isolated near the point C and in a military sense annihilated. Over 30,000 men were put out of action, in one way or another, in the forests before the town of Augustowo.

But this considerable local success, though heartening to the enemy, could be of no effect upon that final object by his success or failure in which this portion of the campaign must be judged. That final object was as follows.

He had failed to take Warsaw by his attacks from in front. He now proposed to come down from the North and to cut the railways behind Warsaw by an advance upon them from the East Prussian frontier, and his victory or defeat in what followed must be measured only by his ability or inability to carry out this plan successfully. It will be evident to the reader that since the enemy's whole aim in Poland is, as we saw in the last article, to possess himself of the bridges of Warsaw (the possession of which by the enemy would immobilize the Russian armies and destroy their power to attack for a long time to come), this object could be achieved just as thoroughly by cutting the railways behind the bridges as by taking the bridges from the front by direct assault.

Before, however, the enemy could get at the lines behind Warsaw he must not only defeat the Russian army, which would be moved up to protect them, but he must also pierce a defensive line elaborately prepared to prevent such an attempt from succeeding.

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This defensive line is known in military topography as the line of the Niemen and the Narew.

Of these two rivers, the River Niemen flows North and then West into the Baltic, the river Narew flows South and West into the Vistula, into which main stream it falls—after joining the Bug—just below Warsaw, at the highly fortified point of New Georgeviesk. There is a gap between the upper portions of the two streams, but it is not one through which any great force could conveniently pass, for between the guns of the two fortresses upon either side, Grodno and Ossowiecs, there are not much more than twenty-five miles of country, very marshy, broken also with forest and poorly provided with roads; while immediately behind it stands the considerable fortress of Bielostock. It was the business, then, of the invading columns of the Germans coming over the frontier of East Prussia to pierce or tear a hole in the defensive line of the Niemen and the Narew and, until they had done that, they would not have accomplished the first necessary step towards their final success. Their fortunes in the prosecution of this attempt at piercing the fortified lines of the Niemen and the Narew developed thus:

The line of the Niemen and the Narew is strengthened artificially in the following fashion. At Kovno and at Grodno upon the Niemen are fortresses of considerable strength. The intermediary point of Olita contains a permanent work. A small tributary of the Narew, the Bobr, flows through or past the town of Ossowiecs just where the railway from the Prussian frontier runs to join the main line at Bielostock, while at the end of the line of the Narew where, after having joined the Bug, the Vistula is reached is the very strong fortress of New Georgeviesk. Between the latter and Ossowiecs a whole string of minor works runs along the line of the Narew at Lomza, Ostrolenka, Rozan, Pultusk and Zegrze.

It is evident that any attempt to cut the line of the Niemen and the Narew with the object of getting at the

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railways behind Warsaw would have to throw its main weight close to the latter city. If, for instance, the main body of the enemy were directed towards Grodno, and succeeded in cutting the line there, they would have left between them and Warsaw numerous Russians who could come up against them and such a place of cutting would leave a great mass of country to be traversed before the second line was reached and cut in its turn. But if the main effort struck close to Warsaw and got across the Lower Narew then the further railways behind Warsaw would all be cut together, and the blow, struck so near the town and its approaches, would put these immediately into the possession of the enemy.

Although, therefore, the very considerable force of about half a million men, or perhaps more, which the Germans so mustered in East Prussia for this adventure had to be deployed upon a considerable front, and although, with the object of driving the Russians out of East Prussia and of occupying the Russians everywhere, the advance was made upon the whole 200 miles of a crescent from A to B, yet the great mass of the enemy had mustered in the South between Mława and Chorzele. Here were the majority of his troops. He had a second column operating with a siege train against Ossowiec, and a third which (after its victory near Augustowo) was advancing towards the neighbourhood of Grodno. But these two latter columns could effect nothing unless the first main body were successful. By the third week in February the third column had neared the Niemen, and for a few days put small bodies on to the further side of that stream, about fourteen miles north of Grodno. The second column had done no more than bombard Ossowiec without any result. It is the fate of the first body, that between Mława and Chorzele, which chiefly concerns us. And in order to appreciate what happened it is necessary to recall certain dates.

The great concentration was made, as we have seen, in the first days of February. By the 13th of that month all

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the inferior Russian forces had been driven out of East Prussia, and by the 20th the advancing Germans stretched in a victorious line from North of Suwalki to West of Mława. Between 20th February and 22nd February this advance was at its height. The column operating from Suwalki and Augustowo had reached and even passed the Niemen; the column in front of Ossowiec had bombarded that fortress, and the main force between Mława and Chorzele was getting itself ready for the great blow to be delivered against the line of the Narew river upon the railways and bridges of Warsaw.

It was upon the 23rd of February that this advance began. On the 25th the town of Przasnysz and a Russian outpost in the shape of a brigade with a score of guns were overwhelmed. But the German success went no further. Contact with the main body of the Russians was established in the night between the 25th and 26th of the month. This main body was advancing from the Narew, using among other sources of supply the railhead of Ostrolenka, and stretching from that town Westward to the Mława railway. It is interesting to note that this Russian counter-offensive, developing to repel the German attack from the North, was not more numerous than the body it had immediately to meet, and was less numerous by far than the total of that body with the reserves behind it.

It has, therefore, been something of a puzzle to understand what was the cause of the Russian success which followed. But our Allies attributed it in part to the insufficiency of the new German levies, a point which, though we only have evidence of it from those interested to believe in such an advantage, should be carefully noted in the West.

Upon the Friday, the 26th of February, the Russian lines everywhere began to establish an advantage over the German line opposed to them. By the evening of that day Przasnysz was reoccupied by the Russians after very heavy

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hand-to-hand fighting and the capture of a great number of German prisoners, and on the Saturday and the Sunday the enemy was in full retreat. The Russians, as they pursued, coming up against the great body of the large German reserves and those opportunities of supply which the excellent railway system of East Prussia gives, were unable to press their advantage. But the result, if negative, was final; and Warsaw was saved.

The battle of Przasnych, as it will come to be called, had definitely prevented the Germans from piercing the line of the Niemen and the Narew. It had saved the railways and bridges of the capital of Poland. By the 1st of March it was apparent that the whole German plan had broken down.

It is here worthy of remark that the grand strategy of the enemy would appear to fail with some regularity in the last stages of its development, and the failure at Przasnych may well be compared with the failure of von Kluck in front of Paris and with the failure of Hindenburg in front of Warsaw a month before.

It is the same story of a similar result produced by similar causes. It is the breakdown in action of the close formation. It is the suffering of overwhelming losses; and it is the apparent inability to use often superior numbers up to the end of a pre-conceived plan.

At any rate, with Warsaw once saved, by the beginning of March the interest of the War in the East was transferred at once to the Southern or Carpathian field.

The problem in this field was as follows:

An artificial frontier, drawn through the territory of Poland, separates the Austrian from the Russian Empire. Between that frontier and the Carpathian mountains lies the Plain of Galicia and at the end of it the smaller district of the Bukowina. The Carpathian mountains thus lie like a great bow which grows much higher and much broader to the South-East and much lower and much narrower to the North-West. There a curved wall protects the fertile plain of Hungary, which is a great source of food supply for

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the enemy and of horses as well, and the inhabitants of which are the least interested, politically, of all our enemies in the war.

Cracow, the rôle of which in the defence of German Silesia will be remembered from former articles in these pages, lies at the extremity of the Galician plain. Its capture would be the prelude to an immediate invasion of the German Empire. The enemy had, therefore, massed considerable numbers and entrenched himself with a numerous



artillery upon the line of the river Dunajec. The Russian army occupied Galicia and a part of the foothills of the Carpathians. But its complete control of that province, and its object of cutting away once more towards Cracow or across the mountains towards the Carpathian plain, were grievously hampered by the resistance of the great fortress of Przemyśl, the importance of which will be apparent from a glance at the sketch map given above.

In all the considerable railway system of Galicia there are but two main double lines, which may be compared to

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the cross-bar and standing upright of the letter T. The first comes in from Hungary Northwards; the second is, as it were, the backbone of Galicia and runs from Cracow through Tarnow and Lemberg to the bases in Russia itself, beyond the frontier.

The two join at Przemyśl. So long as Przemyśl and its ring of forts resisted the investment of the Russians the railway system of Galicia was not clear, and this was especially true of the lateral movement of troops from East to West. Therefore, the resistance of Przemyśl immobilized at least a quarter of a million Russians. The continued defence of the fortress gave the Austro-Germans, who were still at the beginning of March in a very considerable numerical superiority (the cause of which will be immediately alluded to) an opportunity which they were not slow to take.

The Russians were handicapped by lack of munitioning and equipment. The great numbers in reserve could not be used because winter as well as the enemy blockaded them upon every side. The alliance of Turkey with the enemy shut the Dardanelles and the warm-weather ports of the Black Sea, Archangel was frozen up until May and the use of icebreakers, at first successful, had broken down. Vladivostock, however, in the Far East, though 6,000 miles away from the front, was free from ice much earlier, and it is probable that during the month of March the first and most necessary supplies to the Russians began to come in through this source. The Austro-Germans had therefore no time to lose if they were to press to a successful conclusion their plan in this region. That plan was to relieve Przemyśl by a strong flank attack from the South-east upon the Russian army in Galicia.

It was in the course of February that this plan developed. The Austro-Germans in great numbers, with three new German army corps lent to stiffen the attack, crossed the last passes of the Carpathians next to the Roumanian border, occupied Bukowina and its capital Czernowitz,

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moved on to Kolomea (where the first railway crossing the chain—marked 6 upon the map—gave them supply) and then in increasing numbers advanced upon Stanislaw, which town they appear to have taken at much about the time when the battle of Przasnych was being fought in the North.

The capture of Stanislaw, though very important, was not decisive.

The first part of their plan involved the throwing of the Russians in this region behind the river Dneister. With a considerable body of Russians thus pinned behind the river the main Austrian mass could turn to the left directly North-westward and march up towards Przemyśl as it approached the railway between Przemyśl and Lemberg. It would more and more endanger the main line of communications of the Russians and, long before it had actually touched the main railway, the siege of Przemyśl would certainly be raised. It was high time: for the supplies of the garrison, in these closing days of February, were reduced to less than a month's rations.

With these objects in view the Austro-Germans advanced from Stanislaw towards the Dneister at Halicz. Astraddle of the Dneister at Halicz the first part of their plan would be accomplished. The Russian line along the river would have to fall behind it, and, leaving a comparatively small force to prevent its recrossing, the Austro-Germans could turn their masses North-westward and strike blow after blow up the right bank of the river, approaching nearer and nearer to Przemyśl and its railway to Lemberg.

Everything, therefore, at this moment—the last two days of February—depended upon the result of the action which developed between Stanislaw and Halicz.

It bears a curious resemblance again to Przasnych, which had been decided only a few days before. For three full days the issue seems to have hung along the line bisected by the main road between Stanislaw and Halicz. On the fourth day, the 2nd of March, the Austro-Germans began

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to give way. Upon the 4th of March Stanislau was re-occupied by the Russians, and it was apparent that the attempt here to reach Galicia had failed, just as the attempt three or four hundred miles away to the North on the frontier of East Prussia had failed.

On that day, the 4th of March, when Stanislau was re-occupied, it must have been clear to the General Staff of the enemy that Przemyśl was doomed. And in that first week of the month the garrison was probably warned that it could only hold out upon the point of honour and might surrender when lack of supplies demanded that course, since relief was now hopeless.

Przemyśl maintained its resistance as long as the Russians remained and on the 22nd March fell, not to a direct assault, but to famine.

The fall of Przemyśl, noted in the West as the first considerable "move" to strike public imagination, was indeed even more important than the general reader in the West perhaps appreciated. It not only released a quarter of a million of our Allies, but it had this effect just at the moment when the new Russian equipment and munitioning was coming in, and at the same time it cleared the whole railway system of Galicia and left it free to be used at will by the Russians.

The first effect of this event is still in progress at the moment in which these lines are written (21st April).

Whether the Russian commanders intend to make the invasion of the Hungarian plain their chief business, or whether they are only clearing their flanks here and rather intend Cracow to be their chief objective, it is upon the Carpathians that their chief efforts have been directed for the weeks since the fall of Przemyśl.

To appreciate what that objective is we must note the nature of the Carpathians generally and of their passes.

The Carpathian chain, as we have said, is lower and narrower towards its north-western and higher and broader towards its south-eastern end, which latter is also more

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deserted and covered with dense woods. The former has far better communications and more numerous sources of supply. Roughly, the effort of the next few weeks was one upon the part of the Russians to force the passes on the north-east of the chain and, on the part of the Austro-Germans, to exert all the pressure they could, from the Bukowina and the small part of the Galician Plain which they held beyond the mountains, to threaten the Russian communications, for the Russians would not dare push home their effort on the north-west.

The Russians, now in equal numbers to the enemy's, began very slowly to exercise an increasing pressure. The main-road pass, the lowest and easiest in the chain, the Dukla (1), was already in their possession with two minor road passes upon either side. A double line of railway crossing at the Lupkow pass (2) (the road also accompanying it) was, after heavy fighting, captured about three weeks after the fall of Przemyśl. Thirdly, the road pass of Ruski (3) fell. At the moment of writing the struggle continues for the possession of the Uzok pass (4). Should the latter fall into the hands of our ally everything will be favourable for their pressing down, if they choose to do so, upon the Hungarian plain.

Their chances of success in this depend not only upon their considerable and increasing numbers, but also upon the conformation of these mountains.

The valleys upon the Hungarian side converge in a curious fashion towards one narrow district. It is not even necessary to be in possession of the towns Ungvar, Munkacs and Homonna at the mouths of the valleys, or at least it is not necessary to be in possession of all of them, to turn the Austro-German positions upon the rest of the chain. The valleys, the roads and the railways dependent upon them "bunch" together so that, if the Russians reach the line A B at the beginning of the Hungarian plain, they will have made the Austro-German positions

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and all the rest of the mountains to the south and east and in the Galician plain in the Bukowina untenable.

It must be repeated that we have no opportunities for judging whether so successful a conclusion is even intended by the Russian General Staff. If the main objective should turn out to be Cracow it would be sufficient for our ally to hold the mountains firmly so as to secure himself from a danger upon his flank and to use his main masses directly westward against Cracow. But if his objective is the Hungarian Plain, as seems probable at the moment of writing, then his present position in possession of the north-western passes is a favourable one and, should the last of these, the Uzok (4), fall into his possession surely, he will have accomplished his aim.

Upon the Western front the situation is at once simpler and yet commanding a more particular attention if its character is to be justly grasped.

Here, as has too often been complained in our Press, the enemy holds a line of trenches over 500 miles in length between the Swiss mountains and the North Sea, which line has not appreciably changed for six months. At the risk of repetition it is worth the reader's while to follow the nature of the problem presented by this so-called deadlock and the methods upon which the Allies depend for the solving of it.

Such a solution, as will be seen in a moment, can only be achieved *if* the enemy cannot bring great reinforcements in men and material westward in time. If he cannot do this, the plan proposed is at once simple and decisive. Perhaps, indeed, before these lines appear the result, one way or the other may already be apparent.

As against trenches the dominant arm is the heavy piece.

Whether this heavy piece is a gun—that is, a weapon for discharging projectiles with a “throw” above the surface

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of the earth, or a howitzer—that is a weapon for tossing them up with a “lob” into the air, the various factors which render the heavy piece of such value in trench warfare remain the same. They are:

(1) The amount of high-explosive discharged. Roughly speaking, from a calibre of 100mm., or four inches upwards, you discharge a projectile the explosion of which damages earthworks and produces a very considerable moral effect upon the enemy in the trench where it falls. It must always be remembered in this connection that the power of a projectile varies not with its diameter but with the cube of its diameter. A four-inch piece does not sound much bigger than a three-inch piece. But, while the cube of 3 is only 27, the cube of 4 is 64. So that a four-inch shell does a great deal more than twice the work of a three-inch shell. When we come to the six-inch and over the effect is prodigious. Anything over six inches knocks trench work all to pieces.

(2) The invulnerability of the piece. The long range at which even a large howitzer can fire, to say nothing of a large gun, means that it cannot be reached by the enemy's rifle or field guns, while, at the same time, it has an immense arc upon which to hide itself; and again the distance over which observation must extend before it can be silenced is very great. The only thing that can destroy a heavy piece is another heavy piece; and before that other heavy piece can drop a shell accurately upon it there must be very exact air-work done to locate the object. The same is true of the work done by the big shell against trenches. To get the exact range and to drop the shell accurately upon the trenches you are dependent upon air-work.

(3) The angle at which the shell falls. The rifle bullet and even the shell of the field gun skims the surface. The shell of the heavy gun at long range, and still more the shell of the howitzer, comes down upon the ground from above. This means that when the projectile explodes it clears the trenches of their holders in a way that the smaller missiles never can.

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The object in shelling the trenches of an enemy with large shells is two-fold. The shelling destroys the entanglement in front of his trenches, and at the same time bewilders and renders incapable as well as killing and wounding their defenders. And the method of attacking trenches strongly defended is to deluge them with a concentrated rain of heavy shell which stops at a signal and is succeeded by an immediate bounding forward against the enemy of one's own men. When this has taken place the enemy is hampered in bringing up reinforcements by a further concentration of fire some way on, behind the trenches that have been rushed.

It is obvious that this method of fighting requires perfect staff work and the exact co-ordination of the infantry work with the artillery work thousands of yards behind. If there is blundering or lack of synchrony your own guns will be hurting your own men, for they are always shooting over those men. A misfortune of this kind happened after Neuve Chapelle and accounted for some proportion of the British losses.

The method of trench fighting here described *might* be used on a very large scale for the piercing of the enemy's front upon one given section. No doubt it will be so used when the time comes. But meanwhile the object of its employment during the weeks here considered has not been the breaking of the enemy's line, but the wearing of him down, the getting of his numbers heavily reduced, and the shaking of his firmness. It is a method which needs only time to be absolutely certain of success. So long as the heavy artillery on one side is really superior to that on the other, and so long as the numbers of the defence are limited, there must come a point when that defence will either break or be compelled to shorten its line.

Superiority in heavy artillery is guaranteed to the Allies by their superior munitioning, by the fact that they are subject to no blockade, perfect or imperfect, and above all by their great superiority in air-work. But the certitude,

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given time, of success on these lines, is modified by one consideration which must always be kept in view. Should some unexpected success upon the East permit the enemy to bring back very considerable numbers to the West he might break the line now containing him. And his power of doing this will depend almost entirely upon the fortunes of the Russian army.

For the rest, every effort in the West for weeks past has been of the sort we describe. The prolonged and highly successful French action in Champagne, lasting to the middle of March and costing the enemy quite 40,000 men, the succeeding British action at Neuve Chapelle which cost the enemy quite 18,000, the capture of the Hartsmannweilerkopf, and of the spur of Les Eparges, these and a hundred minor incidents all upon the same model are all examples in point. They did not push back the German line appreciably: only by a few hundred yards or, at the most, a mile or so in each case. But they were heavily expensive to the enemy, as compared with the Allies, in mere numbers; and, in morale, they were more expensive to him still.

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